Thesis (M.S. in Operations Research)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2004. / Thesis advisor(s): Gerald G. Brown. Includes bibliographical references (p. 43-44). Also available online.

The threat of biological weapons has never attracted as much public attention as in the past five years. Current concerns largely relate to the threat of weapons acquisition and use by rogue states or by terrorists. But the threat has deeper roots--it has been evident for fifty years that biological agents could be used to cause mass casualties and large-scale economic damage. Yet there has been little historical analysis of such weapons over the past half-century. "Deadly Cultures" sets out to fill this gap by analyzing the historical developments since 1945 and addressing three central issues: Why have states continued or begun programs for acquiring biological weapons? Why have states terminated biological weapons programs? How have states demonstrated that they have truly terminated their biological weapons programs? We now live in a world in which the basic knowledge needed to develop biological weapons is more widely available than ever before. "Deadly Cultures" provides the lessons from history that we urgently need in order to strengthen the long-standing prohibition of biological weapons.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--RAND Graduate School, 1991. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S.)--School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. / "June 2008." Vita. Includes bibliographical references (l. 71-82). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--George Washington University, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 353-370).

This thesis is intended to enhance our knowledge of the processes behind the relinquishing of Canada's nuclear roles. As such, the underlying factors which helped bring about this change in Canadian defence policy are to be isolated and assessed. The process of retiring Canada's nuclear roles was long and complex, involving many actors and influences. The factors examined in this thesis are looked upon in the greater context of the 1960s and 1970s. The global and domestic political climates, the strategic environment and Canada's power within the global community as a whole during this time period, are considered. This study has revealed several interesting conclusions which one may draw concerning the relinquishing of Canada's nuclear roles. First of all, the Trudeau government's position on nuclear weapons coincided with growing opposition to nuclear weapons within the Canadian public. Furthermore, it is evident that public opinion on the nuclear issue was closely related to an individual's perception of the United States and his or her position on defence spending. Secondly, the process of retiring the nuclear weapon systems was led largely by Pierre Trudeau and some of his close associates, in particular Ivan Head and Donald MacDonald. This was done in the face of intense bureaucratic resistance. Thirdly, abandoning the nuclear roles was strongly related to Canada's declining position in the global community and also to the growth of detente. In addition, it was also partly the result of a rapidly changing strategic environemnt in which weapon systems were quickly made obsolete. Perhaps most importantly, this thesis shows that relinquishing Canada's nuclear roles was an extremely important part of the 1971 defence review. The issue of nuclear weapons is one which has been largely overlooked by defence and foreign policy analysts in the past, such as Thordarson as well as Granatstein and Bothwell, and therefore merits our attention. For this thesis, telephone interviews had to be conducted because very little written material is available to the public. Regrettably, these interviews must remain confidential for the time-being. Several books, articles and public opinion surveys also were very helpful in conducting this analysis. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

An exploration of deploying non-lethal weapons in todays chaotic post cold-war world; thereby facilitating peacekeeping deployments without casualties. Dando argues a more sinister outcome could be the result.

No description available.

The military potential of nanotechnology was anticipated by its proponents from the early stages of its development, and explicit programmes for this purpose are now well established. However, the impact of nanotechnology on arms control is very unlikely to be merely additive. Instead, it threatens to undermine the arms control paradigm, for reasons explored in this paper. These include the place of nanoscience and nanotechnology as the principal enablers of technological convergence; the extension from dual-use to multiple-use dilemmas arising from new materials and processes, and their integration into economic development and competitiveness; low entry-level infrastructural requirements (already a feature of biotechnology); and a blurring of the distinction between offensive arms and capabilities likely to be viewed as threatening.

This study investigates how the PRC, during the three decades since its establishment, has responded to international politics involving arms control and disarmament (ACD) issues, and explores the essence of China's approach to concepts of arms control and disarmament. The central finding is that, despite its seeming relaxation of hostility towards international ACD activities, and the more active and flexible part it has played in them at the UN since the mid-1970s, China remains unconvinced of the value of these activities. This does not make it dangerous, irrational or immature. Chapters Two to Five provide a comprehensive account of the history of Chinese ACD policy between 1949 and 1978. Each chapter represents a distinctive period of Chinese arms control policy. Although more interested in the banning of the use, rather than the possession, of atomic weapons, the PRC behaved at first as an uncritical disciple of Soviet ACD positions (Chapter Two). During the second period (Chapter Three), China became increasingly uneasy about international ACD efforts and began to deviate from the Soviet stance. Moscow's denial of concrete assistance to China's nuclear weapons development, and the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, eventually led the PRC into a period (Chapter Four) of open hostility towards nearly all international ACD initiatives. Then, in 1964, China's first nuclear test likewise radically changed its outlook on ACD matters. The final period (Chapter Five) examines its record at the UN in this regard, showing how the PRC was persuaded to commit itself to the Tlatelolco Treaty and to the 1978 UN Special Session on Disarmament. In conclusion, however, there is no evidence to suggest that the PRC has been committed to the concept of a disarmament process through arms control which both the US and the USSR, in their very different ways, have accepted. China has participated in international ACD negotiations while not really believing in their objectives, based as these are on a permanency of two superpowers. It is to be hoped that China's increasing involvement in the UN disarmament negotiation machinery will feed back into PRC policy-making and lead to a more positive and more willing participation in these ACD negotiations.