This thesis considers George Orwell’s response to the emergency legislation of the Second World War. Considering legal and historical sources alongside his biography and corpus it reassesses the impact of Orwell’s works in the context of his patriotism, Englishness and views on the law. This thesis argues that Orwell’s experiences in Burma and Spain established his expectations – as an Englishman – for the law during a crisis. It juxtaposes Orwell’s pre-war anxiety regarding potentially ‘fascising measures’ to his relative silence when emergency powers were introduced in England, suggesting Orwell tacitly endorsed controversial measures, including internment, in the unique context of the early war. The thesis considers wartime compromises Orwell felt were necessary, noting his complicity in curtailing freedom of speech at the BBC, before his critical voice re-emerged regarding the normalisation of emergency powers. New readings of 'Animal Farm' and 'Nineteen Eighty-Four' highlight both their resonance with the English wartime regime and the dangers implicit in emergency legal systems, drawing out Orwell’s concern that eroding English values and legal traditions removed a bulwark against totalitarianism. Given his changing positions concerning individual freedoms this thesis consequently argues for a more nuanced appraisal of Orwell’s reputation as an unwavering defender of civil liberties.

Children are largely ignored in medical ethics, which concentrates on adults with capacities that children lack (including competence, or rationality). This thesis answers how medical decisions should be made for unquestionably incompetent children. The dominant approach to medical ethics in the West depends on respect for autonomy and this distorts medical ethics for children in two ways. Firstly, parental decisions for children may be taken to have the same authority as respect for autonomy. Secondly, theories of general well-being have focused on adult’s well-being with an endorsement of the components of that well-being by the adult themselves. This has hindered the development of an objective, impartial, conception of interests, arguably, the best fit for making decisions for very young children. I argue that although children are clearly demarcated from adults in medical ethics, there is not a clear explanation of why this is. For young children others must make decisions or be prepared to override the child’s decisions. More recently, the distinction between adults and children have become blurred, exemplified by the use of terms such as ‘young person’. Children’s rights at best draw attention to children and their interests, but do not help in resolving the medical treatment of incompetent children. The most promising approach depends on articulating an account of children’s interests. For several reasons the best interests standard is not defensible. I argue that a reasoned, or reasonable, agreement upon the child’s interests should determine medical treatment. Neither the child’s parents (nor the clinicians) can be taken to have an incorrigible grasp of the child’s interests, all should justify the reasons for their choices.

Deleuze&#039 / s Struggle Against Transcendence and Criticisms About It TIBIK, Kamuran M.S., Department of Philosophy Supervisor: Prof.Dr. Yasin Ceylan December,2006, 128 pages In this study, I first studied the undecidability of transcendence and immanence. Then, I studied the demarcation problem between transcendence and immanence with its results in philosophy. Thirdly, I touched on the idea of the death of philosophy in relation to this demarcation problem. Fourthly, I tried to present Deleuze&#039 / s dualist approach to concepts and I also studied Hume&#039 / s effect on the emergence of this dualist approach. As the fifth, I tried to relate the demarcation problem to ethics, concepts and the future of philosophy. Finally, I presented questions and criticisms about both Hume&#039 / s and Deleuze&#039 / s views on immanence and ethics.

Why do we care for future generations? This work argues that the reason we care for future generations lies in our psychogenetic nature. When we think of future generations, we feel that we have to do something for them. If we all have a common feeling profile, it is plausible to assume that this common feeling profile includes &ldquo / caring for future generations&rdquo / , because all of us do care for at least our own future generations. This psychogenetic disposition enables us to explain why sometimes we act as if we do not care for future generations as well. I believe that instead of telling people what their obligations are, it would be more realistic to reach their feelings deep inside: once people are aware of their true feelings, the situation can change.

The aim of this study is to examine Hume&rsquo / s moral theory as expressed in his two main books, Treatise and Enquiry and to show the defects of this theory. Without explaining some basic doctrines such as moral motivation, moral judgment, sympathy, passions, virtues, justice e.t.c., it is not possible to understand Hume&rsquo / s moral theory. To this aim, first, Hume&rsquo / s moral theory is explained in detail. Next, in order to provide a deeper understanding of the theory, its relation with his epistemology and his aesthetics are explained. Afterwards, few philosophers who influenced Hume&rsquo / s thought such as Hobbes, Mandeville, Hutcheson have been briefly discussed. Consequently, it is claimed that Hume&rsquo / s moral theory has a heterogeneous structure so it is difficult to understand his moral theory. Hume&rsquo / s moral theory contains an ambiguity due to his conception of sympathy, which has led to some misinterpretations.

This dissertation aims to determine the role of human nature in Hume&#039 / s philosophy. It will examine how moral motivation arises when one takes human nature as the basis of moral philosophyWhat is maintained here is that Hume approaches his rival rationalist philosophers whom he criticised for drawing on metaphysics and rational methods in building the foundation of their ethics. Hume&rsquo / s &ldquo / science of man&rdquo / attempts to isolate the basis of ethics from metaphysical and rational elements. However, this paper demonstrates that in doing so, Hume actually resorts to reason. Further, certain inconsistencies in Hume&rsquo / s argument can only be resolved by recourse to metaphysics. To make this clear I examine how the passions that Hume puts forward as the basis of human nature cause sympathy and build a sense of morality. Since the most basic feature of human nature exists within the concept of &ldquo / being-human&rdquo / , the necessity of metaphysical and ontological explanations will be shown. Hume&rsquo / s position on the goodness or wickedness of human nature is examined. As a result, the purpose of this research is to show that it is not possible to isolate ethics from metaphysical elements by constructing a science based on Newtonian methods.

The purpose of this study is to explain and evaluate Nietzsche&rsquo / s criticisms of Kantian morality. Kantian morality has greatly influenced western moral thought. Nietzsche&rsquo / s criticisms focus on the scientific and universal character of this philosophy. This work focuses on the ideas of &lsquo / freedom&rsquo / , &lsquo / autonomy&rsquo / , &lsquo / individual virtues&rsquo / and &lsquo / morality as a science&rsquo / . In order to understand and analyze Nietzsche&rsquo / s critiques, his epistemological criticisms are also evaluated.

This thesis evaluates David Hume&rsquo / s notion of justice by examining the coherence in his legal, moral, and political philosophy. It is argued that on the whole, Hume&rsquo / s use of the concept justice is coherent in his theories of law, ethics, and politics. To this end, firstly, Hume&rsquo / s moral thought is examined in detail. Secondly, his legal theory and his position in legal philosophy are considered with references to its moral aspects. Next, Hume&rsquo / s notion of justice is examined in its relation with the state. It is observed that Hume&rsquo / s conception of justice has moral, legal, and political foundations, and that all of these subjects depend on the same principles. It is shown that the laws of justice constitute an ethical, legal, and political issue in Hume&rsquo / s philosophy. According to Hume, although obeying the rules of justice is a moral topic, the laws of justice are guaranteed by the state in large societies.

This thesis analyzes the concept of Friendship in Aristotle&rsquo / s Nicomachean Ethics with its main aspects. Book VIII and Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics are devoted specifically to the concept of Friendship to explore the moral and political aspects of it. Friendship has been one of the prominent topics for moral philosophers and hence contemporary discussions lead the Nicomachean account of friendship come to the fore. Thus, the main features of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics as well as contemporary perspectives and discussions on that topic will be analyzed and explored in depth.

In this work, I scrutinize Leopold&rsquo / s land ethic and Callicott&rsquo / s interpretation of it both from normative and meta-ethical perspectives by making textual and conceptual analyses. Leopold suggests that an ethic which makes us responsible for the protection of whole nature is evolutionarily possible and ecologically necessary. Callicott tried to buttress Leopold&rsquo / s land ethic by developing a nonanthropocentric axiology and some meta-principles. Moreover, in his view, Leopold&rsquo / s views are not only compatible with nonanthropocentric axiology but also imply it. I show that Leopold did not build the land ethic on nonanthropocentrism and he did not enforce attribution of intrinsic value to nature and its constituents. I argue that weak anthropocentrism is quite compatible with Leopold&rsquo / s views, and it provides a way to maintain normative power of land ethic without being ecofascistic. Furthermore, I discuss that Leopold might not have objected attribution of intrinsic value to nonhuman beings although he primarily referred to instrumental values of nature. Moreover, I argue that Leopold preferred a middle position between the concepts of preservation and conservation. As a man of practical wisdom Leopold has always tried to find middle and practicable ways between opposing extremes to harmonize human realm with nonhuman one and to grow the embryo of the conservationist movement. Finally, I argue that Leopold&rsquo / s land ethic is a human ethic which requires human moral agents to accept responsibility for protecting whole nature in order to attain good life.