In my dissertation, I examine factors associated with firms’ submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification and test if shareholder ratification of auditor selection is associated with the extent of price competition in the audit market (as measured by audit fees) and audit quality (as measured by clients’ earnings management). The dissertation is motivated from the recent recommendation of the U.S. Treasury’s Advisory Committee on Auditing Profession (ACAP) regarding the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification votes. The ACAP suggests that this practice may improve the competition in the audit market; yet, there is no empirical evidence supporting the ACAP’s recommendation. My dissertation attempts to fill the gap in the literature on an issue of current interest to the auditing profession. I find that firm size, CEO-Chair duality, insider ownership and institutional ownership are associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. However, I do not find an association between audit committee variables and the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The second essay investigates the association between auditor ratification and audit fees. Audit fees are higher in firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification. The finding is not consistent with the increased price competition predicted by the ACAP. The third essay of my dissertation examine whether the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification is associated with earnings management. I find that firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification are more likely to have lower level of earnings management. Overall, the results suggest that the same factors that are associated with higher quality monitoring also may be associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The results call into question the one-size-fits-all approach recommended by the ACAP.

The purpose of my dissertation is to examine whether competition among audit partners affects audit quality. While prior research on audit market competition focuses on audit firm-level or office-level analyses, I argue that audit partners, as the primary decision makers in providing audit services, are likely to engage in competitive actions in the audit market. Further, I use spatial distance among audit partners to measure partner-level competition. I conjecture that spatial distance could better reflect the dynamics of audit market competition than the Herfindahl index, the traditional proxy for competition used in most extant studies. Drawing on the spatial economics theory and the social comparison theory, I hypothesize a negative association between competition measured by spatial distance and the quality level delivered by the incumbent audit partner. Using newly available data of U.S. audit partners, this study provides evidence that audit quality is higher (lower) when the spatial distance between the incumbent partner and the closest competing partner is larger (smaller). In addition, the results reveal that the effects of competition measured by spatial distance on audit quality is mainly a partner-level phenomenon rather than an office-level one. Overall, this study highlights the importance of studying competitive dynamics among audit partners.