The United States commands the most powerful conventional military in the world. This extraordinary advantage in conventional power should enable the United States to coerce target states without having to fire a single shot. Yet, over the past two decades, leaders of Iraq, Haiti, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Libya have dismissed U.S. threats and invited military clashes with the world's sole superpower. What explains the United States' inability to coerce many of the world's weakest targets with compellent military threats? I argue that the United States' compellent threats fail more frequently in the post-Cold War period because they are costly neither to issue nor to execute. That is, because it is not risky for the United States to issue compellent threats, and because it is relatively cheap for the United States to use military force, the threat of force does not signal to target states that the United States is highly motivated to defeat them. For this reason, a target will resist a U.S. threat that is immediately credible in the belief that the United States will apply limited force, but will not apply decisive force if the target continues to resist after the United States executes its threat. The costly compellence theory asserts that only threats that are costly for the unipole to issue and to execute will be effective in compelling target states to yield before the application of force. To illustrate this logic, I present a basic formal model of a unipole that issues a compellent threat against a weak target state. The model suggests that both unipoles that are highly motivated to prevail over targets and those that are not will behave identically in the early stages of a crisis, i.e., they are both willing to execute military threats in many equilibria. The model suggests that, under many conditions, the target cannot infer from the willingness to issue and to execute a compellent threat that the United States is highly motivated to defeat it, and consequently, it is likely to resist. I then argue that the United States has developed a model of warfare that dramatically limits the human, political, and financial costs of employing force. As the unipole, it is not costly for the United States to issue compellent threats in the post-Cold War period. The United States has also pursued many strategies that limit the costs of force: it relies on an all-volunteer military increasingly supplemented by private contractors; it has developed a force structure based on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) thesis that relies increasingly on airpower and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); it employs force in conjunction with allies who contribute money and troops to U.S. coercive campaigns; it employs deficit spending to pay for its military operations; and, it actively limits collateral damage inflicted on target states. In combination, these strategies both lower the costs of employing force and undermine the effectiveness of U.S. compellent threats. To evaluate the logic of the costly compellence theory, I present a new dataset on the United States' use of compellent threats 1945-2007. I demonstrate that the United States has employed compellent threats more frequently since the end of the Cold War, and that these threats have been less effective on average in the post-Cold War period. These observations are consistent with the logic of the costly compellence theory. I also evaluate four cases in which the United States issued compellent threats against weak opponents. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 2011 threat against Libya constitute "most-likely" cases for the costly compellence theory. The theory accurately predicts that the Soviets would concede in 1962 and that Qaddafi would resist the United States' demands in 2011. I also compare the United States' 1991 and 2003 threats against Saddam Hussein. Saddam's resistance in 1991 is consistent with the logic of costly compellence. I evaluate sources captured after the 2003 invasion of Iraq to evaluate why Saddam Hussein chose to resist the more costly threat in 2003. Finally, I argue that the United States is likely to continue its efforts to minimize the costs of employing force and to emphasize the use of technology over ground troops. My study suggests that these strategies will both enhance the ease with which the United States can employ force and decrease the effectiveness of U.S. compellent threats, because they suggest to potential targets that the United States lacks the motivation to defeat them.

Previous historiography on late Qing naval technology has been geared toward locating the root causes of the Qing’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Pushing back against this teleological view of late Qing naval development, this dissertation underscores the global, multidirectional, and highly contingent processes undergirding the Qing’s naval rebuilding project in the late nineteenth century. Starting from the 1860s, the Qing empire strove to reassert itself as a competitive naval power by establishing new dockyards and arsenals; procuring arms, warships, and machineries from abroad; as well as dispatching educational missions to European naval schools, technical institutes, factories, and shipyards. The Chinese diplomats and students that the Qing sent overseas served as transnational agents who cultivated close-knit networks with Western diplomats, merchants, shipbuilders, military officers, and arms manufacturers. These networks formed the basis upon which the Qing navigated a global marketplace of warships and armaments spanning Asia, Europe, and the Americas. Tracing the personal, material, and institutional networks connecting late Qing China to the world’s naval technology reveals how the Qing engaged actively in a global regime of arms production and arms trading. This regime, driven by the transnational sourcing of raw materials and the export-oriented tendencies of Western arms manufacturers, gave rise to a shared, decentralized, and surprisingly open terrain of material circulation and technological transmission. It produced highly fluid circuits of military industrial products and knowledge that blurred the boundaries between the arms race and the arms trade, secrecy and openness, competition and collaboration. This dissertation shows how the Qing tapped into these tensions through intertwining networks of trade and diplomacy. It also shows how the material and logistical processes underlying the importation of warships, machineries, and shipbuilding components constituted crucial channels for the transfer of naval engineering knowledge from the West to China.

This diplomatic and military history offers a new interpretation of the origins of the three fighting fronts during the final phase of the Cold War in Angola, Central America, and Afghanistan. Vaguely remembered today as proxy wars on the periphery, in fact, these were protracted revolutionary civil wars and regional contests for the balance of power in which millions died, while at the same time they were central to global superpower confrontation. Analysis focuses on the strategy and policy of the United States. The chronology from 1975 to 1982 covers the Ford administration's covert action intervention in the Angolan Civil War, which came to grief at the hands of Cuban troops; Jimmy Carter's effort to conduct foreign policy based on principles, which ran foul of power considerations in Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Afghanistan; and Ronald Reagan's embrace of these wars early in his first term as part of the revival of U.S. strength in its competition with the Soviet Union. The principal argument is that, while generally undervalued as controversial small wars of dubious significance, these wars were in fact integral to U.S. experience of limited war during the Cold War following victory in World War II. In strategic terms, the main conclusion is that the U.S. restricted itself to conducting economy of force contingency operations in Angola, Central America, and Afghanistan as a result of its costly struggles in Korea and Vietnam. Despite declaring these peripheral wars to be central to the Cold War, avoiding the costs of involving U.S forces directly in Third World conflicts and minimizing the risks of escalation with the Soviet Union were overriding political and military imperatives.

Thesis (MMil (Military Strategy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Military intervention remains controversial when it happens, as well as when it fails to. Since the end of the Cold War, military intervention has attracted much scholarly interest, and it was demonstrated that several instances of the use of force or the threat to use force without Security Council endorsement were acceptable and necessary. Matters of national sovereignty are the fundamental principle on which the international order was founded since the Treaty of Westphalia. Territorial integrity of states and non-interference in their domestic affairs, remain the foundation of international law, codified by the United Nations Charter, and one of the international community’s decisive factors in choosing between action and non-intervention. Nonetheless, since the end of the Cold War matters of sovereignty and non-interference have been challenged by the emergent human rights discourse amidst genocide and war crimes. The aim of this study is to explain the extent to which military intervention in Africa has evolved since the end of the Cold War, in terms of theory, practice and how it unfolded upon the African continent. This will be achieved, by focusing on both successful and unsuccessful cases of military intervention in Africa. The unsuccessful cases being Somalia in 1992, Rwanda in 1994, and Darfur in 2003; and the successful cases being Sierra Leone in 2000 and the Comoros in 2008. The objective of this study is fourfold: firstly it seeks to examine the theoretical developments underpinning military intervention after the end of the Cold War; secondly, to describe the evolution of military intervention from a unilateral realist to a more multilateral idealist profile; thirdly, to demarcate the involvement in military intervention in Africa by states as well as organisations such as the AU and the UN and finally, discerning the contributions and the dilemmas presented by interventions in African conflicts and how Africa can emerge and benefit from military interventions. The intervention in Somalia produced a litmus test for post-Cold War interventions and the departure point for their ensuing evolution. Rwanda ensued after Somalia, illustrating the disinclination to intervene that featured during this episode. Darfur marked the keenness of the AU to intervene in contrast with the ensuing debates at the Security Council over naming the crime whether or not “genocide” was unfolding in Darfur. Positively though, the intervention by Britain in Sierra Leone and the AU intervention in the Comoros are clear illustrations of how those intervening, were articulate in what they intend to do and their subsequent success. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Militêre intervensie, of die afwesigheid daarvan wanneer nodig, bly ‘n twispunt binne internasionale verhoudinge. Namate die impak van die Koue Oorlog begin vervaag het, het militêre intervensie besonder prominent in die literatuur begin figureer en is soms so dringend geag dat dit soms sonder die goedkeuring van die Veiligheidsraad van die Verenigde Nasies (VN) kon plaasvind. Aspekte van nasionale soewereiniteit bly nietemin ‘n grondbeginsel van die internasionale orde soos dit sedert die Verdrag van Wesfale beslag gevind het. Territoriale integriteit van state en die beginsel van geen-inmenging in die binnelandse aangeleenthede van ‘n staat nie bly ook ‘n grondslag van die Internasionale Reg soos deur die VN erken word en dit rig steeds standpunte van die internasionale gemeenskap vir of teen intervensie. Sedert die einde van die Koue Oorlog het soewereiniteit en beginsel van geen-intervensie egter toenemende druk ervaar met groeiende klem op menseregte midde in ‘n opkomende diskoers oor volksmoord en oorlogsmisdade. Die klem van hierdie studie val op militêre intervensie en veral hoe dit na die Koue Oorlog ontvou het in terme van teorie en praktyk, in die besonder op die Afrikakontinent. Die bespreking wentel om suksesvolle en onsuksesvolle gevalle van militêre intervensie in Afrika. Die onsuksesvolle gevalle wat bespreek word is Somalië (1992), Rwanda (1994), en Darfur (2003). Die meer suksesvolle gevalle wat bespreek word is Sierra Leone (2000) en die Komoro Eilande in (2008). Die studie omvat vier aspekte van bespreking: eerstens, die teoretiese ontwikkelinge wat militêre intervensie na die Koue Oorlog onderlê, tweedens, die ewolusie van militêre intervensie vanaf ‘n eensydige realisme tot ‘n meer multilaterale idealistiese verskynsel, derdens, die betrokkenheid in militêre intervensie in Afrika deur state en organisasies soos die VN en Afrika-Unie (AU) en laastens, die bydraes en dilemmas van intervensies in Afrika. Die betrokkenheid in Somalië was ‘n kritieke toets vir intervensies na die Koue Oorlog en het baie stukrag verleen aan die daaropvolgende debat. Rwanda het die huiwerigheid ontbloot om in te gryp waar dit werklik nodig was. Darfur vertoon weer die gewilligheid van die AU om in te gryp in weerwil van lang debatte in die VN oor volksmoord en die gebeure in Darfur. Aan die positiewe kant figureer die Britse optredes in Sierra Leone en optredes deur ‘n AU-mag in die Komoro Eilande as gevalle wat toon hoe die vasberadenheid van partye om in te gryp en bedreigings in die kiem te smoor, suksesvolle militêre intervensies kan bevorder.

Thesis (MMil)-- Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Germany’s declaration of war on Poland on 1 September 1939 and the consequent war in Europe not only found the Union of South Africa politically divided but militarily unprepared to fight a modern war let alone make any worthwhile contribution toward its European allies’ war effort. The task of getting South Africa into the fight fell to newly appointed Prime Minister J.C. Smuts who cleverly outmanoeuvred J.B.M. Hertzog as leader of the nation. Not only was the Union Defence Force (UDF) severely ravaged by several budget cuts during and after the depression but it seemed to have no inclination of embracing the kind of mechanisation that was the hallmark of most European armies. Within the space of a year Smuts managed to transform the UDF and on 17 July 1940 the 1st South African Infantry Brigade set sail for East Africa where Mussolini’s Italians reigned supreme after brushing aside a couple of British border guards and laying claim to a few miles of British territory. One of the units dispatched by Smuts was the 1st Royal Natal Carbineers from Pietermaritzburg in Natal. Throughout the campaign the Regiment’s C Company fought with distinction but had the dubious honour of being the South African unit that suffered the most casualties during the whole campaign. Several of C Company’s men then become the vehicles through which the remainder of the war is experienced as the men were moved from one theatre of battle to another. Through their eyes the hunting trips into the East African bush and the death of their Commanding Officer, among other things, are relived. The victorious Springboks are then sent to Egypt where they were needed in an effort to break the deadlock that existed between the British 8th Army and the German Afrika Korps. Amidst the ebb and flow of the battle the men of C Company still found time to experience the sights and sounds of Africa’s most populous cities, Cairo and Alexandria. Here many young soldiers were exposed to pleasures and pastimes not to be had back in the Union. In spite of the eventual defeat of the German forces North Africa C Company witnessed the destruction of the 5th South African Brigade at Sidi Rezegh and suffered the loss of a combined platoon when Tobruk capitulated on 21 June 1942. After a brief period on home leave in 1943 C Company was back in action, this time in Italy as part of the 6th South African Armoured Division. Here they faced mountains, heavy snow and an enemy desperately fighting for every hill, stream and building. In the months which followed C Company were often in the midst of the action and many men lost close friends on the slopes of the Italian mountains. As final victory became apparent during the first months of 1945, C Company’s men began preparing for their post-war lives and when the first planes and ships left for the union at the end of April 1945 the men felt that they have served their country well and did their regiment proud. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Ten tyde van Duitsland se oorlogsverklaring Pole op 1 September 1939 wat die weg gebaan het het vir die gevolglike oorlog in Europa was die Unie van Suid-Afrika nie net polities verdeel nie maar ook militêr onvoorbereid op 'n moderne oorlog. Die kans dat Suid Afrika n beduidende bydrae tot sy Europese bondgenote se oorlogspoging sou kon maak was ook skraal. Die taak om Suid-Afrika voor te berei vir die komende stryd het op die skouers van die nuutaangestelde premier J.C. Smuts gerus wat deur middel van politieke manuvrering vir J.B.M. Hertzog uitoorlê het as leier van die volk. Nie net was die Unie Verdedigings Mag (UVM) erg uitgemergel deur verskeie besnoeings in sy begroting tydens en ná die depressie nie, maar daar was klaarblyklik geen begrip vir die proses van meganisasie gehad waarmee die meeste Europese weermagte doenig was nie. Binne die bestek van 'n jaar het Smuts daarin geslaag om die UVM te transformeer en op 17 Julie 1940 seil die 1ste Suid-Afrikaanse Infanterie Brigade Oos-Afrika toe waar Mussolini se magte die kruin van die golf ry nadat hulle ‘n paar Britse grensposte eenkant toe gevee het en 'n paar myl Britse grondgebied beset het. Die 1st Royal Natal Carbineers van Pietermaritzburg was een van die eenhede wat in Oos Afrika teen die Italianers sou veg. Tydens die veldtog veg die Regiment met onderskeiding, maar verwerf ook die twyfelagtige eer om die Suid-Afrikaanse eenheid te wees wat die meeste ongevalle gely het gedurende die hele veldtog. Verskeie van C Kompanie se manne word gebruik as ‘n lens waardeur die res van die oorlog ervaar word soos die troepe van een front na die ander verskuif word. Deur middel van hul wedervaringe word, onder andere, die jagtogte in die Oos-Afrikaanse bos en die dood van hul bevelvoerder herleef. Na Oos-Afrika word die seëvierende Springbokke na Egipte gestuur waar hulle benodig word om die Britse 8ste Leër by te staan in in die stryd teen die Duitse Afrika Korps. Te midde van die stryd kom die manne van C Kompanie nog tyd vind om Afrika se mees digbevolkte stede, Kaïro en Alexandrië te besoek waar baie jong soldate blootgestel is aan genot en tydverdryf wat nie beskikbaar was in die Unie nie. Ten spyte van die uiteindelike nederlaag van die Duitse magte in Noord-Afrika was C Kompanie teenwoordig tydens die vernietiging van die 5de Suid-Afrikaanse Brigade by Sidi Rezegh en ervaar ook die verlies van 'n gekombineerde peloton toe Tobruk oorgegee op 21 Junie 1942. Na 'n kort tydperk in Suid Afrika is C Kompanie terug in aksie, hierdie keer in Italië as deel van die 6de Suid-Afrikaanse Pantserdivisie. Hier word hulle gekonfronteer deur berge, swaar sneeu en 'n vyand wat desperaat veg vir elke heuwel, stroom en bouval. In die daaropvolgende maande bevind C Kompanie hom dikwels te midde van die aksie sterf vele goeie vriende teen die hange van die Italiaanse bergreekse. Namate dit duidelik begin raak dat die Duitsers die oorlog gaan verloor begin C Kompanie se manne hulself voorberei vir hul na-oorlogse lewens. Met die vertrek van die eerste vliegtuie en skepe na die Unie teen die einde van April 1945 was die manne van Natal oortuig daarvan dat hulle hul land na die beste van hulle vermoë gedien het en dat hulle die goeie naam van hulle regiment gestand gedoen het.

Thesis (MPhil (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2008. / The primary goal of this thesis is to explore, analyse and apply the New War theory to the West African case of Sierra Leone. The motivation for conducting a study of this nature was that much literature exists on the assumption that the Sierra Leonean conflict equates to a resource war. This research project attempts to bridge the gap between the New War schools of thought and those who maintain a resource war approach. Although Kaldor’s (2006) work on New Wars is significant, she does not place much emphasis on Africa. In order to supplement this, William Reno (2001) and Paul Collier (2000) have also been studied. Both write about Africa. The RUF virtually razed the Sierra Leonean society to the ground. The overtly violent methods employed were dissimilar to the interstate and intrastate wars of the past. Blatant exploitation of the country’s mineral wealth aggravated the situation. In attempting to reach a relevant finding, this study is divided into distinctive sections. Chapter two documents the theoretical background. The writings of Kaldor (2006), Reno (2001) and Collier (2000) are explored and applied. The third chapter investigates the factors in the conflict. Issues such as the resource factor (diamonds) and poverty are discussed; the failed state in Sierra Leone; criminal networks; social conditions; arms; and the role of youth and children. The general finding of this chapter indicates that Sierra Leone fits this model. Chapter four describes and analyses the actors. Identity was not an issue in the Sierra Leone war; thus a large part of Kaldor’s theory becomes redundant. In the final assessment the study establishes what Sierra Leone’s position is: New War or merely resource war? The bulk of the applied theory proved to be applicable to this case; but the study also acknowledges the mistaken views regarding Kaldor’s identity theories. Collier and Reno’s works prove to be significantly more relevant. This study was able to determine that Sierra Leone was indeed an example of New Wars, albeit considerably affected and influenced by greed.

Text in Afrikaans / Die twee boeke waarin J.J. Collyer die kampanjes in Duits Suidwes-Afrika (Namibie) en Duits Oos-Afrika (Tanzanie) beskryf, bevat enkele kennis stellings wat vandag nog bruikbaar is. Collyer verduidelik dat militere foute van die verlede histories deur die staf ontleed moet word om sodanige foute in die toekoms te vermy. Hy gaan egter verder en verduidelik dat die moontlikheid om toekomsti.ge optrede te verbeter nodig is om onnodige bloedvergieting te verhoed. Hierdie verhandeling het ten doel gehad om die laaste stelling van Collyer te ondersoek en te bepaal of dit wel in Suid-Afrika toegepas is. Die navorsingsprobleem van die verhandeling was om te bepaal ofKrygsgeskiedenis aangewend is om die militere doktrine in Suid-Afrika mee te verbeter. Die bevinding van die verhandeling was dat daar slegs in enkele gevalle deur die SuidAfrikaanse Nasionale Weermag (en sy voorgangers) wel van Krygsgeskiedenis gebruik gemaak was om doktrine mee te ontwikkel en dat baie meer gedoen behoort te word. / The two books of 1.1. Collyer which discuss the campaigns in German South West Africa (Namibia) and German East Africa (Tanzania) contain knowledge propositions that are still valid today. Collyer explains that the military mistakes that were made in the past should be analysed especially by the staff today to prevent making the same mistakes in the future. He goes on to explain that future conduct should be improved in order to prevent unnecessary bloodshed. This dissertation's aim was to investigate Collyer's proposition and to determine whether this was applied in South Africa. The research problem of the dissertation was to determine whether Military History was utilised to improve South Africa's military doctrine. The finding of the dissertation was that the South African National Defence Force (and its predecessors) utilised Military History only in very few cases to develop doctrine and that much remains to be done. / Political Sciences

Text in Afrikaans / Die twee boeke waarin J.J. Collyer die kampanjes in Duits Suidwes-Afrika (Namibie) en Duits Oos-Afrika (Tanzanie) beskryf, bevat enkele kennis stellings wat vandag nog bruikbaar is. Collyer verduidelik dat militere foute van die verlede histories deur die staf ontleed moet word om sodanige foute in die toekoms te vermy. Hy gaan egter verder en verduidelik dat die moontlikheid om toekomsti.ge optrede te verbeter nodig is om onnodige bloedvergieting te verhoed. Hierdie verhandeling het ten doel gehad om die laaste stelling van Collyer te ondersoek en te bepaal of dit wel in Suid-Afrika toegepas is. Die navorsingsprobleem van die verhandeling was om te bepaal ofKrygsgeskiedenis aangewend is om die militere doktrine in Suid-Afrika mee te verbeter. Die bevinding van die verhandeling was dat daar slegs in enkele gevalle deur die SuidAfrikaanse Nasionale Weermag (en sy voorgangers) wel van Krygsgeskiedenis gebruik gemaak was om doktrine mee te ontwikkel en dat baie meer gedoen behoort te word. / The two books of 1.1. Collyer which discuss the campaigns in German South West Africa (Namibia) and German East Africa (Tanzania) contain knowledge propositions that are still valid today. Collyer explains that the military mistakes that were made in the past should be analysed especially by the staff today to prevent making the same mistakes in the future. He goes on to explain that future conduct should be improved in order to prevent unnecessary bloodshed. This dissertation's aim was to investigate Collyer's proposition and to determine whether this was applied in South Africa. The research problem of the dissertation was to determine whether Military History was utilised to improve South Africa's military doctrine. The finding of the dissertation was that the South African National Defence Force (and its predecessors) utilised Military History only in very few cases to develop doctrine and that much remains to be done. / Political Sciences