The purpose of this thesis is to provide a robust epistemological justification for Evidence Based Medicine (EMB), and thereby to demonstrate the epistemological short comings of Complementary and Alternative Medicine (CAM). CAM has received support from both philosophers, such as Rorty and Feyerband, and the Sociology and Anthropology of Medicine. The thesis will thus review both the internal coherence and the application of non-realist arguments, and counter non-realism with the realist epistemology and philosophy of science that is represented by C.S. Peirce’s pragmatism. Rorty and Feyerabend and others have developed radical forms of scientific antirealism in the latter 20th century. Subsequently, sociologists developed even more intractable forms of anti-realism, which they applied to the social study of science. This approach served to challenge the legitimacy of orthodox scientific practice (including EMB). A practical expression of this controversy was immediately identified in the question of the role of scientific authority in a democratic society. That question was immediately applied to the status of alternative medical systems and their legitimacy vis-a-vis EBM in terms of the controversy over what has come to be termed "medical pluralism": If scientific medicine has no particular authority, should other, medical systems, epistemically incompatible with EBM, be made available as well? The thesis will suggest that non-realism is in fact a marginal position within the philosophy of science. Scientists, medical researchers and medical practitioners may thus appeal to the philosophy of science in order to justify their authority in the face of challenges from CAM. However, it will be suggested that they are frequently ill-served by a reliance on a simplistic understanding of the philosophy of Karl Popper. An alternative will be proposed in the philosophy of C. S. Peirce. His pragmatism offers to medical research and medical practice a way of understanding and justifying the scientific process, a justification of realism in the face of non-realism, and a resource for the criticism of CAM and medical pluralism, as at once epistemologically ill grounded and potentially dangerous to patients and the general public.

As veterinary graduates will take up an ethically challenging role, initiatives fostering reflective thinking and moral development are being increasingly promoted in the veterinary curriculum. The aim of this study was to develop and validate a structured, reflective learning tool to promote ethical awareness in pre-clinical veterinary students. The Animal Welfare Associated Reflective Exercise (AWARE) focused on the ethical content of animal welfare related issues witnessed by pre-clinical students during extra mural study (EMS) placements. The AWARE had five sections: demographic information, animal welfare related event, personal reflection, ethical reflection and round up. Students were invited to identify, and give details of, a relevant incident that had an animal welfare impact. The AWARE guided students to reflect on their emotional reaction to the event, and its ethical basis, with reference to three well established ethical frameworks. A computer based teaching package was created to accompany the AWARE. The AWARE was piloted with 25 first year veterinary undergraduate students. Most students reflected on an experience on a lambing placement and feedback from the pilot study was positive with the majority of students self-reporting that their awareness of animal welfare and ethical issues had improved. Validation of the AWARE was then completed with a full cohort of first year veterinary students using a mixed-methods approach. Qualitative analysis revealed that students exhibited higher levels of reflection in the AWAREs than they did in the unstructured reflections previously completed by students following EMS placements. Ethically relevant text was also significantly increased in the AWAREs than in the unstructured reflections. However, completion of the AWARE did not improve scores on standardised measures of ethical sensitivity or moral reasoning, two components of moral development. Following validation, the AWARE was adapted for use in clinical EMS contexts. Fourth year veterinary students completed either the AWARE using a clinical situation which impacted animal welfare or a modified version of the AWARE, the Reflection on Professional Ethics (ROPE) which focused on a professional ethical dilemma. Three different frameworks were utilised in the ROPE – RCVS’s ten guiding principles, the bioethical principles and virtue ethics. Engagement with the AWARE was similar in clinical and pre-clinical students but fewer clinical students left responses blank and more considered their future actions. Findings from analyses of the ROPEs indicated that veterinary surgeons struggled to meet all of their ethical obligations in difficult situations, that respect for client autonomy was met in the majority of cases, and that virtue ethics was poorly understood by students completing the exercise. Investigations into moral reasoning abilities of vet students at various points in the curriculum were also carried out, using a well-established measure, the Defining Issues Test (DIT). First year students were found to have a wide range of moral reasoning abilities but their mean scores were similar to that expected for students of their age and stage. The moral reasoning scores of clinical stage veterinary students were no higher than those of first year veterinary students. Application of the DIT to qualified veterinary surgeons also revealed a wide range of moral reasoning ability, with practising veterinarians scoring no higher than members of the public and over a quarter relying primarily on a basic form of moral reasoning, normally reserved for pre-adolescent children. These findings raise important questions regarding the impact of veterinary education on moral reasoning and concern for animal welfare and veterinary well-being. Ethical development is an area where both undergraduates and qualified veterinarians could benefit from improved training of ethical skills. Collectively, the findings show that the AWARE reliably elicits ethically relevant content, is viewed positively by students and has several learning benefits including improved ability to recognise and reflect on animal welfare and ethical issues. The AWARE now forms part of the veterinary curriculum at the University of Glasgow and is available to other UK vet schools.

There are few in depth attempts to address the question: why teach ethics to medical students? This thesis argues that, identifying moral growth and development as the primary goal in teaching medical ethics is essential. Lawrence Kohlberg's moral development theory is the starting point for this research. This is important to understand the work of the researcher at the Medial School in Kuwait. The instrument used in assessing the moral reasoning of medical students at Kuwait University is the Defining Issues Test (DIT), which was devised at the University of Minnesota. The study hypothesis is that the rigid, authoritarian medical education in Kuwait University that lacks any emphasis on medical ethics will inhibit the expected growth in moral development of medical students. With a disappointing response rate of only 27.8%, it was found that normally expected growth did not occur in the first four years of medical education, suggesting that the educational experience somehow inhibited student's moral reasoning ability rather than facilitating it. The results of this study cannot be understood in isolation from the general understanding of the fabric of the researcher society, which was detailed in Chapter Five. The implication of this study is basically that medical education that ignores the moral nature of medicine will fail its own purpose, the needs of its students and the welfare of society.

This thesis is an inquiry into the economics and ethics of residential integration. Efforts to integrate otherwise segregated black and white households in the United States over the last 40 years has been met with legitimate skepticism. Primarily, there is an absence of evidence as it relates to whether neighborhoods cause disadvantage (neighborhood effects) in addition to a lack of evidence related to whether “mixing” actually produces adequate social benefits for those being moved or for society as a whole. I intend to move the conversation forward by presenting two additional considerations. First, in the economic paradigm, it is useful to explore the issue of segregation through what has been described as adverse impacts occurring in the wake of a market failure (“subprime financial crisis”). Second, there are ethical considerations relevant to the integration discussion that offer new norms by which to engage and advance our approach to residential integration and endeavors to mix. This thesis makes a contribution to knowledge by explicating these two points and ultimately providing a more morally capacious evaluative framework by which to appraise this complex social issue.

The aim of this thesis is to deconstruct the ethical framework, in which the theological community deliberates the new reproductive technologies (NRTs) and to interrogate the constructions of woman and the embryo that have correlated into the ensuing discourses from ecclesiastic traditions. The foundational premise is that the church does not fulfil its pastoral and prophetic role in this increasingly vital socio-cultural area, predominantly because woman’s subject position of invisibility in theological discourses prevents the church from speaking differently to the secular world. The methodology establishes the validity of using critical discourse analysis as a tool of deconstruction based on the insights of Michel Foucault. This is then deployed to interrogate the constructions of woman and the embryo circulating in the popular NRT narratives of the media in order to ground a secular baseline. From this vantage point, critical discourse analysis is undertaken on two church reports and three theological texts. The concluding chapter sketches a different framework of moral perception, within which the church would be enabled to offer greater empathy in its pastoral care and also to prophetically challenge macro-systems of power more effectively.

This thesis is a critical study of the prospects for contemporary accounts of ethical intuitionism. Ethical intuitionism is an epistemological theory about the nature of our justified ethical beliefs, whose central claim is that we have at least some non-inferentially justified beliefs. Having been out of favour for much of the latter-part of the twentieth century, ethical intuitionism is enjoying something of a renaissance. Contemporary proponents of the view have shown that ethical intuitionism need not fall foul of the main objections previously brought against it. Furthermore, developments in epistemology have helped to make the notion of non-inferential justification (and the associated view, epistemological foundationalism) more philosophically respectable. As I will suggest, non-inferentially justified belief paradigmatically involves a belief that is justified by a non-doxastic state. In this thesis I will consider four accounts of ethical intuitionism which each claim that a particular kind of non-doxastic state can ground justified ethical beliefs: understandings, intellectual seemings, perceptual experiences and emotional experiences. Note that contemporary ethical intuitionists do not commit themselves to there being a distinctively ethical non-doxastic state. Rather, contemporary ethical intuitionists adopt a sort of innocence by association strategy, suggesting that that we gain non-inferential justification in ethics in much the same way as we get non-inferential justification in other domains. It is my purpose in this thesis to subject each of these four accounts of contemporary ethical intuitionism to sustained philosophical criticism. Although I do not think that ethical intuitionism is implausible, it is my view that the current enthusiasm for the position ought to be seriously tempered, and that much work will need to be done in order to make it acceptable as a meta-ethical view. Firstly, with regard to the understanding (self-evidence) account I argue that there are serious problems with the view that the substantive Rossian principles are non-inferentially justifiably believed on the basis of an adequate understanding of their content. Secondly, I go on to suggest, inter alia, that proponents of the intellectual seemings account of intuitionism cannot appeal to their favoured general epistemological principle in order to ground their ethical epistemology. Given this, much work needs to be done on their part in order to show why we ought to think that intellectual seemings with an ethical content that is substantive get to justify. Thirdly, against the ethical perception account I suggest that even if it is true that ethical agents have perceptual experiences which represent ethical properties, it is not at all obvious that this supports ethical intuitionism, since insofar as such experiences get to justify, it seems plausible that they will ground inferentially or mediately justified beliefs. I do, however, suggest that a related perceptual view may be able to ground a plausible account of non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs. Finally, I consider the ethical emotions account. Given that this is a relatively new view on the philosophical scene I spend much of my time defending it against some serious recent objections brought against it. However, I will also suggest that there are question marks surrounding the epistemological credentials of emotional experiences and that much work will therefore need to be done in order to make the view that emotional experiences do in fact non-inferentially justify ethical beliefs acceptable.

The thesis argues that insights into global economic alternatives can be gained from examining existing global cultures which are in contrast to the market. Religious movements form one of the most ancient, but also one of the most enduring and controversial examples of such global cultures. Such movements, it is argued, could be one possible source, not only of localised alternatives to the dominant capitalist regime, but of emerging global alternative economic geographies. Through ethnographic research, the various geographies of one such emerging global socio-religious movement, the Focolare, are examined in depth. It is argued that this movement offers a social vision, rooted in the idea of a Trinitarian perspective, which therein contains concepts of economic life and its relationship to other dimensions of human existence not present within contemporary economic discourses. The thesis considers, in particular, the emergence of a global 'economic' project, the Economy of Sharing, which grew from within the Focolare Movement in 1991. It first explores the evolution of the Economy of Sharing, providing a statistical overview of the main contours of the project. It also examines the various local, regional and global organisational structures which form the institutional dimension of the project. The implementation of the Economy of Sharing is then examined at a local level in the social, cultural and economic geographies of two contrasting regions: Sao Paulo in Brazil and Milan in Italy. The different spaces in which the Economy of Sharing is applied are then examined in turn. In successive chapters, the spaces of sharing of the Economy of Sharing are opened out, from the local to the global, examining the new possibilities and conflicts which arise through the application of the Focolare's ethos at these different scales. The thesis concludes by asking what could be the wider implications of this economic and social experiment. In a series of more theoretical reflections, three inter-linking themes with particular geographical pertinence are re-examined in the light of the empirical research: the relationships between the cultural and the economic, the economic as networks, and the question of care for distant strangers. The possible futures of the Economy of Sharing are explored and the potential of the concept to solve the pressing global problem of the distribution of wealth are

My interests lie in consideration of conceptions of authenticity and inauthenticity from the perspective of ethical theories which conceive of the good for man with reference to human nature and concomitant beliefs regarding the most appropriate realisation of human capacities. Here, I find particular interest in the philosophical styles embodied by the existentialist and Lebensphilosophie movements. Such approaches sit outside the traditional frames of reference provided by deontological and utilitarian approaches to ethical reasoning and yet do I shall argue, share significant similarities with ancient aretaic styles of ethics. Here, I take Aristotle to represent those aspects of ethical thought which are quintessentially of this period of intellectual history. I find not merely points of comparison but a fruitful way in which to re-examine the thought of thinkers such as Nietzsche, Scheler, Heidegger and Sartre with reference to styles of ethical enquiry which place primacy upon an objective conception of happiness which centres upon the appropriate realisation of human capacity understood with reference to Aristotle's Function Argument. I argue that phenomenological analysis shares a conception of self-perspicuity in which the agent reflects upon the full contents of their conscious experience. By this means, certain self-delusions which impede entry into the ethical life, may be removed. Additionally, whilst Aristotle's 'non-law' conception of ethics shares with existentialist thought an understanding of the human situation and its normative concerns in isolation from dualistic and theistic metaphysical speculation, such philosophy is still able to provide clear and objective ethical standards - standards often lacking within existentialism. For instance, whilst Nietzsche's pronouncement of the 'death of God' signals the death also of Christian morality, we find that such philosophy is not without normative implications and in fact can be derived to a large degree from assent towards a radical and more severe ethical self-discipline. Indeed, central certainly to the thought of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre is an understanding of the role of self-deception in the human condition. Here a useful distinction may be made between those types of self-deception which may be understood as structural that is to say which are representative of an essential characteristic of human being at the abstract level - and those types of self-deception which may be described as 'motivated' or 'psychological' which relate to more specific types of self-deceptive engagement. I believe it is useful to examine both Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre through the lens of such interpretation, I find for instance that it is of use to examine the early Sartre as having a purely structural interpretation of bad faith (described by Jeanson as 'natural' bad-faith) whilst moving towards a psychological account in his later work, an account which has more specific moral implications with the possibility of 'willed conversion' to authenticity (Santoni). Additionally with Nietzsche, we also find a similar distinction between a self-deception which is in some sense preconditional and a motivational account of self-deception in which the agent infused with ressentiment falsifies reality in favour of subjective needs which are ultimately destructive of life-enhancement. In this sense the vicious individual can be said to have achieved merely a false optimum, and moreover, false from an objective standpoint.

This thesis provides a detailed analysis of the dialectic of conscience within Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. It aims to show that Hegel provides a fundamental role for conscience within the state and, thus, that Hegel preserves the right to subjective freedom within ethical life. In doing so, it aims to unite divided opinion on the role of conscience within Hegel’s political philosophy and to further disarm the charge that Hegel’s state advocates repressive or authoritarian political structures. In order to pursue this argument, this thesis first examines the emergence of conscience within the morality section of the text. It presents the moral conscience as the fruition of subjective freedom; as possessing the right to produce its own convictions and determine for itself what is good. However, it then continues to highlight the necessarily formal nature of the moral conscience and claims that, because of this formality, the content of conscience is always contingent. As such, the moral conscience is always in danger of willing evil; and it is precisely this danger that necessitates the move into ethics. The moral conscience is sublated by the true, ethical conscience. This thesis presents its own reading of the Aufhebung from the moral conscience to the true conscience of ethical life, which it believes properly reflects the dialectical progression of freedom within the text. It argues that, during the process of Aufhebung, the essential moments of moral conscience are retained and only the negative aspects are lost. In particular, it claims that conscience’s right to produce its own convictions (and, thus, the right to subjective freedom) is preserved within ethical life, but that the contingency of conscience is not. As such, true conscience (unlike the moral conscience) wills the good both in and for itself. This does not mean that true conscience cannot make mistakes. But it does entail that true conscience cannot put its own convictions beyond criticism. For this reason, this thesis also maintains that the formal conscience of morality, in its non-aufgehoben form, has no place within the ethical realm. This thesis locates true conscience’s function in the disparity between the actual and the existing state. It argues that, in recognising the rational principles inherent in society and by transforming the existing world to conform more faithfully to these principles, true conscience plays an essential role in keeping the state in line with its own, rational essence. However, it also maintains that this type of immanent critique extends only to reform, and not to not radical, social criticism. The thesis concludes by describing true conscience’s role in the legislative power.

My thesis focuses on Nietzsche’s ethics. More precisely, its main objective is to explore Nietzsche’s substantive ethical framework in a comprehensive, detailed, and systematic manner. Furthermore, the thesis also attempts to examine the epistemological, non-ethical ground of the Nietzschean substantive ethics. Also, it deals with Nietzsche’s critique of conventional morality, and explains Nietzsche’s criticism of morality in terms of his substantive ethics. The central argument of the thesis is, very briefly, that Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole does have a distinctive, substantive ethical system. Its constitutive elements or contents, being coherently related, are rich, complicated, and concrete. The major category Nietzsche employs in his ethics is the notion of ‘value’ understood as merit or desirability; he is not much concerned with the right or obligatory. Nietzsche views some human qualities, abilities and states and a style of life as noble and desirable for us. Specifically, the creative way of life, creative capacity, self-discipline, the capacity for ‘self-commanding’, knowledge, health, strong affectivity, and vitality constitute the core of Nietzsche’s evaluative standard. Moreover, a variety of dispositions, such as honesty, solitude, courage, and magnanimity, position themselves within his theory of value and are posited as crucial virtues. Finally, my thesis aims at analysing these particular contents of Nietzsche’s substantive ethical system and to examine how the system as a whole works. As such, the thesis is fundamentally an exposition based upon Nietzsche’s own texts, especially, his later works including Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, The Genealogy of Morals, Twilight of the Idols, and The Antichrist.