This thesis critically analyses the Australian law of jurisdiction in private international litigation. Jurisdiction in international litigation is often regarded as a procedural area of law which is less important than choice of law in practical and theoretical terms. There has been little scholarly attention devoted specifically to the study of jurisdiction in Australia. In recent years, jurisdiction has certainly overtaken choice of law in practical importance. This emphasises the need for critical academic study of the law of jurisdiction. This thesis addresses this need. It critically analyses the present principles and the manner in which they are applied, identifies the factors which should influence the law, and proposes appropriate reforms to the principles. This thesis is in five related parts. The first part examines the procedural and constitutional context in which the principles of jurisdiction have been developed and applied. This context has important implications for the law and practice of jurisdiction, which have largely been overlooked in the literature, although they are important in understanding how the principles have developed and how they are applied. The second part critically analyses the present law of jurisdiction. The Australian principles of jurisdiction have not changed substantially in the last 100 years, while economic and social conditions which affect international litigation have undergone dramatic and wide-reaching changes. The present law provides that the courts are jurisdictionally competent in a wide range of cases, which do not all require a substantial connection between the dispute and the forum. The various principles applied in declining jurisdiction make it likely that the Australian courts will exercise their discretion to retain jurisdiction in the majority of cases. Foreign jurisdictional agreements should be enforced by a stay unless there are strong reasons for non- enforcement. But the application of overriding mandatory rules, even where there is a jurisdictional agreement, and the courts' wide discretion under the Australian forum non conveniens principle make it unlikely that the courts will decline to exercise jurisdiction. The present principles, in short, permit the courts to take jurisdiction in too many cases, and require them to decline to exercise jurisdiction in too few cases. The third part examines how the principles on declining jurisdiction operate in practice. This is addressed by a doctrinal and an empirical analysis of the manner in which these principles are applied by the Australian superior courts. These analyses identify factors which appear to influence decisions in practice, not all of which are consistent with the applicable principles. For example, the principle requires the court to enforce foreign jurisdictional agreements unless there are strong grounds for non-enforcement. In practice, strong grounds are easily shown. These analyses show that there are factors which influence decisions which are not always apparent from the principles, suggesting that reform is required. The fourth part identifies the factors which ought to influence the law and practice of jurisdiction. The relevant factors are identified in terms of the interests of foreign states, individual litigants' interests and the forum state's interests. The law and practice of jurisdiction are examined to determine whether those interests do in fact influence law and practice. Many important interests, especially of foreign states and of defendants, are not sufficiently taken into account. This also implies that reform of the principles is warranted. The fifth part considers how Australian jurisdictional principles could be improved. Detailed reforms are suggested, drawing on a discussion and an evaluation of different approaches to jurisdiction, particularly drawing on the European Community's Regulation on Jurisdiction and Judgments. The principles should ensure that the court is jurisdictionally competent only where it is likely to be an appropriate forum for the dispute. The proposed reforms identlfy grounds of exclusive jurisdiction, provide protection to weaker parties to contracts, and otherwise require the enforcement of jurisdictional agreements. Default rules of jurisdiction which are likely to indicate a strong connection between the forum and the dispute are proposed. Specific principles for declining jurisdiction are also proposed. Retention of the forum non conveniens principle is recommended, but the English principle is advocated as a more suitable and just approach. This thesis is intended to contribute both to a theoretical understanding of this area of law and to an understanding of its practical application.

This thesis is a history of moral rights in Australian law. It traces the historical discourse about moral rights in Australian law and demonstrates how that discourse has shaped the meaning moral rights have come to assume in their current form under the current regime contained in the Copyright Amendment (Moral Rijghts) Act 2000. This history examines the reception and later production of a moral rights discourse in Australian law, and reveals that the historical discourse about Australian moral rights was dominated by the three themes; foreignness, international obligation and economic impact. I contend these three themes fundamentally shaped moral rights as they now appear in the moral rights regime. As the history unfolds, it will become clear that the moral rights regime was organised around a specific repertoire of arguments and imaginings, and it is this discourse that informs this thesis. My argument is pursued in three stages. Section One of the thesis provides the historical detail of the moral rights trajectory in Australian jurisprudence, and reveals, within that history, the emergence of three dominant themes, which are pursued in subsequent detail. In addition to the history, this section also provides detailed discussion of the legislative provisions in order to illustrate moral rights as a product of the history, and it highlights some of the shortcomings of the regime and provides some background for the case study in Section Two. Section Two of the thesis interrogates the structure of the moral rights regime by applying the Act's provisions to the case study of indigenous creators, thus providing a contemporary example of how these rights may work in practice, as the result of the historical discourse. Thus this section sets the scene for final part of the thesis, which delves further into the historical discourse. Section Part Three follows the themes of the moral rights debate as they emerged historically. Reconceptualizing the moral rights discourse in this way helps to explain why the debates about moral rights took a particular course and produced the outcomes it did. The starting point for these discussions is a detailed examination of the themes of foreignness, international obligation and economic impact, and follows these themes as they evolved chronologically. In particular, the discussion reveals that the debates about moral rights effectively fall into two eras. The first era (1928-1988) centred around the question of whether Australia should introduce moral rights and the debates about the appropriateness of the reception. At the commencement of the second era (1988-2000) the question shifted to what form moral rights should take. This then provides a backdrop with which to understand why specific discussions about moral rights were sidelined during the years of debates leading up to the legislation; in particular, the subject and the object; which form the fulcrum of a moral rights action. This is an essential part of the history because it explains why the subject and the object came to be imagined and constructed in such a narrow and limited way and clarifies why the moral rights provisions appear manifestly ineffective, particularly for indigenous creators and their communities. This thesis contributes to legal history in three important ways. First, it provides a detailed account of a discourse about moral rights in Australian law, and in doing so challenges the long held assumptions about their reception and production. Second, it highlights the importance of history to legal discourse. Just as regulatory regimes, institutions, and rules are integral to the law, so too are the informal practices, discourses and contexts on which they were based. Third, it reminds the reader that history is a signpost, and this history of moral rights demonstrates that the way this law was derived, imagined and constructed has significance for the social, cultural and legal context in which that process takes place.

Thesis (LLM)--Stellenbosch University, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Judicial management has been part of South African company law since 1926. It was introduced as a procedure to provide for a corporate rescue. Judicial management has changed little since its introduction. This is in stark contrast with the position in other jurisdictions where the need for improved corporate or business rescue procedures has received considerable attention in the last few decades. This thesis examines the suitability of judicial management as a business rescue procedure for the current South African circumstances and compares it to similar mechanisms in England and Australia. The modem economy relies on credit. Furthermore the globalisation of markets and the increase in competition between enterprises add to the unpredictability of an enterprise's economic circumstances. Thus, one of the important objectives of a corporate insolvency regime is the preservation of viable economic enterprises. A business rescue procedure such as judicial management is therefore an essential component of a corporate insolvency regime. However, judicial management needs reform. The existing shortcomings of judicial management include its high cost, the appointment of professional liquidators as business rescuers, the lack of a business rescue culture, the absence of an approved rescue plan, the treatment of judicial management as an extraordinary measure in corporate insolvency and the use of section 311 of the Companies Act as a corporate rescue mechanism. This thesis proposes that judicial management should commence with a mere resolution by the directors. This is less cumbersome than the existing procedure to commence judicial management comprising a court order. Judicial management triggers a stay of limited duration on legal proceedings that provides an essential breathing space to devise and implement a rescue plan. Once judicial management commences the creditors should hold the power to decide on the future of the company. They can therefore accept or reject a rescue plan (prepared by the judicial manager) for the restructuring of current rights and obligations and for the future management of the company. During judicial management and the execution of the rescue plan, control of the company's assets vests in the judicial manager and directors lose their powers of management. Judicial managers should be encouraged to make a success of judicial management by providing that the judicial manager cannot be appointed as the liquidator in a subsequent liquidation. Furthermore, the burden of the costs of judicial management could be eased by providing a more flexible system for the remuneration of the judicial manager. A statutory business rescue procedure interacts with other components of an insolvency regime and other areas of law. In order to optimise the positive effects of a business rescue procedure certain changes are proposed regarding statutory provisions on insolvent trading, the phenomenon of phoenix companies, section 311 of the Companies Act and tax legislation. The thesis also proposes a smooth transition from judicial management to voluntary liquidation. The thesis has an annexure with draft legislation to give effect to the principal changes proposed by it for the Companies Act. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Geregtelike bestuur is reeds sedert 1926 deel van die Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappyereg. Dit is ingestel as 'n prosedure om maatskappye van ondergang te red. Geregtelike bestuur het sedertdien min verander. Dit is in skerp teenstelling met ander jurisdiksies wat die afgelope paar dekades toegewy gewerk het aan prosedures om korporasies en besighede te red. Hierdie tesis ondersoek die toepaslikheid van geregtelike bestuur as 'n prosedure om in die huidige Suid-Afrikaanse omstandighede besighede van ondergang te red en vergelyk dit met soortgelyke prosedures in Engeland en Australië. Moderne ekonomieë se afhanklikheid van krediet, die globalisering van markte en die toename in mededinging tussen ondernemings dra by tot die wisselvallige ekonomiese omstandighede van 'n onderneming. Die redding van lewensvatbare ondernemings is gevolglik 'n belangrike doelstelling van korporatiewe insolvensiereg. Daarom is 'n prosedure soos geregtelike bestuur om ondernemings te red 'n onontbeerlike element van korporatiewe insolvensiereg. Geregtelike bestuur moet egter hervorm word. Geregtelike bestuur het verskeie tekortkominge waaronder hoë regskoste, die aanstelling van professionele likwidateurs as persone om ondernemings te red, die gebrek aan 'n kultuur om ondernemings te red, die afwesigheid van 'n goedgekeurde reddingsplan, die hantering van geregtelike bestuur as 'n buitengewone remedie in korporatiewe insolvensiereg en die gebruik van artikel 311 van die Maatskappywet as 'n meganisme om maatskappye van likwidasie te red. Die tesis stel voor dat geregtelike bestuur met 'n blote direksiebesluit in werking gestel word. Dit is minder belemmerend as die hofbevel waarmee geregtelike bestuur tans begin word. Geregtelike bestuur stel'n moratorium van beperkte duur in werking waartydens geen geregtelike prosesse teen die maatskappyaanhangig gemaak of voortgesit kan word nie. Dit gee die maatskappy die nodige grasie om 'n reddingsplan uit te werk en te implementeer. Opsomming Geregtelike bestuur is reeds sedert 1926 deel van die Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappyereg. Dit is ingestel as 'n prosedure om maatskappye van ondergang te red. Geregtelike bestuur het sedertdien min verander. Dit is in skerp teenstelling met ander jurisdiksies wat die afgelope paar dekades toegewy gewerk het aan prosedures om korporasies en besighede te red. Hierdie tesis ondersoek die toepaslikheid van geregtelike bestuur as 'n prosedure om in die huidige Suid-Afrikaanse omstandighede besighede van ondergang te red en vergelyk dit met soortgelyke prosedures in Engeland en Australië. Moderne ekonomieë se afhanklikheid van krediet, die globalisering van markte en die toename in mededinging tussen ondernemings dra by tot die wisselvallige ekonomiese omstandighede van 'n onderneming. Die redding van lewensvatbare ondernemings is gevolglik 'n belangrike doelstelling van korporatiewe insolvensiereg. Daarom is 'n prosedure soos geregtelike bestuur om ondernemings te red 'n onontbeerlike element van korporatiewe insolvensiereg. Geregtelike bestuur moet egter hervorm word. Geregtelike bestuur het verskeie tekortkominge waaronder hoë regskoste, die aanstelling van professionele likwidateurs as persone om ondernemings te red, die gebrek aan 'n kultuur om ondernemings te red, die afwesigheid van 'n goedgekeurde reddingsplan, die hantering van geregtelike bestuur as 'n buitengewone remedie in korporatiewe insolvensiereg en die gebruik van artikel 311 van die Maatskappywet as 'n meganisme om maatskappye van likwidasie te red. Nadat geregtelike bestuur in aanvang geneem het behoort die krediteure die mag te hê om oor die toekoms van die maatskappy te besluit. Krediteure sou 'n reddingsplan (voorberei deur die geregtelike bestuurder) wat vir die herstrukturering van die regte en verpligtinge van die maatskappy en vir sy toekomstige bestuur voorsiening maak kon aanvaar of verwerp. Gedurende geregtelike bestuur en die uitvoering van die reddingsplan vestig die beheer oor die bates van die maatskappy in die geregtelike bestuurder. Die direksie verloor terselfdertyd alle bestuursbevoegdhede. Geregtelike bestuurders behoort aangemoedig te word om 'n sukses van die geregtelike bestuur te maak deur te bepaal dat 'n geregtelike bestuurder nie as likwidateur aangestel kan word indien die maatskappy uiteindelik gelikwideer word nie. Die las van hoë koste kan verlig word deur 'n buigsame stelsel van vergoeding vir die geregtelike bestuurder in te stel. 'n Statutêre reddingsprosedure vir ondernemings staan in wisselwerking met ander elemente van korporatiewe insolvensiereg en ander regsgebiede. Ten einde die positiewe uitwerking van 'n reddingsprosedure vir ondernemings te optimaliseer word sekere veranderinge ten opsigte van die wetgewing met betrekking tot handeldryf in insolvente omstandighede, die verskynsel van "phoenix" maatskappye, artikel 311 van die Maatskappywet en belastingwetgewing voorgestel. Die tesis stelook 'n gladde oorskakeling van geregtelike bestuur na vrywillige likwidasie voor. Die tesis sluit ook 'n aanhangsel met voorgestelde wetgewing in om uitvoering te gee aan die belangrikste veranderinge aan die Maatskappywet wat in die tesis voorgestel word.

While the word 'critique' appeared frequently in Australian legal education texts between 1987 and 2003, the meaning and the emphasis accorded critique varied widely. Michel Foucault's ideas about the close relationship between knowledge and power provide a theoretical framework within which this inconsistency of meaning and emphasis can be described, analysed and explained. Rather than monolithic, the discipline of legal education was by 2003 a dynamic nexus of distinct and competing discourses: doctrinalism, vocationalism, corporatism, liberalism, pedagogicalism and radicalism. Each of these six discourses was simultaneously a form of knowledge and an expression of disciplinary power within the law school. As a form of knowledge, each discourse accorded critique a different meaning and a different emphasis as a consequence of a range of historical, social and political contingencies. As an expression of power, each discourse was an attempt to achieve a set of objectives including the universalisation of a particular approach to the teaching of law and the enhancement of the status of a particular role within the law school. Critique, in a variety of forms, was a strategy employed by each discourse in order to achieve these objectives and to dominate and displace competing discourses.

A body of critical legal scholarship argues that, by the time they have completed their studies, students who enter legal education holding social ideals and intending to use their legal education to achieve social change, have become cynical about the ability of the law to do so and no longer possess such ideals. This is explained by critical scholars to be the result of a process of ideological indoctrination, aimed at ensuring that graduates uphold the narrow and conservative interests of the legal profession and capitalist society, being exercised by law schools acting as adjuncts of the legal profession, and exercised upon the passive body of the law student. By using Foucault’s work on knowledge, power, and the subject to interrogate the assumptions upon which this narrative is based, this thesis intends to suggest a way of thinking differently to the approach taken by many critical legal scholars. It then uses an analytics of government (based on Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’) to consider the construction of the legal identity differently. It examines the ways in which the governance of the legal identity is rationalised, programmed, and implemented, in three Queensland law schools. It also looks at the way that five prescriptive texts to ‘surviving’ law school suggest students establish and practise a relation to themselves in order to construct their own legal identities. Overall, this analysis shows that governance is not simply conducted in the profession’s interests, but occurs due to a complex arrangement of different practices, which can lead to the construction of skilled legal professional identities as well as ethical lawyer-citizens that hold an interest in justice. The implications of such an analytics provide the basis for original ways of understanding legal education, and legal education scholarship.