Thesis (Ph. D.)--Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 224-240).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2007. / Thesis directed by Keir A. Lieber for the Department of Political Science. "July 2007." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 171-176).

International Telemetering Conference Proceedings / October 25-28, 1999 / Riviera Hotel and Convention Center, Las Vegas, Nevada / The arms control verification activity is executed between countries, so various telemetry data will be remote-transmitted in the public signal channel and can be easily tampered. In order to secure this data’s authenticity and integrality, the paper has established a Multi-layer Data Authentication Protocol (MDAP) in which the key cryptographic technologies are digital signature and authentication. Meanwhile, overall evaluations of MDAP have been presented. We proved the MDAP is secure.

The global trade in weaponry has created an environment in which states are now utilizing arms transfer agreements to bolster their own domestic defense industry aspirations. Previous research concerning arms transfers has suggested that a state may alter its behavior depending on its level of dependency on foreign sourced weapons. However, previous scholarship primarily examined the effect from importing arms and not the effect that military industry will have upon state behavior. Since the number of states possessing domestic defense industries has risen by 250% since 1950, it is paramount that we understand the effect of a domestic military industry on state behavior. To explore this problem, this dissertation utilizes militarized interstate dispute and arms procurement data. 3 primary independence variables are created, all of which measure military independence in different ways. These variables include, military industry presence, arms supplier diversification, and foreign dependence on military goods. The dissertation hypothesizes that the level of military independence will have an effect on the probability that a state will be involved, initiate as well as decrease dispute duration.

The United States and China have been conducting extensive operational-level engagement on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation issues for more than three decades. Many policy-makers and analysts are wondering whether such engagement has contributed to more trust in the two countries' nuclear relationship. The core question that this research seeks to address is: does operational-level engagement between the United States and China increase China's trust towards the United States in their nuclear relationship? And if so, why is this the case and how does this take place? This research distinguishes strategic trust from moralistic trust and examines the impact of operational-level engagement on helping states recognize common interests and/or common moral principles. It fills the gap in existing international relations research that does not answer the question of whether and how trust arises between states that do not imagine or understand there to be common interests or shared moral principles at the inception of engagement. The research uses three cases in the U.S.-Chinese nuclear engagement to show that interaction at the operational-level brings about convergence of perception about common interests at the top-level through building of epistemic community and enhancing bottom-up communication. However, such engagement encourages realpolitik thinking in Chinese nuclear community and therefore undermines moralistic trust between the two countries.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Are U.S. nuclear weapons still needed in Europe now that the threat that brought them there is gone? This thesis examines whether basing theater nuclear weapons in Europe is useful, irrelevant or counterproductive for maintaining European security. U.S. and NATO policymakers adhere to political and military utility arguments, while others argue TNWs in Europe are irrelevant-their utility has been supplanted by political, cultural and economic interdependence, modern conventional capabilities and the existential deterrent of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. Nonproliferation and arms control advocates argue TNWs are counterproductive because they enhance, rather than deter proliferation, undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and impede cooperation in the NATO-Russia security relationship. This thesis demonstrates how economic and political ties, including widespread participation in nuclear planning, the increasing importance of the nuclear taboo, prospects for conventional deterrence and the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella render TNWs in Europe irrelevant. Emphasizing their utility provides incentive for others to join the "nuclear club," degrades the nonproliferation regime, and creates a roadblock for NATO-Russian arms control and counterproliferation efforts. This thesis recommends withdrawing U.S. theater nuclear weapons from Europe, relying instead on a strategy of conventional deterrence and reassurance while maintaining general nuclear deterrence via strategic forces. / Major, United States Air Force

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. / Despite decades of energetic international control efforts, nuclear weapons technology continues to spread worldwide. To understand how these complex weapons programs can be developed, we assume the role of a nation seeking to build a first fission weapon, and the ability to continue to build more. We introduce a large-scale project management model that includes alternate development paths to achieve certain key technical milestones. We show how such a project can be optimally accelerated by expe-diting critical tasks. Next, we present a new analysis tool to detect vulnerabilities in such a development program: we seek optimal actions to impede, set back and/or otherwise frustrate completion of a first weapon, even if the proliferator knows what we are doing to delay things. This two-sided project evaluation tool is implemented with a combination of off-the-shelf project management software, optimization software and custom code. An illustrative case study of a first fission weapon program shows how this new analysis tool can be used. Our methods also apply to chemical, biological and/or radiological dispersion weapons, as well as to more conventional strategic industrial and commercial activities. / Lieutenant, Supply Corps, United States Navy

The question of use or non-use of nuclear weapons has suddenly got new prominence as part of the search for an effective strategy against international terrorism. This dispute is not new. Within the deterrence strategy, American and NATO nuclear weapons policy over the years shifted from massive retaliation over flexible response towards nuclearweapons only as a last resort. <br>In the multilateral framework, deliberations have focussed on positive and negative assurances for non-nuclear weapons states. The International Court of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion, considers the use of nuclear weapons as generally contrary to the rules of international law. Today, there are strong indications that the U.S. is moving towards giving nuclear weapons a war-fighting role. For future wars, the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used would grow considerably.

Deutschlands linke Mehrheit ist gespalten. In besonderem Maße betrifft dies außenpolitische Themen. Gegen den menschenfeindlichen Irrsinn von Rüstungsexporten anzugehen könnte hingegen ein einigendes Projekt werden. Die Kanzlerin hat mit ihrer zynischen Behauptung, Rüstungsexporte könnten Bestandteil von Konfliktbearbeitung sein, eine Steilvorlage geboten.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense))--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Knopf, Jeffrey. Second Reader: Davis, Zachary. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on February 1, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Nuclear terrorism, nuclear forensics, attribution, deterrence, risk of nuclear terrorism, probability of nuclear terrorism, consequences of nuclear terrorism, post-detonation response. Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-95). Also available in print.