Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Despite the political impetus for greater multilateralism in international military operations, recent coalitions including U.S. forces reflect a trend toward increasing U.S. dominance and decreasing allied participation. As the United States continues to invest in its military with research, development and acquisition budgets at least double that of any other nation, it fields technologies so advanced with respect to its allies as to leave them incompatible for combined operations. Recent coalition operations suggest that there is a close relationship between technological asymmetries created by partner contributions and the structures formed as the coalition assembles. Using Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force as case studies, this thesis identifies a systemic relationship between technological advantage and coalition dominance. As a coalition seeks to reduce aggregate risk, it relies on technologies that offer the greatest effectiveness. This reliance causes the coalition to divert combat burden to the technologically dominant partner which, in turn, imposes its operational culture. This thesis concludes that the technological transformation currently underway in the U.S. Department of Defense conflicts with U.S. political initiatives to promote greater multilateralism in combat operations by forcing allies to rely on U.S. technologies thereby creating more unilateral operations. / Outstanding Thesis

Thesis. 1978. Ph.D.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Architecture. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ROTCH. / Bibliography: leaves 202-204. / by Andrée Beaulieu-Green. / Ph.D.

The United States commands the most powerful conventional military in the world. This extraordinary advantage in conventional power should enable the United States to coerce target states without having to fire a single shot. Yet, over the past two decades, leaders of Iraq, Haiti, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Libya have dismissed U.S. threats and invited military clashes with the world's sole superpower. What explains the United States' inability to coerce many of the world's weakest targets with compellent military threats? I argue that the United States' compellent threats fail more frequently in the post-Cold War period because they are costly neither to issue nor to execute. That is, because it is not risky for the United States to issue compellent threats, and because it is relatively cheap for the United States to use military force, the threat of force does not signal to target states that the United States is highly motivated to defeat them. For this reason, a target will resist a U.S. threat that is immediately credible in the belief that the United States will apply limited force, but will not apply decisive force if the target continues to resist after the United States executes its threat. The costly compellence theory asserts that only threats that are costly for the unipole to issue and to execute will be effective in compelling target states to yield before the application of force. To illustrate this logic, I present a basic formal model of a unipole that issues a compellent threat against a weak target state. The model suggests that both unipoles that are highly motivated to prevail over targets and those that are not will behave identically in the early stages of a crisis, i.e., they are both willing to execute military threats in many equilibria. The model suggests that, under many conditions, the target cannot infer from the willingness to issue and to execute a compellent threat that the United States is highly motivated to defeat it, and consequently, it is likely to resist. I then argue that the United States has developed a model of warfare that dramatically limits the human, political, and financial costs of employing force. As the unipole, it is not costly for the United States to issue compellent threats in the post-Cold War period. The United States has also pursued many strategies that limit the costs of force: it relies on an all-volunteer military increasingly supplemented by private contractors; it has developed a force structure based on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) thesis that relies increasingly on airpower and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); it employs force in conjunction with allies who contribute money and troops to U.S. coercive campaigns; it employs deficit spending to pay for its military operations; and, it actively limits collateral damage inflicted on target states. In combination, these strategies both lower the costs of employing force and undermine the effectiveness of U.S. compellent threats. To evaluate the logic of the costly compellence theory, I present a new dataset on the United States' use of compellent threats 1945-2007. I demonstrate that the United States has employed compellent threats more frequently since the end of the Cold War, and that these threats have been less effective on average in the post-Cold War period. These observations are consistent with the logic of the costly compellence theory. I also evaluate four cases in which the United States issued compellent threats against weak opponents. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 2011 threat against Libya constitute "most-likely" cases for the costly compellence theory. The theory accurately predicts that the Soviets would concede in 1962 and that Qaddafi would resist the United States' demands in 2011. I also compare the United States' 1991 and 2003 threats against Saddam Hussein. Saddam's resistance in 1991 is consistent with the logic of costly compellence. I evaluate sources captured after the 2003 invasion of Iraq to evaluate why Saddam Hussein chose to resist the more costly threat in 2003. Finally, I argue that the United States is likely to continue its efforts to minimize the costs of employing force and to emphasize the use of technology over ground troops. My study suggests that these strategies will both enhance the ease with which the United States can employ force and decrease the effectiveness of U.S. compellent threats, because they suggest to potential targets that the United States lacks the motivation to defeat them.

“Doubtful Gains” argues that the concept of economic risk emerged in the early modern theater through performances of maritime peril staged at a moment of unprecedented growth for English venturing. Even as the hazards of global commerce became increasingly apparent, there existed no expression in English for risk, nor the inchoate logic by which early modern merchants attempted to manage their voyages’ losses. Yet my study shows that oceanic hazards are repeatedly worked over in “maritime drama,” an under-recognized cross-section of plays concerned with the sea, staged between the founding of the Levant Company in 1592 and the end of the Jacobean era in 1625. While the prevailing scholarly narrative has limited early modern uncertainty to inscrutable forms of “chance,” “accident,” and religious “providence,” my study shows how otherwise fragmentary knowledge was ordered in performance, implicating theater audiences in the management of new forms of uncertainty. Recovering the emergence of risk on the early modern stage has demanded not only the analysis of a new corpus of maritime drama, but a sophisticated account of economic history constructed from the archives of English joint-stock companies and attentive to the anachronism of modern risk theory. Shakespeare’s plays, at the center of my study, are complemented by the work of Christopher Marlowe, Ben Jonson, John Fletcher, Phillip Massinger, William Haughton, and Robert Daborne, as well as a diverse collection of prose texts. I draw on pamphlets of mercantile policy, voyage journals, and charters, and a specialized archive of financial and navigational records. Constructing an archive of plays and prose that engage with an increasingly commercial global ocean, I argue that theatrical representations of maritime hazard precipitated a new discourse of risk in early modern England. Each of my four chapters shows how the theater helped shape one of those forms, which I term “maritime risks.” Scenes of shipwreck, piracy, enslavement, and news connected English venturing to economic vulnerability in increasingly systematic ways, helping to develop the logic of uncertainty which would come to be codified as economic risk. Shipwreck scenes in The Comedy of Errors, Eastward Ho, and The Tempest exemplify the period’s most typical hazard, demonstrating how spectators of shipwreck are central to reproducing the risk of disaster at sea. Encounters with pirates in 2 Henry VI, Hamlet, and Daborne’s A Christian Turn’d Turke establish risk within the many forms of negotiation demanded by early modern ventures, and the enslavement of Ithamore in Marlowe’s Jew of Malta launches my analysis of the risk to human agency posed by the sex trade in Shakespeare’s Pericles, Prince of Tyre. Finally, I address news of financial loss in Merchant of Venice and Haughton’s Englishmen for My Money, showing how risk manifests through the unreliability of staged merchant correspondence. The notion of maritime risk that emerges from these plays builds on contemporary oceanic studies while also recovering the inter-determination of oceanic space and economic reasoning everywhere evident on the early modern stage.

Texte remanié et augmenté de: Doct. diss. / Bibliogr. p. 427-442. Index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rutgers University, 2009. / "Graduate Program in Art History." Includes bibliographical references (p. 304-331).

Thesis (M. A. in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense))--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): McMaster, Michael T. ; Dahl, Erik. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 27, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Homeland defense, Homeland Security, maritime homeland defense, Maritime Homeland Security, joint, Navy, command and control, Northern Command, NORTHCOM, defense support of civil authorities. Includes bibliographical references (p. 69-74). Also available in print.

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, AY 1997-1998. / "March 2004." Includes bibliographical references. Full text document available on public STINET.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2004. / Thesis advisor(s): Hy Rothstein. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis (M.S. in Leadership and Human Resource Development)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): Alice Crawford, Gail Fann Thomas. Includes bibliographical references (p. 71-72). Also available online.