I investigate whether investors have statistically significant negative reactions to the local clients of sanctioned auditors at the time of the PCAOB’s announcement of an enforcement action against that auditor. I also investigate whether or not the significance of the reactions has uniformly varied over time to account for the possibility of changing comprehensiveness in PCAOB enforcement actions. I measure abnormal returns using CAPM over three different measurement periods. I also disaggregate the data by year of enforcement action. 6 of the 27 data sets produced a statistically significant negative abnormal return suggesting that clients of sanctioned auditors do experience statistically significant abnormal negative returns at the time of the PCAOB’s announcement of the enforcement action. The significance of the abnormal returns did not vary overtime.

This paper focuses on understanding the higher than average punishment to Greek stocks and bonds and the overall investor reactions to the worsening economic situation in Greece from 2000 to 2014. Were Greek stock and bond values driven by fiscal and financial conditions, macroeconomic indicators and event shocks to the economy? Time series regressions, Granger Causality Wald tests and impulse response functions are used to answer the question. The proxies for Greek stock and bond market performance include the Athens Stock Exchange Index growth rate and the short run and long run interest rate spreads between Greece and Germany. The macroeconomic variables include debt to GDP ratio, the National Bank of Greece return on equity growth rate, real GDP growth rate, inflation rate, and M1 and M2 money supply growth rates. The significant events include Greece joining the Euro in 2001, the Greek government admitting to lying about budget deficits in 2004, Greece’s first bailout in 2010 and the resignation of Prime Minister George Papandreou in 2011. Results show that most variables are significant and stock and bond market performance are dependent on macroeconomic indicators and event shocks.

Antalet kvinnliga styrelseledamöter i bolag har ökat de senaste åren och studier visar att bolag med könsdiversifierade styrelser redovisar högre lönsamhet än andra företag. Flera av dessa studier är baserade på data från små, medelstora och stora börsnoterade bolag. Regeringen föreslog nyligen en kvoteringslag där kvinnor skall utgöra 40 procent av antalet styrelseledamöter i bolag med syfte att få mer jämlika styrelser. Intressant är då att studera om fördelarna med könsdiversifierade styrelser beaktas av investerare och hur marknadsaktörer agerar. I studien visas att när nominering av kvinnliga styrelseledamöter offentliggörs har det en negativ påverkan på företagets marknadsvärde, men denna påverkan är inte statistiskt signifikant. Vidare påverkas inte nomineringens inverkan på aktiekursförändringen av ett bolags branschtillhörighet. / The number of female directors of companies has increased in recent years and studies show that companies with diverse boards report higher profitability than other companies. Several of these studies are based on data from small, medium and large listed companies. The government recently proposed a quota law where women will constitute 40 per cent of the directors of companies to push for more equal boards. Hence, studying the benefits of diverse boards and its investor reactions and how the market is moving is of interest. The study shows that when the nomination of female board members is published, it has a negative impact on the company's market, but this effect is not statistically significant. Furthermore, the nomination affect does not have an impact on the stock price change regarding the company's industry affiliation.

Since 2005, listed firms in Germany have been subject to the hybrid enforcement system that aims at ensuring consistent and faithful application of relevant accounting standards and in particular IFRS. Being first of its kind, the German enforcement system combines cooperative investigations conducted by a private financial reporting enforcement panel (FREP) and federal powers through downstream involvement of the German Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). The hybrid enforcement system’s main deterrent is adverse disclosure which involves public dissemination of financial misreporting. In this dissertation, which comprises five separate manuscripts, I analyze both foundations and consequences of adverse disclosure in Germany. The first two manuscripts address different questions related to institutional premises and deduce avenues for future research. The remaining three manuscripts elaborate on selected research questions related to consequences of financial misreporting and their determinants. In summary, this dissertation has material impact on the understanding of hybrid enforcement systems.:I. ENFORCEMENT IN GERMANY: FOUNDATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF ADVERSE DISCLOSURE 1 Introduction to the Research Context 2 Overview and Findings of the Manuscripts II. ENFORCEMENT OF FINANCIAL REPORTING: A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE 1 Introduction 2 Theoretical Background 3 Identification and Description of Relevant Literature 4 Critical Discussion 5 Avenues for Further Research 6 Conclusion and Limitations III. DEUTSCHLAND UND ÖSTERREICH ALS BEISPIEL DER IMPLEMENTIERUNG HYBRIDER ENFORCEMENT-SYSTEME IN EUROPA 1 Einleitung und Problemstellung 2 Charakteristika hybrider Enforcement-Systeme 3 Unterschiede in der formalrechtlichen Gestaltung der Enforcement-Systeme in Deutschland und Österreich 4 Implikationen für die Klassifizierung hybrider Enforcement-Systeme und die Enforcement-Praxis 5 Zusammenfassung IV. DETERMINANTS OF INVESTOR REACTIONS TO ERROR ANNOUNCEMENTS: EXTENDED EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY 1 Introduction 2 The German Enforcement System 3 Previous Research and Hypotheses Development 4 Methodology 5 Results 6 Conclusion V. THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN EXECUTIVE TURNOVER AND FINANCIAL MISREPORTING: EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY 1 Introduction 2 Corporate Governance, Financial Misreporting, and Management Turnover 3 Hypothesis Development and Empirical Predictions 4 Methodology 5 Results 6 Conclusion VI. ENFORCEMENT OF FINANCIAL REPORTING IN PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL FIRMS: AN INTEGRATIVE CASE 1 Introduction 2 Student Material 3 Educators Material

Enforcement of financial reporting has gained new momentum in the European Union (EU) due to the so-called ‘IAS Regulation‘ (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002), with recital 16 requiring EU member states to take appropriate actions to ensure compliance with international accounting standards. Accordingly, several EU member states took concurrent or subsequent measures to increase the level of accounting enforcement, either by establishing new enforcement institutions, or by reforming existing ones. While these actions are designed to enhance accounting compliance by unfolding a preventive and sanctioning function of enforcement, a thorough literature review reveals that there is only scarce empirical evidence on whether this aim has been indeed achieved. Striving to shed light on the impact of recent enforcement reforms, this dissertation examines the sanctioning function in the German enforcement system by investigating shareholder reactions to error announcements. Moreover, a cross-country analysis of 20 EU member states provides novel insights on the postulated preventive function in the aftermath of enforcement reforms. In summary, this dissertation aims to improve the understanding of the economic impact of accounting enforcement in Germany and the EU.:I. Does Enforcement of Financial Reporting Matter? Empirical Evidence from Germany and Europe – Overview of the Dissertation 1 Introduction to the Research Context 2 Overview and Findings of the Manuscripts II. Enforcement of Financial Reporting – A Corporate Governance Perspective 1 Introduction 2 Theoretical Background 3 Identification and Description of Relevant Literature 4 Critical Discussion 5 Conclusion and Limitations III. Determinants of Investor Reactions to Error Announcements – Extended Evidence from Germany 1 Introduction 2 The German Enforcement System 3 Previous Research and Hypotheses Development 4 Methodology 5 Results 6 Robustness Tests 7 Conclusion IV. Error Announcements, Auditor Turnover, and Earnings Management – Evidence from Germany 1 Introduction 2 Institutional Background: The German Enforcement System 3 Previous Research and Hypotheses Development 4 Methodology 5 Results 6 Robustness Tests 7 Conclusion V. Does Enforcement Change Earnings Management Behavior? Evidence from the EU after Mandatory IFRS Adoption 1 Introduction 2 The Development of National Enforcement Institutions in the EU 3 Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 4 Research Design and Data Description 5 Results 6 Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests 7 Conclusion