I investigate whether investors have statistically significant negative reactions to the local clients of sanctioned auditors at the time of the PCAOB’s announcement of an enforcement action against that auditor. I also investigate whether or not the significance of the reactions has uniformly varied over time to account for the possibility of changing comprehensiveness in PCAOB enforcement actions. I measure abnormal returns using CAPM over three different measurement periods. I also disaggregate the data by year of enforcement action. 6 of the 27 data sets produced a statistically significant negative abnormal return suggesting that clients of sanctioned auditors do experience statistically significant abnormal negative returns at the time of the PCAOB’s announcement of the enforcement action. The significance of the abnormal returns did not vary overtime.

No description available.

Auditors regularly make judgments regarding whether a client’s chosen accounting policy is appropriate and in accordance with generally accepted accounting Principles (GAAP). However, to form this judgment, auditors must either possess adequate topic-specific knowledge or must gain such knowledge through information search. This search is subject to numerous biases, including a bias toward confirmation of a client’s preference. It is important to further our understanding of bias in auditors’ information search to identify its causes and effects. Furthering our understanding is necessary to provide a basis for recommending and evaluating a potential debiaser, such as accountability. the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) annually inspects the audit files of selected engagements, which introduces a new form of accountability within the auditing profession. This new form of accountability has come at great cost, however, there is little empirical evidence regarding its effects on auditors’ processes. As such, it is important to understand whether the presence of accountability from the PCAOB is effective in modifying auditors’ search behaviors to diminish confirmation bias. Using an online experiment, I manipulate client preference (unknown vs. known) and PCAOB accountability pressure (low vs. high) and measure search type (information –focus or decision-focus), search depth (shallow or deep) and documentation quality. I investigate whether auditors’ information search behaviors differ based on knowledge of client’s preference and in the presence of accountability from an expected PCAOB inspection. I also investigate whether differences in auditors’ information search behaviors influence documentation quality, which is the outcome of greatest concern to the PCAOB. I hypothesize and find a client preference effect on information search type such that auditors with knowledge of the client preference consider guidance associated with the client’s preference longer than those without knowledge of the client’s preference. Contrary to expectations, PCAOB accountability pressure does not influence information search depth. with respect to documentation quality, I find that auditors engaged in a more information-focused search have higher documentation quality. Further, as expected, auditors who initially engage in a decision-focus and deep search have higher documentation quality than those auditors who initially engaged in a decision-focused but shallow search.

I samband med revisionsskandaler i USA så infördes ett nytt kontroll organ för revisorer, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. De har syftet att kontrollera att revisorer som arbetar med klienter som lyder under Sarbanes-Oxley Act efterföljder de nya reglerna. Den svenska revisorsprofessionen har länge varit självreglerad men på grund av PCAOB möts professionen av en tydligare reglering vilket kan resultera i problem. Därför finns det ett behov att undersöka hur svenska revisorer ser på PCAOB och hur det har påverkat revisorsprofessionen. Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka svenska revisorers åsikter om PCAOB och om PCAOB har förändrat den svenska revisorsprofessionen. Uppsatsen har också syftet att förklara orsakerna bakom de svenska revisorernas åsikter och varför den svenska revisorsprofessionen påverkas. Utifrån uppsatsen syfte valdes en kvalitativ ansats. Data har samlats in genom semistrukturerade telefonintervjuer och personlig intervju. Urvalet består av 4 stycken anonyma auktoriserade revisorer som alla har erfarenhet av Sarbanes-Oxley Act. PCAOB har påverkat revisorsprofessionen till att bli mer professionell men samtidigt har formaliseringen ökat för professionen och bidragit till mindre tid för analytiskt arbete vilket i längden kan påverka kvaliteten på revisionen negativt och därmed kan PCAOB utgöra ett hot mot professionen. Trots att revisorsprofessionen är och har varit starkt kopplad till självreglering så verkar regulativa förändringar från PCAOB som syftar till att stärka revisorernas förtroende vara viktigare än att vidhålla professionens självreglering / As auditing scandals occurred in the US, a new controlling institute for auditors was formed, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. It has the purpose to monitor auditors who are working with clients that have to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Swedish auditing profession has for long time been self-regulated, but due to PCAOB the profession faces a stricter regulation which could lead to some problems. Hence, there exists a need to investigate how Swedish auditors look upon PCAOB and how it has effected the auditing profession. The purpose of this thesis is to examine Swedish auditor’s opinions about PCAOB and if PCAOB has affected the Swedish auditing profession. Furthermore, this thesis aims to explain the reasons behind the Swedish auditor’s beliefs and why the Swedish auditing profession is affected. On the basis of the purpose, a qualitative research method was chosen. Data has been collected through semi-structured telephone interviews and personal interview. The selection consists of four anonymous authorized public accountants who all have experience of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Due to PCAOB the auditing profession has become more professionalized but at the same time an increase in formalisation has left little time for actual analytical work and the quality of the audit might in the end be lower which constitute a major threat to the auditing profession. Although, the tradition of the auditing profession is and has been self-regulation it appears that PCAOB is welcomed by auditors since a regulative change that aim to improve auditors’ trust is more important than maintaining a self-regulated profession.

With the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, external auditors face a new regulatory inspection process in addition to an increase in litigation (or engagement) pressure. It has been communicated that this new inspection process will place an increased emphasis on the efficiency of integrated audits while maintaining the same level of effectiveness. In an experiment, I explore how external auditors’ reliance decisions on the internal audit function will be affected by different inspection focuses, varying levels of engagement risk, and the level of risk associated with the audit test or procedure. While I expect that there will be significant main effects for inspection focus, engagement risk and the riskiness of the audit test, I explore the potential presence of a three-way interaction between these three factors. My findings suggest that the auditor reliance decisions are impacted by differing levels of engagement risk, the focus of the inspection process, and the riskiness of the audit tests. In general, as engagement risk increased, auditors’ reliance decreased. Also, as the riskiness of the audit test increased, auditors placed less reliance on the internal audit function. However, when the focus of the inspection changed, these factors interacted with one another. Specifically, when auditors faced a focus of both effectiveness and efficiency, their reliance decisions increased as engagement risk and riskiness of the test decreased, but when auditors faced a focus of effectiveness only, their reliance decisions were not impacted by the engagement risk when the riskiness of the test was high. Thus, the impact of engagement risk on auditors’ reliance decisions depends on the focus of the inspection process and the riskiness of the tests.

<p>I samband med revisionsskandaler i USA så infördes ett nytt kontroll organ för revisorer, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. De har syftet att kontrollera att revisorer som arbetar med klienter som lyder under Sarbanes-Oxley Act efterföljder de nya reglerna. Den svenska revisorsprofessionen har länge varit självreglerad men på grund av PCAOB möts professionen av en tydligare reglering vilket kan resultera i problem. Därför finns det ett behov att undersöka hur svenska revisorer ser på PCAOB och hur det har påverkat revisorsprofessionen.</p><p>Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka svenska revisorers åsikter om PCAOB och om PCAOB har förändrat den svenska revisorsprofessionen. Uppsatsen har också syftet att förklara orsakerna bakom de svenska revisorernas åsikter och varför den svenska revisorsprofessionen påverkas.</p><p>Utifrån uppsatsen syfte valdes en kvalitativ ansats. Data har samlats in genom semistrukturerade telefonintervjuer och personlig intervju. Urvalet består av 4 stycken anonyma auktoriserade revisorer som alla har erfarenhet av Sarbanes-Oxley Act.</p><p>PCAOB har påverkat revisorsprofessionen till att bli mer professionell men samtidigt har formaliseringen ökat för professionen och bidragit till mindre tid för analytiskt arbete vilket i längden kan påverka kvaliteten på revisionen negativt och därmed kan PCAOB utgöra ett hot mot professionen.</p><p>Trots att revisorsprofessionen är och har varit starkt kopplad till självreglering så verkar regulativa förändringar från PCAOB som syftar till att stärka revisorernas förtroende vara viktigare än att vidhålla professionens självreglering</p> / <p>As auditing scandals occurred in the US, a new controlling institute for auditors was formed, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. It has the purpose to monitor auditors who are working with clients that have to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Swedish auditing profession has for long time been self-regulated, but due to PCAOB the profession faces a stricter regulation which could lead to some problems. Hence, there exists a need to investigate how Swedish auditors look upon PCAOB and how it has effected the auditing profession.</p><p>The purpose of this thesis is to examine Swedish auditor’s opinions about PCAOB and if PCAOB has affected the Swedish auditing profession. Furthermore, this thesis aims to explain the reasons behind the Swedish auditor’s beliefs and why the Swedish auditing profession is affected.</p><p>On the basis of the purpose, a qualitative research method was chosen. Data has been collected through semi-structured telephone interviews and personal interview. The selection consists of four anonymous authorized public accountants who all have experience of Sarbanes-Oxley Act.</p><p>Due to PCAOB the auditing profession has become more professionalized but at the same time an increase in formalisation has left little time for actual analytical work and the quality of the audit might in the end be lower which constitute a major threat to the auditing profession.</p><p>Although, the tradition of the auditing profession is and has been self-regulation it appears that PCAOB is welcomed by auditors since a regulative change that aim to improve auditors’ trust is more important than maintaining a self-regulated profession.</p>

To gain insight into the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) impact on audit quality, this study investigates the association between PCAOB inspection exposure (akin to the threat of a PCAOB inspection) and auditor reporting decisions. Certain foreign governments prohibit PCAOB inspections of their domestic auditors of U.S. SEC registrants citing sovereign control. This unique setting provides an opportunity to observe variation in the reach of the PCAOB inspection program and isolate its' effect on auditor reporting. I find that auditors in jurisdictions allowing PCAOB inspections are more likely to report going concern opinions and material weaknesses relative to auditors in jurisdictions barring PCAOB inspections. I find no difference in these auditor reporting propensities in the pre-PCAOB regulatory. This study provides evidence that PCAOB inspection exposure is associated with auditor reporting incentives, and ultimately audit quality, which is the fundamental purpose of the PCAOB inspection program.

I examine how risk-based inspections influence auditor behavior in a multi-client setting. I conduct an experiment using an abstract setting that captures the theoretical constructs present in the audit ecology. I manipulate the presence of risk-based inspections between-participants and the level of client risk (higher vs. lower) within-participants. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, under conditions of high resource pressure, I find that auditor effort is higher under a regime with risk-based inspections as compared to a regime without inspections, and the auditor effort increases more for higher-risk clients than for lower-risk clients. More notably, following attentional control theory, I predict and find that risk-based inspections diminish the quality of auditor decision performance for lower-risk clients. Specifically, auditors' decision performance is worse (i.e., more suboptimal) for lower-risk clients than for higher-risk clients (ceteris paribus), but only under a risk-based inspections regime. Likewise, auditors' decision performance for lower-risk clients is worse in a regime with risk-based inspections than in a regime without inspections. I theorize that accountability pressures from PCAOB inspections combined with pressures from high resource constraints (that naturally occur in the audit environment) induce task-related anxiety on auditors. Following attentional control theory in a multi-task setting, I predict anxiety interrupts auditors' decision-making processing shifting attention toward higher-risk clients contributing to the anxiety, and away from lower-risk (untargeted) clients, thereby decreasing the quality of decision performance for lower-risk clients. I perform several supplemental analyses to test the underlying theory. First, I conduct a second experiment where auditors operate under relatively lower resource pressure and find that auditors’ decision performance is no longer worse for lower-risk clients in an inspections regime. The results support the theory that it is the combined pressures of inspections and high resource constraints causing the negative effects. Second, I conduct a supplemental experiment and measure participants' levels of anxiety. In support of the underlying theory, participants' reported anxiety levels are higher under a regime with versus without inspections. Third, I perform several robustness checks to rule out alternative explanations of the findings. The findings of this study contribute to the auditing literature, and they have practical and regulatory implications. First, by identifying higher auditor effort in a regime with inspections, I join others in documenting potential benefits of inspections on auditor behavior, and thus audit quality. Second, by examining the effect of risk-based inspections on auditor effort in a multi-task setting, I extend prior research by providing evidence that inspections increase auditor effort more for higher-risk clients than for lower-risk clients. Third, and most notably, by identifying diminished auditor decision performance for lower-risk clients under a risk-based inspections regime, this is the first study to provide theory and evidence on how risk-based inspections can lead to potential negative consequences on audit behavior, and thus audit quality.

This paper is about Sarbanes-Oxley Act that was passed in response to the financial scandals such as Enron and WorldCom. SOX created organization PCAOB that has 6 auditing standards in its portfolio. My thesis is aim at Auditing standard no. 5. IBM was also affected by this law and so the thesis is focused on internal controls, testing and quarterly certification. At the end, there is a part about the relationship between IBM and its customers who are under this law as well.

自2005年開始PCAOB對外國之註冊會計師事務所進行國際檢查，至今已逾十年，然而制度實施之初面臨許多質疑。而今，已有文獻指出不論是美國或是其他國家，PCAOB的檢查皆具有一定效益，且具有外溢效果。惟各國間的國家特性因素於目前文獻中尚有發展空間，因此本研究欲了解國家特性是否會影響PCAOB國際檢查的外溢效果。 　　本研究以2004年至2013年間35國的資料計算裁決性應計數，以此代理審計品質，觀察各國審計品質於檢查前後的變化，並以法規執行力以及四大會計師事務所市占率代理國家特性，進一步了解不同特性的國家，其審計品質改變幅度的差異。 　　根據實證結果發現，當一國的法規執行力較高或是四大會計師事務所市占率較高時，審計品質較佳，因此於PCAOB國際檢查後審計品質提升幅度較小。各國的準則制定機構可透過本研究的國家分類，量身訂定更符合國家的準則，以改善審計品質。 / Since 2005, PCAOB has inspected foreign registered audit firms for a period over ten years. The benefits of inspection in both the United States and other countries are documented by extant literature, but the research of country characteristics on the spillover benefits is still lacking. In this study, we document how country characteristics influence the spillover effect of PCAOB international inspection on audit quality. This study uses discretionary accruals as the proxy of audit quality. Our data of non-US-listed companies from 35 countries during 2004-2013 are taken from Datastream. In addition, we use legal enforcement and Big 4 dominance to investigate how country characteristics affect the magnitude of audit quality changes. According to empirical results, we find that countries with higher legal enforcement or Big 4 dominance provide better audit quality. Therefore, PCAOB international inspections in these countries generate smaller magnitude of audit quality improvement than in countries with lower legal enforcement and Big 4 dominance . Our results suggest that regulators of different countries should develop more tailored regulation in order to improve audit quality of their respective countries.