Thesis (Ph.D.) in Interdisciplinary--University of Maine, 2009. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves397-307).

Thesis (M.A.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1990. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 85-90). Also available via the Internet.

This thesis describes the events leading up to the capture of Atlanta by the Union army during the Civil War.

With the advent of the rifled musket onto Civil War battlefields, the ability of a soldier on the defense to kill his attacking enemy rose dramatically. The former standard weapon had been the smoothbore musket. Such smoothbores had a maximum effective range of seventy-five meters. The new standard weapon, the rifled musket, had an effective range of 300 meters. Defenders, armed with this new weapon, could put attacking enemy soldiers under killing fire at a far greater range that ever before possible. Using the rifled muskets, defenders exacted punishing tolls before attackers closed within bayonet range for the close combat that furnished the cornerstone of contemporary tactical planning. As they made their tactical plans, commanders in the American Civil War seemed to ignore this deadly technological innovation, and Lee, Bragg, Burnside, Hood, Pope, and Jackson make a list of the worst offenders. They continued frontal assaults, assaults that brought their men directly under fire from the rifled musket. Bloody Civil War battles offer a litany of failed assaults: Manassas, Shiloh, Malvern Hill, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, and Cold Harbor. Where frontal assaults succeeded, the costs in soldiers’ lives were staggering. As casualties mounted astronomically, Civil War commanders must have realized that something was wrong on the battlefield. Yet, these commanders, with one important exception, rarely varied their battlefield tactics. Only one commander gave evidence of understanding the deadly message of the rifled musket, and the failure of Civil War tactics to silence or mute that message, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman. This thesis examines that understanding and provides Sherman’s rationale for changing contemporary battlefield maneuvers. Sherman came to the conclusion that the tactics of the day could not defeat a defense armed with rifled muskets, so he changed the battlefield rules. In doing so, he defeated a determined and aggressive foe, inflicted more casualties on his enemy than his forces sustained, split the Deep South asunder, and hastened the end of the Civil War. / Master of Arts

No description available.

This dissertation will examine the formation of the myth that William T. Sherman laid waste to the state of Georgia in 1864, and almost single-handedly invented the concept of “total war.” It will also examine how Sherman’s reputation has evolved over the years from accusations of being a Southern sympathizer and traitor at the end of the Civil War to the modern image of Sherman as the destroyer of the old South. William Tecumseh Sherman was the most controversial general of the American Civil War. The modern image of Sherman is either a destructive monster who violated the laws of civilized warfare or a strategic genius who invented modern warfare. Both of these images have evolved over the years. In large part, they have been the product of Lost Cause writers trying to reinterpret the history of the war, but also the product of Union generals and politicians attempting to glorify their own place in the history of the war, men with personal grudges against the general and modern historians using Sherman to make their own arguments about contemporary society. The sources used for this dissertation were the journals, letters and memoirs of the participants. The Official Records of both the Union and Confederacy were examined as well as nineteenth and twentieth century newspapers and magazines. This dissertation will show that the modern conception of General Sherman is not the same as the historical fact, but rather a post-war creation. Individuals’ agendas have created and sustained the myth of Sherman to explain defeat in the Civil War, justify later military strategy, condemn later conflicts and for personal gain. It is not enough to know that historical events as commonly understood are inaccurate; it is important to understand how and why these inaccuracies came about.