Thesis (MMil (Security and Africa Studies))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / The purpose of this study is to investigate the cause(s), the nature, and characteristics of the conflict in Burundi, and 10 explore the conditions for sustainable peace and prospects for peace. The study is intended as a descriptive analysis of conflict and peace in a case study of Burundi. Since independence in 1962, intermittent conflict has characterised the state of Burundi. There are various accounts of the conflict, of which a popular, but superficial, relates an 'ethnic' conflict between Hutus and Tutsis. Equally disparate, is the prescription of solutions, the most dominant of which is power sharing based on ethnic quotas. The conflict is played out in the context of a failing state with sharp structural weaknesses. In addition, Burundi is mired in the wider instabilities of the Great Lakes region and the communicable effects thereof. The study breaks away from the tendency to analyse only the current (since 1993) bout of conflict. It is proposed that the various incidences of conflict mark different phases in the life cycle of a single conflict. The study also breaks away from the tendency to view the conflict as only opposing Hutus and Tutsis. These two tendencies in analysis generate serious distortions and omissions and may account for the wrong conclusions regarding the conflict in Burundi. Another contribution of the study resides with the proposal of the necessary and sufficient conditions for peace in Burundi. The contention brought forward by this study is that exclusion would appear to be the strongest theoretical approach to understand and describe the conflict in Burundi. In this regard, one particular contentious issue has remained constant throughout all the incidences of conflict involving different groups. The central issue has been about the political economy of Burundi that has systematically denied social mobility for the 'other'. The Burundian state is a repository of political, economic and social security where the 'other', defined in ethnic, intra-ethnic, clanic, regional, elitist (and historically dynastic) terms, is excluded and subordinated. Exclusion (and the consequent inequalities and injustices) is a source of acute grievance and motivation for collective violence. The resultant conflict has manifested in a struggle for the control of the state. Inter alia, the conflict has been pemicious, genocidal, protracted and intractable. The notion of institutionalised power sharing, based on ethnic quotas, has been put forward by the actors in the peace process as the fundamental principle guiding the search for a solution to the conflict in Burundi. The study concludes that power sharing may be necessary, as a confidence building measure, however, power Sharing in itself is not a sufficient condition for sustainable peace, and may well in fulure prove to be Ihe weakest link in the peace process. Inter alia, the conditions in Burundi are not amenable to institutionalised power sharing as such, e.g. the presence of an overwhelming majority, and deep socio-economic inequality along ethnic lines. Further, the current power sharing structure in Burundi tilts the democratic framework in favour of Tutsi participation and security, awards the Tutsi with a de facto veto power, fixes the ethnic balance of power, and thus perpetuates conflict generating Tutsi domination of the political economy of Burundi. This study proposes the reconstruction of the state (state building) as a necessary precondition for peace. II is concluded that political representation, economic opportunity and social mobility, must transcend social categories in Burundi. The continuing instabilities in the Great Lakes region are also a point of concem. Thus, peace in Burundi is also contingent upon greater efforts to curb the communicable conflicts in this region.

Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Since the beginning of naval power, navies have been used by their states as instruments of foreign policy. In South Africa, the political transition since 1994 originated the evolution of the country’s foreign policy. Accordingly, foreign policy has implications for the South African Navy (SAN). Traditionally, navies have three main roles, namely: military, policing and diplomatic, roles. This study only focuses on the diplomatic role of the navy, termed naval diplomacy. In this regard, the SAN is the custodian of South African naval diplomacy. The purpose of this study is to investigate and theoretically appraise the nature and scope of South African naval diplomacy since 1994. The study has two objectives: firstly, it seeks to outline the most salient features of South Africa’s foreign policy, post-1994, as the framework for naval diplomacy; and secondly, it seeks to analyse and describe how the SAN has utilised naval diplomacy, namely: maritime coercion, naval cooperation, international maritime assistance, and international conflict resolution and management, in pursuit of South Africa’s foreign policy objectives. The research methodology is a qualitative descriptive analysis, using a literature study, factual data sources, and interviews, as techniques. Both primary and secondary sources are consulted. This study makes an original contribution to the gap in the literature on South African naval diplomacy. In this regard, with the procurement of the recent ships and submarines, South African naval diplomatic capabilities have improved significantly. It is for this reason that the SAN is currently instrumental in maritime coercion in the region, particularly deterrence against piracy and other maritime insecurity issues. The SAN is also immensely involved in naval cooperation. In terms of international maritime assistance, the SAN does not only assist other countries in search and rescue missions, but also empower them. It also plays a vital and evolving role in international conflict resolution and management. The, however, SAN faces several hindrances including ageing equipment and ships (such as strike craft and hydrographic survey vessel); lack of patrol vessels and sea lift capability; loss of skilled personnel; and other challenges. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Sedert die ontstaan van vlootmagte het state vlote as buitelandse beleidsinstrumente aangewend. Die politieke oorgang in Suid-Afrika in 1994 het tot ʼn evolusie in die land se buitelandse beleid aanleiding gegee, wat ook gevolge vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Vloot (SAV) ingehou het. Tradisioneel het vlote drie hooffunksies, naamlik ʼn militêre, ʼn polisiëring en ʼn diplomatieke funksie. Hierdie studie fokus slegs op die diplomatieke funksie van die vloot, waarna verwys word as vlootdiplomasie, en die SAV se rol as die ‘bewaarder’ van Suid-Afrikaanse vlootdiplomasie. Die doel van hierdie studie is om ondersoek in te stel na die aard en omvang van Suid-Afrikaanse vlootdiplomasie sedert 1994 en dit aan die hand van relevante teoretiese beginsels te beoordeel. Hieruit voortspruitend is twee doelwitte: eerstens om die wesenskenmerke van Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid na 1994 as raamwerk vir vlootdiplomasie te gebruik; en tweedens om die wyse waarop vlootdiplomasie ter ondersteuning van Suid-Afrikaanse buitelandse beleidsdoelwitte aangewend is, te beskryf en te ontleed met spesifieke verwysing na maritieme dwang, samewerking tussen vlootmagte, internasionale maritieme hulpverlening, en internasionale konflikresolusie. Die navorsingsmetodologie is 'n kwalitatiewe beskrywende ontleding, gegrond op 'n literatuurstudie, feitlike bronne, en onderhoude. Beide primêre en sekondêre bronne is in die proses geraadpleeg. Hierdie studie is 'n oorspronklike bydrae om die leemte in die literatuur oor die Suid-Afrikaanse vlootdiplomasie aan te spreek. Na die onlangse aanskaffing van nuwe skepe en duikbote, het die SAV se diplomatieke vermoëns aansienlik verbeter. Die gevolg is dat die SAV tans ʼn wesenlike bydrae met betrekking tot maritieme dwang in die streek speel, veral wat teen-seerowery en ander maritieme veiligheidsbedreigings betref. Die SAV is ook baie betrokke in maritieme samewerking. Wat internasionale maritieme hulp betref, het die SAV ander lande met soek en reddingsoperasies bygestaan en ook bemagtig. Die SAV lewer ook ‘n groeiende bydrae tot internasionale konflikresolusie en bestuur. Maar die SAV staar ook verskeie uitdagings in die gesig wat die volgende insluit: verouderde toerusting en skepe (soos aanvalsvaartuie en die hidrografiese opmetingskip); 'n gebrek aan patrollievaartuie en 'n see-verplasingsvermoë; verlies van opgeleide personeel, en verskeie ander uitdagings.

Thesis (MMil (Military Strategy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Military intervention remains controversial when it happens, as well as when it fails to. Since the end of the Cold War, military intervention has attracted much scholarly interest, and it was demonstrated that several instances of the use of force or the threat to use force without Security Council endorsement were acceptable and necessary. Matters of national sovereignty are the fundamental principle on which the international order was founded since the Treaty of Westphalia. Territorial integrity of states and non-interference in their domestic affairs, remain the foundation of international law, codified by the United Nations Charter, and one of the international community’s decisive factors in choosing between action and non-intervention. Nonetheless, since the end of the Cold War matters of sovereignty and non-interference have been challenged by the emergent human rights discourse amidst genocide and war crimes. The aim of this study is to explain the extent to which military intervention in Africa has evolved since the end of the Cold War, in terms of theory, practice and how it unfolded upon the African continent. This will be achieved, by focusing on both successful and unsuccessful cases of military intervention in Africa. The unsuccessful cases being Somalia in 1992, Rwanda in 1994, and Darfur in 2003; and the successful cases being Sierra Leone in 2000 and the Comoros in 2008. The objective of this study is fourfold: firstly it seeks to examine the theoretical developments underpinning military intervention after the end of the Cold War; secondly, to describe the evolution of military intervention from a unilateral realist to a more multilateral idealist profile; thirdly, to demarcate the involvement in military intervention in Africa by states as well as organisations such as the AU and the UN and finally, discerning the contributions and the dilemmas presented by interventions in African conflicts and how Africa can emerge and benefit from military interventions. The intervention in Somalia produced a litmus test for post-Cold War interventions and the departure point for their ensuing evolution. Rwanda ensued after Somalia, illustrating the disinclination to intervene that featured during this episode. Darfur marked the keenness of the AU to intervene in contrast with the ensuing debates at the Security Council over naming the crime whether or not “genocide” was unfolding in Darfur. Positively though, the intervention by Britain in Sierra Leone and the AU intervention in the Comoros are clear illustrations of how those intervening, were articulate in what they intend to do and their subsequent success. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Militêre intervensie, of die afwesigheid daarvan wanneer nodig, bly ‘n twispunt binne internasionale verhoudinge. Namate die impak van die Koue Oorlog begin vervaag het, het militêre intervensie besonder prominent in die literatuur begin figureer en is soms so dringend geag dat dit soms sonder die goedkeuring van die Veiligheidsraad van die Verenigde Nasies (VN) kon plaasvind. Aspekte van nasionale soewereiniteit bly nietemin ‘n grondbeginsel van die internasionale orde soos dit sedert die Verdrag van Wesfale beslag gevind het. Territoriale integriteit van state en die beginsel van geen-inmenging in die binnelandse aangeleenthede van ‘n staat nie bly ook ‘n grondslag van die Internasionale Reg soos deur die VN erken word en dit rig steeds standpunte van die internasionale gemeenskap vir of teen intervensie. Sedert die einde van die Koue Oorlog het soewereiniteit en beginsel van geen-intervensie egter toenemende druk ervaar met groeiende klem op menseregte midde in ‘n opkomende diskoers oor volksmoord en oorlogsmisdade. Die klem van hierdie studie val op militêre intervensie en veral hoe dit na die Koue Oorlog ontvou het in terme van teorie en praktyk, in die besonder op die Afrikakontinent. Die bespreking wentel om suksesvolle en onsuksesvolle gevalle van militêre intervensie in Afrika. Die onsuksesvolle gevalle wat bespreek word is Somalië (1992), Rwanda (1994), en Darfur (2003). Die meer suksesvolle gevalle wat bespreek word is Sierra Leone (2000) en die Komoro Eilande in (2008). Die studie omvat vier aspekte van bespreking: eerstens, die teoretiese ontwikkelinge wat militêre intervensie na die Koue Oorlog onderlê, tweedens, die ewolusie van militêre intervensie vanaf ‘n eensydige realisme tot ‘n meer multilaterale idealistiese verskynsel, derdens, die betrokkenheid in militêre intervensie in Afrika deur state en organisasies soos die VN en Afrika-Unie (AU) en laastens, die bydraes en dilemmas van intervensies in Afrika. Die betrokkenheid in Somalië was ‘n kritieke toets vir intervensies na die Koue Oorlog en het baie stukrag verleen aan die daaropvolgende debat. Rwanda het die huiwerigheid ontbloot om in te gryp waar dit werklik nodig was. Darfur vertoon weer die gewilligheid van die AU om in te gryp in weerwil van lang debatte in die VN oor volksmoord en die gebeure in Darfur. Aan die positiewe kant figureer die Britse optredes in Sierra Leone en optredes deur ‘n AU-mag in die Komoro Eilande as gevalle wat toon hoe die vasberadenheid van partye om in te gryp en bedreigings in die kiem te smoor, suksesvolle militêre intervensies kan bevorder.