In this thesis I have set out to perform two interlocking, although separable, tasks. The first is to provide some insight into the philosophical and theoretical roots of ethnomethodology by investigating the work of Garfinkel and others who have in some way assimilated, borrowed from, or been influenced by his work, in a context provided by a discussion of the work of Husserl and Schutz on the one hand and that of Wittgenstein on the other. I will show the ways in which Schutz has adapted Husserlian phenomenological insights to further his own fundamentally sociological ends and how Garfinkel, borrowing only selectively from Schutz and allowing many other influences to play upon his work (here Kaufman, Parsons and Gurwitsch are important sources of ideas), transforms ideas generated in the phenomenological tradition to an extent which suggests that his writings should be seen in a context set by Wittgenstein's writings (in terms particularly of notions such as 'form of life' and trulel in a sense of those terms which will become apparent), rather than encumbering it with too uuch phenomenological baggage I will move on from there to investigate the writings of other ethnomethodologists, showing how some - for example Cicourel - remain more firmly within the phenomenological tradition, whilst others have taken various of Garfinkel's ideas (although few have taken them whole and undiluted) and investigated, in their various ways, their implications for the study of -social order and society. In the process of this arm of the discussion I will point out some of the weaknesses and strengths of various ethnomethodological positions, suggesting in conclusion that there is important work being done and waiting to be done in the areas currently being investigated. The second task of the thesis is less historically oriented. Here the focus will be upon theoretical issues surrounding the problem of social order and the problem of meaning, problems which will be seen to be interrelated. The chief concern here will be to show the ways in which Wittgenstein and Garfinkel struggle to present and make coherent a sense of 'meaning' which is fundamentally different from that which is espoused by phenomenologists like Schutz and by many other contemporary sociologists, and how this difference rests side by side, in Garfinkel's work, with a radically different approach to the problem of social order from that which characterises the work of Parsons and others. The thrust of this difference lies in an attempt to reconceptualise 'meaning' in a way that does not posit as fundamental the distinction between 'subjectivity' on the one hand and an 'objective' world on the other, but which instead, by emphasising the omniprevalence of 'language games' and the 'indexicality' of expressions, focuses attention on some notion of 'form of life' or of the 'formal structures of practical actions'. The effect of this shift of emphasis, I will suggest, is that 'meaning' becomes transformed from seeming to be a 'thing' of some kind contained within a 'structure' of meanings to become instead an 'embedded' phenomenon, bound up with what we do in the social world, where the things we do generate and exhibit those orderly features which make meaning possible.

The notions of 'meaning' and 'historicity', of the manner in winch they inform or reflect conceptions of collective or ‘social’ being and of individuality, and of the ways in which these dimensions are primordially experienced by human beings. This investigation concerns primarily the phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions and especially Heidegger’s formulation of the notion of historicity as correlative to the 'event' of truth understood in terms of an interplay between disclosure and concealment (aAf)0eia) and Gadamer's understanding of 'meaning and historicity’ as an indispensable couplet for both philosophical hermeneutics and the social sciences. Nevertheless the present inquiry does not content itself with an exploration of the notions of 'meaning' and historicity' within the confines of the phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition, but rather attempts to attain a more adequate grasp of those concepts by a critical Juxtaposition of Heidegger and Gadamer with accounts that have the 'social' as their point of departure. Thus, Heidegger’s formulations on historicity are not only examined in relation to his 'immediate' legacy of German thought -especially Hegel and Nietzsche- but are also contrasted with conceptions of history pertaining to the Marxist tradition and especially Castoriadis’ conception of the social-historical. In effect, the contrast between 'historicity' and the workings of 'actual' history has arguably prevented a genuine dialogue between the Marxist and the phenomenological camps. Far from being concerned with a synthesis of those traditions or from being preoccupied with justifying either of them I have attempted to show that a combined reading of both is indispensable for the disclosure of the essential dimensions of historical experience. Castoriadis' emphasis on the ‘magmatic’ character of unconscious significations and his grounding of social-historical 'instituting' on the unconscious, together with Heidegger's attempt to link the primordial experience of history with myth have given me occasion to dissociate the very notion of 'meaning' from that of 'rationality'. This should not be interpreted as a rejection of rationality or as an -at bottom- ethical invocation of a return to a pre-Critical philosophical position but rather as an attempt to indicate the primordial manner in which history is accessible in experience and which arguably precedes any thematic theorizing of the historical realm. I have finally attempted to show the antinomies inherent in any attempt to grasp ‘rationally’ the social-historical by a detailed exploration of Gadamer's ambivalent conception of tradition’ and 'prejudice'. Gadamer’s conception of the ‘fusion of horizons’ gave me occasion to reflect further on the manner in which history and truth are made correlatively accessible in thought, in experience, and in historical praxis.

This work represents an interdisciplinary attempt at the development of a-- scientific theory of norms and normativity. Normativity, understood in its most general interpretation as value determinations and prescriptions, has traditionally been troublesome to account by science and difficult to “place” within a scientific worldview. Such an accomplishment is attempted by the joining in conversation of two bodies of literature. The first of these is Steve Fuller’s naturalist epistemology and the second corresponds to the situated study of cognition, along with the epistemologies that have resulted from their findings. These two bodies of literature constitute the most radically naturalist attempts at developing a viable frame of epistemological and/or normative reference within their respective fields.

This thesis explores the possibility of a modern consumption distinct from discussions of the ‘consumer,’ ‘consumption,’ ‘consumerism’ and the ‘consumer society’ and rejects the possibility of a universal or ‘human’ consumption-activity rooted in use that merely varies with space and time. This is done by exploring the roots of these terms in the philosophical anthropology of economic theory, specifically the concept of homo oeconomicus. The economic inheritance within contemporary accounts of the capitalist consumption-relation is then pursued through a review of the disciplinary approaches to the topic made by historical accounts of ‘consumer culture,’ the study of patterns of use across the social sciences, from psychology, through geography to marketing and anthropology. Finally, the contemporary sociological investigation of ‘consumption’ is critiqued and its broad reliance upon a utilitarian-derived cost/benefit model adapted to incorporate ‘sign-value’ and discussions of postmodernism are rejected. This prompts the proposal of a ‘postphenomenological’ approach to the study of modern consumption and the ‘terrain’ upon which it is available to experience. The bulk of the thesis, chapters three, four and five, are taken up with a review of the contemporary commodity-form using the phenomenological categories of space, time and causality, respectively. This allows a historical perspective to be employed in the analysis of the role of material factors in the constitution of subjective experience and its role within the emergence of modern consumption. The theory of modern consumption and the sociospatial terrain upon which it unfolds is developed through the concept of ‘affordance,’ adapted from environmental psychology and a re-definition of ‘possession’ that arises from the inter-relation of being and having. This allows the rejection of the orthodox models and theories of ‘consumption’ outlined in chapter two. The thesis concludes by advocating an engagement in a ‘playful’ modern consumption that engages with the commodity-form as the medium within which contemporary ‘experience’ is transmitted and, which, consequently, forms the of the phenomenal forms of subjective experience derived from the capitalist consumption-relation.

This thesis argues that questions of ethical life, moral identity, and gender are inextricably involved, and that an appropriate conception of each is necessary for the thinking of the others. In particular it seeks to demonstrate that the way in which freedom is conceived in its relation to moral identity and ethical life has profound implications for the thought of gender relations. It is further argued that the writings of Kierkegaard open up a way of relating freedom and the finite that offers the possibility of re-thinking gender. The writings of Rousseau and of Freud are examined to show the interdependence of their philosophical anthropology and the systematic subordination and exclusion of women that operates in each of them. In each case it is shown that, despite the very different, and even opposed ways that they construe the nature of moral identity and its relation to ethical life, a parallel gender polarity is at work. In Rousseau male moral identity rests on independence from society and infinite, excessive freedom. This is brought into relation to the mundane world of ethical life through gender. Women are denied independence and moral identity and made responsible for social being. Their subordination is such that dependence on them does not destroy the integrity of men. The crisis of this unstable structure is demonstrated through a reading of Rousseau's novel La Nouvelle Heloise, the death of whose heroine is shown to be the moment of collapse of the Rousseauean synthesis. In Freud moral identity is achieved through the identification of the self with social authority. The finite freedom that can be thought in psychoanalysis rests on a fusion of ethical and moral life. The "depersonalisation" of the super-ego is the road to liberation. Through the gendered experience of the Oedipal drama this path can only be taken by men. Woman are again exclude from moral identity, being allowed only a "masochistic" relation to the Law. The crisis of this structure is found in the notion of the "archaic heritage", which it is argued, represents a collapse of Freudian thought. Finally both Freud and Rousseau are brought into relation with the psychological writings of Kierkegaard, whose distinctive notion of freedom and faith is held to address the limitations of both sets of writing. Infinite freedom is made to co-exist with finitude. The implications of these writings for the thought of gender is briefly explored through other of the writings of Kierkegaard.