I investigate the effects of requiring the audit engagement partner (EP) signature and individual EP’s quality on information asymmetry, analysts’ forecast errors and forecast dispersion. I predict and find that, ceteris paribus, there is a significant decline in information asymmetry, analysts’ forecast errors and forecast dispersion from the pre- to post-EP signature period in the UK over both of short-term (e.g., 2008-2010) and long-term (e.g., 2004-2014). These findings hold when using a control sample approach and a different proxy for the information asymmetry, which indicate that my results are not likely due to the effect of concurrent events and correlated omitted variables. These findings provide timely and important empirical evidence to the ongoing debate about whether the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board should pass a similar requirement in the U.S. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2016. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

Using tax accrual quality as a proxy for audit quality, I investigate whether companies that significantly decreased APTS surrounding the effective date of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s 2006 Rules on Ethics, Independence, and Tax Services experienced an improvement in audit quality after the change. Given the specific target of the PCAOB 2006 restrictions is companies aggressively avoiding taxes with the assistance of APTS, I also investigate whether companies associated with tax aggressive services are also more likely to experience an improvement in audit quality following the reductions in APTS. Results suggest an increase in audit quality due to a reduction in economic bonding following APTS restrictions. Consistent with the economic bonding theory, companies that significantly reduced APTS experienced a larger improvement in audit quality after the change compared to companies that did not significantly reduce APTS. For tax aggressive companies, those that reduced APTS did experience a significant increase in audit quality after the change compared to tax aggressive companies that did not significantly reduce APTS. Moreover, companies considered important tax clients by their audit firms that significantly reduced APTS did experience a marginally greater increase in audit quality after the change compared to other important tax clients that did not significantly reduce APTS. Overall, my results indicate that the PCOAB 2006 restrictions were effective in decreasing APTS and economic bonding, thereby leading to improved audit quality, especially among companies associated with tax aggressive services. Accordingly, concerns for loss of knowledge spillover seem to be minimal. There are few studies that investigate the effectiveness of the PCAOB 2006 restrictions on audit quality. Therefore, my study fills this void by using a tax specific measure of audit quality, tax accrual quality, to specifically examine the target of the restrictions— audit clients that are associated with aggressive tax services. My study confirms and expands APTS, economic bonding, audit quality, tax accrual quality, and tax aggressive research, and also provides insight into and support for current policy debates concerning APTS and tax aggressive services. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2017. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

The Big 4 global networks (Deloitte, Ernst & Young [E&Y], KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers [PwC]) market themselves as providers of worldwide seamless services and consistent audit quality through their members. Under the current environment in which these auditors operate, there are three types of global network members: inspected non-U.S. affiliates (inspected affiliates, hereafter), non-inspected non-U.S. affiliates (non-inspected affiliates, hereafter), and inspected U.S. offices (U.S. offices, hereafter). The recent suspension of the China-based Big 4 affiliates from auditing U.S.-listed companies calls into question whether these global networks can deliver the same level of audit quality across all their members and whether those located in jurisdictions denying access to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board, hereafter) to conduct inspections may benefit from such inspections. This study examines the effect of being an affiliate and the effect of PCAOB inspections on perceived audit quality. I use earnings response coefficients (ERCs) as a proxy for perceived audit quality. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2015. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

Many external parties such as investors, creditors, and regulatory agencies, use a company’s financial statements in their decision-making. In doing so, they rely on audit opinions on whether financial statements are fairly stated. However, evidence suggests that there are factors in the audit environment that influence auditor judgments. For example, nondiagnostic client information dilutes auditor judgments when compared to judgments based on diagnostic information alone, especially for less experienced auditors (Hackenbrack 1992; Hoffman and Patton 1997; Glover 1994; Shelton 1999). High time pressure conditions mitigate this effect by refocusing auditor attention toward relevant client information, therefore reducing the impact of nondiagnostic information (Glover 1994, 1997). This research study examines other common audit environment factors to determine if they too influence audit judgment results. An online questionnaire of 149 auditors, CPAs and other accounting professionals indicate that the inclusion of nondiagnostic client information results in a significant change in auditor judgments. The direction of this change follows a theorized pattern; risk assessments that were initially high are reduced, while those that were initially low are increased. Significance was not consistently found for a workload and PCAOB effect on auditor judgment. However, a comparison of the absolute value of dilution effect means across conditions reveals some trending for the proposed unwanted effect of high workload, and the beneficial effect of PCAOB guidance. These results have important implications for auditing research and practice. It extends previous archival research on workload effects and uses a unique questionnaire design to reexamine workload pressures in a behavioral setting. The results of hypothesis testing on workload pressure and PCAOB guidance, although lacking consistent statistical significance; exhibit trends that agree with proposed theoretical relationships. Tests on the effects of nondiagnostic information show strong statistical support for previous studies in the area of psychology and audit. This study’s greatest contribution suggests that audit pressures do not produce equivalent effects on auditor judgment; time pressure improves audit judgment, while workload pressure does not (Glover 1994, 1997). These results can be explained by examining the relationship between stress and audit judgment performance (Choo 1995, Yerkes and Dodson 1908). Different types and different degrees of audit pressures may correspond to different levels of audit pressure. Low to moderate levels of audit pressure, such as the level of time pressure used in Glover’s (1994, 1997) study improve audit performance. Higher audit pressures, such as high workload during an auditor’s busy season, may lower audit performance.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act made audit committees directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and supervision of companies' auditors. Limited research in the auditor selection process and PCAOB inspections suggest that managers, not audit committees, may still be selecting the auditors, and that inspection reports are not useful. This study addresses both of these areas. This paper considers two theories of governance, Agency Theory and Institution Theory, to analyze the audit committee members' auditor selection process. The study examines whether Audit Committee Members use two specific types of audit quality indicators, other than managers' recommendation, in evaluating auditors. In a setting where the manager recommends the auditor, the auditors' inspection results (favorable/unfavorable) and a prior manager/auditor affiliation (absent/present) are manipulated in a between-subject research design, using financially literate professionals as a proxy for audit committee members. The study finds that audit quality perception and auditor selection are jointly determined. Inspection results are positively associated with audit quality perception and auditor selection. The nature of a manager-auditor affiliation is directly associated with audit quality perception and inversely related to auditor selection. Further, controlling for perception, audit committee members are more likely to recommend auditors with unfavorable inspection results, if a prior affiliation with management is present than if an affiliation is absent. Overall, the results indicate that audit committee members are diligent in evaluating auditors, and PCAOB inspection results are useful. The results of this study contribute to the audit committee effectiveness and PCAOB literature. / by Veena Looknanan-Brown. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-Florida Atlantic University, 2011. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2011. Mode of access: World Wide Web.