This study uses agency theory to test whether the demand for quality audits by listed Chinese companies is associated with changes in ownership structure, which is characterized by the dominance of the state, institutional and individual shareholders. The empirical test results obtained in a concentrated ownership setting are supportive of agency theory. Specifically, I find that the decrease of state shares and the corresponding increase of institutional shares result in a demand for higher-quality audits in China’s stock market. The results provide empirical support for the government’s recent initiative in reducing state ownership in listed companies to improve firm performance and the supply of quality accounting information through independent auditing.

<p><strong>Syfte:  </strong>Syftet med studien är att belysa och analysera hur revisorn arbetar för att eliminera risken för att göra väsentliga fel i årsredovisningen. Studien ska även beskriva och skapa förståelse för Revisorsnämndens och små revisionsbyråers arbete och ställningstagande till kvalitetssäkring.</p><p><strong>Metod: </strong>Utifrån ett<strong> </strong>hermeneutiskt synsätt och med en kvalitativ metod utfördes personliga intervjuer med tre små revisionsbyråer och Revisorsnämnden. Vid val av informanter tillämpades ett strategiskt urval. I studien har en abduktiv ansats använts. </p><p><strong>Slutsatser: </strong>Åtaganden för att god kvalitet ska uppnås i revisionen är revisionsprocessen, rotation på revisionsuppdrag vart sjunde år, tillämpning av analysmodell och etiska normer, FAR SRS:s kvalitetskontroller, internt kontrollsystem och kvalitetssäkring från RN.</p> / Revisionskvalitet, kvalitetssäkring, etik, moral, trovärdighet, självständighet, oberoende, objektivitet, opartiskhet

Syfte:  Syftet med studien är att belysa och analysera hur revisorn arbetar för att eliminera risken för att göra väsentliga fel i årsredovisningen. Studien ska även beskriva och skapa förståelse för Revisorsnämndens och små revisionsbyråers arbete och ställningstagande till kvalitetssäkring. Metod: Utifrån ett hermeneutiskt synsätt och med en kvalitativ metod utfördes personliga intervjuer med tre små revisionsbyråer och Revisorsnämnden. Vid val av informanter tillämpades ett strategiskt urval. I studien har en abduktiv ansats använts.  Slutsatser: Åtaganden för att god kvalitet ska uppnås i revisionen är revisionsprocessen, rotation på revisionsuppdrag vart sjunde år, tillämpning av analysmodell och etiska normer, FAR SRS:s kvalitetskontroller, internt kontrollsystem och kvalitetssäkring från RN. / Revisionskvalitet, kvalitetssäkring, etik, moral, trovärdighet, självständighet, oberoende, objektivitet, opartiskhet

Prior studies that examine audit quality and earnings management mostly separate discretionary accruals from total accruals and use discretionary accruals (or absolute value of discretionary accruals) to measure the magnitude of earnings management. Although most of those studies find audit quality is able to restrain the degree of earnings manipulation, few evaluate whether audit quality is capable of reducing the information risk faced by investors. Compared to discretionary accruals, accruals quality measured by the extent to which current accruals map into operating cash flow realization is more directly related to information risk. The purpose of this study is to examine the association between audit quality and information risk faced by investors, using accruals quality to proxy for information risk and adopting auditor brand name, audit-firm tenure, CPA tenure and auditor industry specialization as measures of audit quality. The study hypothesizes that auditor brand name, audit-firm tenure, CPA tenure and auditor industry specialization will contribute positively to reduce information risk faced by investors. The empirical results indicate (1) higher quality auditors (Big 4 auditors) are able to lower the information risk faced by investors, (2) the longer the audit-firm tenure, the lower the information risk faced by investors, (3) clients of industry specialist auditors have lower information risk than clients of non-specialist auditors, and (4) the relationship between audit-partner tenure and information risk is yet insignificant. Finally, the results further show that the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights will weaken the negative relationship between auditor brand name and information risk as well as the negative relationship between audit-firm tenure and information risk. However, it does not affect the negative relationship between auditor industry specialization and information risk; it may be because the industry specialist auditors can better resist the pressure from the controlling shareholders that can help alleviate the information risk faced by investors.

Financial statement quality can directly affect investor confidence. Corporate governance in well-functioning mechanisms can improve Financial statement quality. Recently, in order to enhance corporate governance performance, avoid financial fraud, and protect investors, the government constantly amend the related rules. Financial fraud is most through misstated financial reports, and even fraudulent misstatement may result from financial statement restatement. The purpose of the study is to examine whether ownership structure, board of director composition, and audit quality in corporate governance are associated with financial statement restatement. Empirical results show that in ownership structure the higher stock proportion of the institutional investors, the probability of financial statement restatement is higher. It is consistent with conflict of interest hypothesis. In audit quality, the enterprises have lower occurrence rates of financial statement restatement while they hire the big 4 accounting firms to audit their financial statements. Furthermore, when accounting firms provide non-audit services to their audit clients, the higher significance of non-audit fees, occurrence rates of financial statement restatement are higher.

Standard-setters believe high-quality internal audit functions (IAFs) serve as a key resource to audit committees for monitoring senior management. However, regulators do not enforce IAF quality or require disclosures relating to IAF quality, which is in stark contrast to regulatory requirements placed on boards, audit committees, and external auditors. Using proprietary data, I find that a composite measure of IAF quality is negatively associated with the likelihood of management misconduct even after controlling for board, audit committee, and external auditor quality. A difference-in-differences analysis suggests that misconduct firms improve IAF quality after misconduct is revealed by increasing IAF competence. Finally, IAF quality is a predictor of accounting-related management misconduct even after controlling for other observable predictors of misconduct. These findings suggest that regulators and audit committees should consider ways to improve IAF quality and that investors would benefit from disclosures relating to IAF quality. / text

To gain insight into the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) impact on audit quality, this study investigates the association between PCAOB inspection exposure (akin to the threat of a PCAOB inspection) and auditor reporting decisions. Certain foreign governments prohibit PCAOB inspections of their domestic auditors of U.S. SEC registrants citing sovereign control. This unique setting provides an opportunity to observe variation in the reach of the PCAOB inspection program and isolate its' effect on auditor reporting. I find that auditors in jurisdictions allowing PCAOB inspections are more likely to report going concern opinions and material weaknesses relative to auditors in jurisdictions barring PCAOB inspections. I find no difference in these auditor reporting propensities in the pre-PCAOB regulatory. This study provides evidence that PCAOB inspection exposure is associated with auditor reporting incentives, and ultimately audit quality, which is the fundamental purpose of the PCAOB inspection program.

Purpose - The purpose of this study is to shed light on one part of the external auditor’s work by examining how the cooperation between external auditors and internal auditors is organized and if external auditors face a dilemma when cooperating with internal auditors. The focus will therefore be on what aspects are considered by the external auditor in the decision to cooperate with internal auditors (and to use their work), as well as how the external auditor safeguards the audit quality by maintaining an independently and professionally executed audit. Design/methodology/approach - This study was realized through a qualitative research method. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with external auditors that have engagements with internal audit functions. All respondents are employed in the Big 4 and are operating in Sweden. Findings - The results of the study show that external auditors tend to use the work of internal auditors when they cooperate. To gain efficiency improvements is the main beneficial aspect the external auditors consider in the cooperation with internal auditors. The findings would suggest that some external auditors may act after self-interest more than others because if they start the cooperation and spend the time to evaluate the internal auditors’ work, they would prefer to use it. This would also indicate that the external auditors’ independence and professionalism can to some extent be compromised because there seems to be an acceptance of a certain degree of lower audit quality when using the work of internal auditors. Originality/value - The use of semi-structured interviews makes it possible to obtain deeper knowledge and complement prior studies concerning cooperation in the audit industry and how the external auditor considers different aspects in a decision-making environment.

Previous research noticed a conflict between audit quality and efficiency that has been discussed when applying International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) in the audit of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). However, there is a lack of research that concerns ISAs affect on audit quality and efficiency in the same study. Hence, the following research question was formulated: How has the implementation of International Standards on Auditing in Sweden affected audit quality and efficiency in the audit of small and medium-sized enterprises? Based on the perceptions of the interviewees, the implementation of ISAs has resulted in clearer risk assessment and increased use of analytical procedures, thereby improved audit quality. Further, ISAs have increased the hours spent on internal control, which impair audit efficiency since this activity is not judged as important when gathering audit evidence. This conflict between audit quality and efficiency is mostly explained by the shall requirements of ISAs since many of these are not applicable in the audit of SMEs. Our findings indicate a need to adapt ISAs and to allow deviations from shall requirements. The outcome would be that ISAs are closer to fulfil their aim in the audit of SMEs, which is higher audit quality without the loss of efficiency.

I propose and test a dynamic model of corporate fraud pyramid using tax fraud, accounting and management compensation controversies (MCC). The pyramid facets represent the explanatory dimensions of corporate governance mechanisms, quality of audit and regulatory regimes, and executive compensation. I find that large-sized firms with bigger boards invariably indulge in tax fraud. Conversely, older firms, firms paying higher executive compensation, exhibiting greater audit committee expertise and greater board meeting frequency curtail tax fraud incidence. Increased board meeting frequency, firm age, senior executive compensation and firm size is associated with increase in accounting controversies. Conversely, increased gender diversity curtails accounting fraud. Increase in firm size, senior executive compensation and outsider director’s compensation is associated with increased MCC incidence. CEO duality, single biggest owner, regulatory quality, rising EPS and operating profit margin, linking CEO compensation with total shareholder return and audit committee management independence significantly curtail MCC incidence. Increased stock-based compensation is accompanied by an increase in MCC. Audit and nomination committees and board members may not be truly independent. Firms audited by Big4 auditors have the least chance of getting entangled in accounting controversies. However, firms paying higher audit fee have a greater tendency of indulging in accounting fraud. Firms exposed to better regulatory quality environment have a much greater chance of getting involved in tax fraud controversies. Various explanatory variables behaved differently before, during and after the financial crisis. Univariate analyses support the majority of results of multivariate analyses.