Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Sydney, 1986. / Title from title screen (19th January, 2009) Bibliography: leaves 463-501. Also available in print form.

In the two decades between 1970 and 1990, hundreds of people passed through the ALP branches of Leichhardt Municipality. These were predominantly members of what this thesis calls a 'middle class Left', employed in professions and para-professions like teaching or the public service and motivated, to one degree or another, by the social movements and politics of the late 1960's and early 1970's. This is a social history incorporating the life histories of a selection of these people. It is set against the backdrop of conflicts with incumbent, conservative, working class-based political machines and the political climate of the times. The thesis is in four parts. Part I, the introduction, establishes the point of view of the writer as it shapes what is also a 'participant history'. In this context, and that of the oral history interviews, the introduction addresses the relationship between memory and history. Parts II and III are the body of the thesis and each is lead by a 'photo-essay', recognising the complimentary importance of a visual narrative. Part II sets out the broad political topography of the 1970's and early 1980's. Chapter one describes the middle-classing of the ALP in Leichhardt Municipality, set against a review of the principal literature. It then moves through chapters two to four to examine the three loci of middle-classing: Annandale, Balmain and Glebe. Part III moves on into the 1980's when the middle class Left 'takes power'. It examines, in chapter five, the emerging, sharp, divisions among the Left on Leichhardt Council and in the contests for federal and state parliamentary seats. Chapter six examines the deepening of these divisions in the mid to late 1980's, concluding with the climactic struggle over the Mort Bay public housing project. Chapter seven looks at the diaspora of the Labor Left in Leichhardt at the end of the 1980's as the branch membership declined and many sought out political alternatives to the ALP. Part IV brings the thesis to its conclusion, focussing on the complexities and ambiguities of the middle class Left and drawing out the main socio-political themes of the two decades.

This thesis is a study of the federal Australian Labor Party (ALP) in Opposition. It seeks to identify the various factors that shape the political direction of the party when it is out of office by examining three important periods of Labor Opposition. It is argued in the first period (1967-72) that the main factor in the party’s move to the left was the radicalisation that occurred in Australian (and global) politics. Labor in Opposition is potentially more subject to influence by extra-parliamentary forces such as trade unions and social movements. This was true for this period in the case of the reinvigorated trade union movement and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement, whose policy impacts on the ALP under Gough Whitlam are examined in detail. While every one of the party's policies cannot be attributed to the tumult of the period, it is argued that Labor's Program embodied the mood for social change. The second period (1975-83) records a much different experience. After Labor's Dismissal from office in November 1975, the enduring conclusion drawn by the party was that it had failed in government as economic managers, and that in future it would need to embrace responsible economic management and to jettison programmatic-style reform. This conclusion was accepted and argued by both federal leaders during this time, Gough Whitlam (1975-77) and Bill Hayden (1977-83). The thesis argues that the key reason for Labor's abandonment of reformist politics was the dramatic shift in the economic context wrought by the collapse of the post-war boom in 1974, which undermined the economic basis of the Program. The degree to which 'economic responsibility' governed Labor's approach to policy-making is highlighted through case studies of uranium mining and the Prices-Incomes Accord. The final period of Opposition (1996-2001) commences with the party’s landslide defeat at the 1996 Federal Election. Under the leadership of Kim Beazley, the party continued in the pro-free market policy tradition of Labor Prime Ministers Bob Hawke and Paul Keating. In conjunction with this, it employed a 'small-target' strategy that pitched its electoral success on community anger towards the government, rather than any alternative policies of the Opposition. The free-market policy continuity is set in the context of the ideological effects of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, in the aftermath of which all political players accepted that there was no real alternative to the market. Furthermore, the overall state of the Australian and world economies was not conducive to a return to 'tax and spend' policies. The party’s bipartisanship on globalisation and economic rationalism effectively robbed it of an alternative political approach to that of the Coalition. Thus, in a sense it was hemmed into the 'small-target' strategy. The thesis concludes by comparing and contrasting the three periods, and assigning weight to the various factors that shape Labor in Opposition.

For over two decades the issue of East Timor's right to self-determination has been a ‘prickly’ issue in Australian foreign policy. The invasion by Indonesian forces in 1975 was expected, as Australian policy-makers had been well informed of the events leading up to the punitive action being taken. Indeed, prior discussions involving the future of the territory were held between the Australian Prime Minister and the Indonesian President in 1974. In response to the events unfolding in the territory the Australian Labor Government at the time was presented with two policy options for dealing with the issue. The Department of Defence recommended the recognition of an independent East Timor; whereas the Department of Foreign Affairs proposed that Australia disengage itself as far as possible from the issue. The decision had ramifications for future policy considerations especially with changes in government. With the Department of Foreign Affairs option being the prevailing policy what were the essential ingredients that give explanation for the government's choice? It is important to note the existence of the continuity and cyclical nature of attitudes by Labor governments toward Indonesia before and after the invasion. To do so requires an analysis of the influence ‘Doc’ Evatt had in shaping any possible Labor tradition in foreign policy articulation. The support given by Evatt for the decolonisation of the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia) gave rise to the development of a special relationship-so defined. Evidence of the effect Evatt had on future Labor governments may be found in the opinions of Gough Whitlam. In 1975 when he was Prime Minister, Whitlam felt the East Timor issue was merely the finalisation of Indonesia's decolonisation honouring Evatt's long held anti-colonialist tradition existing in the Australian Labor Party. The early predisposition toward Indonesia's cohesiveness surfaced again in the Hawke and Keating Labor governments of later years. It did not vary a great deal with changes in government The on-going commitment to preserving and strengthening the bilateral relationship meant Indonesia's territorial integrity became the focus of the Australian political elites’ regional foreign policy determinations. The actions taken by policy-makers served to promote the desire for a stable region ahead of independence claims of the East Timorese. From a realist perspective, the security dilemma for Australian policy-makers was how to best promote regional order and stability in the South East Asian region. The desire for regional cohesiveness and stability continues to drive Australian political elites to promote policies that gives a priority to the territorial integrity of regional states. Indonesia, in spite of its diversity, was only ever thought of as a cohesive unitary state and changes to its construct have rarely been countenanced. Australia's political elite justifications for this stance vacillate between strategic and economic considerations, ideological (anti-colonialism) to one of being a pragmatic response to international politics. The political elite argues the projection of power into the region is in Australia’s national interest. The policies from one government to the next necessarily see the national interest as being an apparent fixed feature of foreign policy. The persistent fear of invasion from the north traditionally motivated Australia's political elite to adopt a strategic realist policy that sought to ‘shore up’ the stability, strength and unity of Indonesia. The national interest was deemed to be at risk if support for East Timorese independence was given. The national interest though can involve more than just the security issue, and the political elite when dealing with East Timor assumed that they were acting in the common good. Questions that need to be addressed include determining what is the national interest in this context? What is the effect of a government invoking the national interest in debates over issues in foreign policy? And, who should participate in the debate? In an effort to answer these questions an analysis of how the ex-foreign affairs mandarin Richard Woolcott defines the national interest becomes crucial. Clearly, conflict in East Timor did have implications for the national interest. The invasion of East Timor by Indonesia had the potential to damage the relationship, but equally communist successes in 1975 in Indo-China raised Australia's regional security concerns. During the Cold War, the linking of communism to nationalism was driving the decision-making processes of the Australian policy-makers striving to come to grips with the strategic realities of a changing region. Because of this, did the constraints of world politics dominated by Cold War realities combined with domestic political disruption have anything to do with Australia's response? Certainly, Australia itself was experiencing a constitutional crisis in late 1975. The Senate had blocked supply and the Labor Government did not have the funds to govern. The Governor-General by dismissing the Labor Government finally resolved the impasse. What were the reactions of the two men charged with the responsibility of forming the caretaker government toward Indonesia's military action? And, could the crisis have prevented the Australian government from making a different response to the invasion? Importantly, and in terms of economic security, did the knowledge of oil and gas deposits thought to exist in the Timor Sea influence Australia's foreign policy? The search for oil and gas requires a stable political environment in which to operate. Therefore for exploration to continue in the Timor Sea Australia must have had a preferred political option and thoughts of with whom they preferred to negotiate. What was the extent of each government's cooperation and intervention in the oil and gas industry and could any involvement have influenced the Australian political elites’ attitude toward the prospect of an independent East Timor? Australia's subsequent de jure recognition that East Timor was part of Indonesia paved the way for the Timor Gap (Zone of Cooperation) Treaty signing in 1989. The signing underpinned Australia's acceptance of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. The outcome of the analysis of the issues that shaped Australia's foreign policy toward East Timor showed that the political elite became locked into an integration model, which was defended by successive governments. Moreover, they formed an almost reflexive defence of Indonesia both at the domestic and international level.

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