Tidsperioden mellan räkenskapsårets slut och datumet för påskriven revisionsberättelse benämns audit report lag (ARL). Anledningarna till att ARL uppstår har studerats i stor utsträckning, men de konkreta effekterna som uppstår till följd av ARL är mindre studerade. En tidigare studie om ARL:s samband med ökad risk för aktieprisfall på den kinesiska aktiemarknaden visade på ett positivt samband. På grund av detta samband finns ett intresse att studera om ett liknande samband existerar på den svenska aktiemarknaden. Syftet med studien är att förklara ett eventuellt samband mellan lång ARL och ökad risk för aktieprisfall på den svenska aktiemarknaden. Studien använder sig av en deduktiv ansats och en longitudinell forskningsdesign bestående av kvantitativ data för att försöka förklara ett eventuellt samband mellan lång ARL och en ökad risk för aktieprisfall. Datamaterialet bestod av sekundärdata. Studien finner inget samband mellan lång ARL och ökad risk för aktieprisfall på den svenska aktiemarknaden. Däremot visas svaga indikationer på att kort ARL leder till ökad risk för aktieprisfall på den svenska aktiemarknaden. Studien bidrar med utökad kunskap om sambanden mellan ARL och ökad risk för aktieprisfall. Vidare bidrar studien med kunskap för revisorer, bolagsledningar och investerare om vilka konsekvenser ARL kan ha på börsnoterade bolags aktiekurs. / The time period between the fiscal year end and the audit report date is termed audit report lag (ARL). The determinants of ARL have been frequently studied, however the practical consequences of ARL have not been studied to the same extent. A previous study about ARLs association with stock price crash risk on the Chinese stock market showed a positive association. This association made it interesting to study if a similar association exists on the Swedish stock market. The purpose of this study is to explain a possible association between long ARL and an increased stock price crash risk on the Swedish stock market. This study uses a deductive approach and a longitudinal research design consisting of quantitative data to explain a possible association between long ARL and an increased stock price crash risk. The data set consisted of secondary data. The study finds no association between long ARL and an increased stock price crash risk on the Swedish stock market. However, the study does find weak indications that short ARL leads to an increased stock price crash risk on the Swedish stock market. The study contributes with increased knowledge regarding associations between ARL and an increased stock price crash risk. Furthermore, the study contributes with knowledge for auditors, company management and investors of the consequences ARL can have on listed companies’ stock price.

This paper examines the occurrence and outcome of auditor litigation related to financial statement misstatements and the effect of auditor misstatement-based litigation on subsequent auditor behavior. The study is motivated by recent calls to limit auditor legal liability and the need to examine the ability of litigation to deter non-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) financial reporting. I find that misstatement severity is the primary driver of auditor litigation. Specifically, I find that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely when the misstatement is associated with fraud, a regulatory investigation, a larger stock price decline, and/or a greater number of accounting application [i.e., Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)/GAAP) failures. In addition, I find that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely to occur when the misstatement is associated with engagement fees that consist of a greater magnitude or a greater proportion of non-audit service fees. Further, I find that misstatement severity and the size of the plaintiffs? claims are the primary drivers of auditor settlements resulting from misstatement-based litigation. Specifically, I find that an auditor settlement resulting from misstatement-based litigation is more likely to occur when the misstatement is associated with fraud, a greater amount of alleged income or equity inflation over the class action time period, and/or a larger alleged percentage drop in share price over the class action time period. With respect to subsequent auditor behavior, I find evidence that auditor litigation results in more conservative subsequent auditor behavior across a litigated auditor?s office-wide client portfolio (that excludes the litigated client). Specifically, in the year following auditor litigation, I find evidence that litigation results in increased auditor constraint of client-reported positive and signed discretionary accruals, as well as longer audit report lags.

This paper examines the occurrence and outcome of auditor litigation related to financial statement misstatements and the effect of auditor misstatement-based litigation on subsequent auditor behavior. The study is motivated by recent calls to limit auditor legal liability and the need to examine the ability of litigation to deter non-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) financial reporting. I find that misstatement severity is the primary driver of auditor litigation. Specifically, I find that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely when the misstatement is associated with fraud, a regulatory investigation, a larger stock price decline, and/or a greater number of accounting application [i.e., Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)/GAAP) failures. In addition, I find that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely to occur when the misstatement is associated with engagement fees that consist of a greater magnitude or a greater proportion of non-audit service fees. Further, I find that misstatement severity and the size of the plaintiffs? claims are the primary drivers of auditor settlements resulting from misstatement-based litigation. Specifically, I find that an auditor settlement resulting from misstatement-based litigation is more likely to occur when the misstatement is associated with fraud, a greater amount of alleged income or equity inflation over the class action time period, and/or a larger alleged percentage drop in share price over the class action time period. With respect to subsequent auditor behavior, I find evidence that auditor litigation results in more conservative subsequent auditor behavior across a litigated auditor?s office-wide client portfolio (that excludes the litigated client). Specifically, in the year following auditor litigation, I find evidence that litigation results in increased auditor constraint of client-reported positive and signed discretionary accruals, as well as longer audit report lags.

I examine three issues related to internal control reporting by non-accelerated filers. Motivation for the three studies comes from the fact that Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) continues to be controversial, as evidenced by the permanent exemption from Section 404(b) of SOX granted to non-accelerated filers by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The Dodd-Frank Act also requires the SEC to study compliance costs associated with smaller accelerated filers. In the first part of my dissertation, I document that the audit fee premium for non-accelerated filers disclosing a material weakness in internal controls (a) is significantly lower than the corresponding premium for accelerated filers, and (b) declines significantly over time. I also find that in the case of accelerated filers remediating clients pay lower fees compared to clients continuing to report internal control problems; however, such differences are not observed in the case of non-accelerated filers. The second essay focuses on audit report lag. The results indicate that presence of material weaknesses are associated with increased audit report lags, for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers. The results also indicate that the decline in report lag following remediation of problems is greater for accelerated filers than for non-accelerated filers. The third essay examines early warnings (pursuant to Section 302 disclosures) for firms that subsequently disclosed internal control problems in their 404 reports. The analyses indicate that non-accelerated firms with shorter CFO tenure, presence of accounting experts on the audit committee, and more frequent audit committee meetings are more likely to provide prior Section 302 warnings. Overall the results suggest that there are differences in internal control reporting between the accelerated and non-accelerated filers. The results provide empirical grounding for the ongoing debate about internal control reporting by non-accelerated filers.

Emerging research on real earnings management [REM] has expressed the concern that firms deviating from normal business practices may endure a negative impact on future cash flows and performance. This dissertation (in three essays) investigates the phenomenon of real earnings management in its association with: 1) enterprise resource planning systems [ERPs]; 2) audit report lags [ARLs]; and 3) future firm performance. In the first investigation I hypothesize that the increased monitoring associated with the implementation of an ERP will result in a decline in REM. In the second investigation I hypothesize that higher levels of REM will evoke greater auditor scrutiny and be associated with longer ARLs. In the third investigation I hypothesize that managerial actions that would ordinarily be classified as REM: reductions in discretionary expenditures or overproduction, are not REM but indicative of enhanced efficiencies when found in concert with prior period restructurings or expected future sales growth respectively. In each of the three investigations, my hypotheses are confirmed.

In my dissertation, I examine the role of the audit committee chair in the financial reporting process and test if the change in audit committee chair is associated with changes in audit fees, audit report lag, and audit quality. Motivation for this dissertation comes from the increased attention paid by legislators and regulators in recent years on the role of the audit committee in the financial reporting process. While prior studies have examined diverse issues related to the composition of the audit committee, no prior study has examined the role of the audit committee chair on the oversight of financial reporting, even though the chair of the committee has significant control over the functioning of the committee. In the first essay of my dissertation, I show that audit fees are higher in firms that have a change in the audit committee chair. In the second essay, I examine the association between changes in the audit committee chair and audit report lag. In a changes regression, I find that the change in audit committee is associated with higher audit report lag. The third essay examines the association between changes in audit committee chair and two different measures of audit quality: restatements and abnormal accruals. There is no evidence in support of the argument that changes in audit committee chair is associated with higher quality financial reporting. Overall, the results suggest that the change in audit committee chair has an important impact on the financial reporting process of public companies.

The purpose of our paper is to study how ownership structure affects ARL (audit report lag) in Swedish companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. In particular, family ownership (FAMO), institutional ownership (INSO) and foreign ownership (FORO) are analysed. Audit report lag is defined as the period between the end of a fiscal year to the signing of the audit report, which is directly followed by the release of an annual report. Based on a sample of 814 firm-year observations for Swedish-listed firms for 2020-2022, this study finds a significant negative relationship between audit report lag and both family and foreign ownership. The results indicate that audit report lag decreases when family and foreign ownership increases. Moreover, the findings suggest that family-owned firms have a shorter audit report lag compared to non-familyowned firms. No statistically significant relationship was discovered between ARL and institutional ownership. Arguments for our results can be found in the agency theory, signalling theory, and consequently the reputational hypothesis. Companies with certain ownership structures may try to signal certain information to investors to achieve the best possible reputation and external perception. Signalling theory has implications for companies that want to combat agency theory type 2 through timely reporting.