I examine how risk-based inspections influence auditor behavior in a multi-client setting. I conduct an experiment using an abstract setting that captures the theoretical constructs present in the audit ecology. I manipulate the presence of risk-based inspections between-participants and the level of client risk (higher vs. lower) within-participants. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, under conditions of high resource pressure, I find that auditor effort is higher under a regime with risk-based inspections as compared to a regime without inspections, and the auditor effort increases more for higher-risk clients than for lower-risk clients. More notably, following attentional control theory, I predict and find that risk-based inspections diminish the quality of auditor decision performance for lower-risk clients. Specifically, auditors' decision performance is worse (i.e., more suboptimal) for lower-risk clients than for higher-risk clients (ceteris paribus), but only under a risk-based inspections regime. Likewise, auditors' decision performance for lower-risk clients is worse in a regime with risk-based inspections than in a regime without inspections. I theorize that accountability pressures from PCAOB inspections combined with pressures from high resource constraints (that naturally occur in the audit environment) induce task-related anxiety on auditors. Following attentional control theory in a multi-task setting, I predict anxiety interrupts auditors' decision-making processing shifting attention toward higher-risk clients contributing to the anxiety, and away from lower-risk (untargeted) clients, thereby decreasing the quality of decision performance for lower-risk clients. I perform several supplemental analyses to test the underlying theory. First, I conduct a second experiment where auditors operate under relatively lower resource pressure and find that auditors’ decision performance is no longer worse for lower-risk clients in an inspections regime. The results support the theory that it is the combined pressures of inspections and high resource constraints causing the negative effects. Second, I conduct a supplemental experiment and measure participants' levels of anxiety. In support of the underlying theory, participants' reported anxiety levels are higher under a regime with versus without inspections. Third, I perform several robustness checks to rule out alternative explanations of the findings. The findings of this study contribute to the auditing literature, and they have practical and regulatory implications. First, by identifying higher auditor effort in a regime with inspections, I join others in documenting potential benefits of inspections on auditor behavior, and thus audit quality. Second, by examining the effect of risk-based inspections on auditor effort in a multi-task setting, I extend prior research by providing evidence that inspections increase auditor effort more for higher-risk clients than for lower-risk clients. Third, and most notably, by identifying diminished auditor decision performance for lower-risk clients under a risk-based inspections regime, this is the first study to provide theory and evidence on how risk-based inspections can lead to potential negative consequences on audit behavior, and thus audit quality.

This paper examines the occurrence and outcome of auditor litigation related to financial statement misstatements and the effect of auditor misstatement-based litigation on subsequent auditor behavior. The study is motivated by recent calls to limit auditor legal liability and the need to examine the ability of litigation to deter non-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) financial reporting. I find that misstatement severity is the primary driver of auditor litigation. Specifically, I find that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely when the misstatement is associated with fraud, a regulatory investigation, a larger stock price decline, and/or a greater number of accounting application [i.e., Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)/GAAP) failures. In addition, I find that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely to occur when the misstatement is associated with engagement fees that consist of a greater magnitude or a greater proportion of non-audit service fees. Further, I find that misstatement severity and the size of the plaintiffs? claims are the primary drivers of auditor settlements resulting from misstatement-based litigation. Specifically, I find that an auditor settlement resulting from misstatement-based litigation is more likely to occur when the misstatement is associated with fraud, a greater amount of alleged income or equity inflation over the class action time period, and/or a larger alleged percentage drop in share price over the class action time period. With respect to subsequent auditor behavior, I find evidence that auditor litigation results in more conservative subsequent auditor behavior across a litigated auditor?s office-wide client portfolio (that excludes the litigated client). Specifically, in the year following auditor litigation, I find evidence that litigation results in increased auditor constraint of client-reported positive and signed discretionary accruals, as well as longer audit report lags.

This paper examines the occurrence and outcome of auditor litigation related to financial statement misstatements and the effect of auditor misstatement-based litigation on subsequent auditor behavior. The study is motivated by recent calls to limit auditor legal liability and the need to examine the ability of litigation to deter non-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) financial reporting. I find that misstatement severity is the primary driver of auditor litigation. Specifically, I find that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely when the misstatement is associated with fraud, a regulatory investigation, a larger stock price decline, and/or a greater number of accounting application [i.e., Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)/GAAP) failures. In addition, I find that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely to occur when the misstatement is associated with engagement fees that consist of a greater magnitude or a greater proportion of non-audit service fees. Further, I find that misstatement severity and the size of the plaintiffs? claims are the primary drivers of auditor settlements resulting from misstatement-based litigation. Specifically, I find that an auditor settlement resulting from misstatement-based litigation is more likely to occur when the misstatement is associated with fraud, a greater amount of alleged income or equity inflation over the class action time period, and/or a larger alleged percentage drop in share price over the class action time period. With respect to subsequent auditor behavior, I find evidence that auditor litigation results in more conservative subsequent auditor behavior across a litigated auditor?s office-wide client portfolio (that excludes the litigated client). Specifically, in the year following auditor litigation, I find evidence that litigation results in increased auditor constraint of client-reported positive and signed discretionary accruals, as well as longer audit report lags.

Titel: Revisionskvalitet - En studie beträffande hur låg revisionskvalitet vidareutvecklarkonceptet revisionskvalitet. Bakgrund & problematisering: Revisorer befinner sig i förtroendebranschen där skandaler, vars grund ligger i bristande revisionskvalitet, har fått allmänheten att se på revisionsprofessionen med misstänksamhet. För att inte missbruka professionens förtroende såväl som frambringa skandaler finns ett behov av att reducera bristande revisionskvalitet. Då majoriteten av tidigare forskning, gällande konceptet revisionskvalitet, fokuserar på konceptets högre spektrum menar vi att ett nytt angreppssätt för att konceptualisera revisionskvalitet och därmed reducera bristande revisionskvalitet är nödvändigt. Syfte: Uppsatsens huvudsyfte är att utforska vad låg revisionskvalitet innebär utifrån den kontroll- och tillsynsåtgärd som övervakar revisionsprofessionen från insidan, för att på så vis skapa en vidare förståelse för konceptet revisionskvalitet. Uppsatsens delsyfte är att redogöra för utvecklingen av låg revisionskvalitet över tid fram till aktuell tidpunkt, för att på så vis få en mer flerdimensionell förståelse för hur låg revisionskvalitet har vidareutvecklat konceptet revisionskvalitet. Metod: Uppsatsen har tagit utgångspunkt i en abduktiv forskningsansats och har där igenom antagit en kvalitativ undersökningsmetod och longitudinell design. Den kvalitativa undersökningsmetoden har utförts i två steg, varvid förstudien har tagit sin utgångspunkt iintervjuer, medan huvudstudien har tagit sin utgångspunkt i en innehållsanalys av disciplinärenden utförda av Revisorsnämnden med den disciplinära åtgärden upphävande av auktorisation eller godkännande. Slutsats: Revisionskvalitet som koncept kan genom uppsatsens förstudie och huvudstudie definieras utifrån låg revisionskvalitet i from av överkategorierna; Dokumentation, Granskning, Okunskap, Regelverk, Formella brister samt Uppfyller inte steg i revisionen. Således har denna uppsats, genom nya aspekter såväl som nivåer, preciserat befintlig teori och befintliga konceptpå så vis att utvecklingen av låg revisionskvalitet har vidareutvecklat konceptet revisionskvalitet. Nyckelord: Audit, audit failure, audit failure definition, audit service quality, audit quality, audit quality definition, dysfunctional auditor behavior, ethics, etik, going concern warning, high audit quality, legitimacy, legitimacy theory, low audit quality, profession, professionalduty, revision, revisionskvalitet, revisionsmisslyckande, revisor och quality. / Title: Audit Quality - A thesis regarding how low audit quality further develop the concept ofaudit quality. Background & problem: Accountants are in the trust industry and scandals, whose foundationlies in the lack of audit quality, has thus gained the public to see the audit profession with suspicion. In order not to abuse the trust as well as produce scandals there is a need to reduce low audit quality. Since the majority of previous research has been focusing on the concept's higher spectrum, we believe a new approach for conceptualizing audit quality is necessary in aim to reduce low audit quality. Purpose: The main purpose with this thesis is to explore what low audit quality means based on the control and enforcement measure that monitors the audit profession from the inside, to thereby create a wider understanding of the concept of audit quality. The subsidiary aim of this thesis is to describe how the low audit quality has developed over time, compare with the current situation and thereby obtain a multidimensional understanding of how low audit quality has developed into the concept of audit quality. Method: This thesis has an abductive research approach and has therefore adopted a qualitative research method and longitudinal design. The qualitative survey methodology was conducted in two stages, the feasibility study has been based on interviews, while the main study has been based on a content analysis of disciplinary proceedings conducted by the Supervisory Boardwith the disciplinary action waiver of authorization or approval. Conclusion: Audit quality as a concept can through the thesis feasibility study and the mainstudy be defined by low-quality audits in the form of the categories; Documentation, Review, Ignorance, Regulatory framework, Formal shortage and Does not fulfill the stage of the audit. Thus, this thesis, through new aspects as well as new levels, has specified existing theory and existing concepts in a way that the development of low audit quality has further developed the concept of audit quality. Key words: Audit, audit failure, audit failure definition, audit service quality, audit quality,audit quality definition, dysfunctional auditor behavior, ethics, going concern warning, high audit quality, legitimacy, legitimacy theory, low audit quality, profession, professional duty andquality.