Despite Jung’s frequent claims that one’s moral and ethical stance play an important role both in the development and in the cure of neurosis, Jung’s ethical position had not been subjected to a critical assessment and the main sources of his ethical outlook had not been investigated. I take my point of departure in Jung’s definition of ethics as involving both consciousness and the unconscious. In the first chapter, Kant’s argument for the primacy of practical reason is shown to ground Jung’s conviction of the decisive freedom of the ego. Jung’s insistence on the importance of the moral development of both patient and therapist is also related to Kant’s call for moral independence. Having elucidated Jung’s understanding of conflicts of duty – the existence of which was denied by Kant – I discuss Jung’s Nietzschean legacy. I argue that Jung derives the crucial distinction between ethics and morality from Nietzsche, as well as the idea that ethics must consider the irrational and unintentional side of the Self; I also consider how Jung’s application of the ‘health criterion’ to ethics differs from Nietzsche’s utilisation of the same device. In Chapter 3, I highlight the critical convergence between Aristotle’s approach to ethics and Jung’s psycho-ethical paradigm: while both stress the importance of acquiring a balance between reason and the passions and place wisdom at centre stage, Jung adds that psychotherapy can successfully integrate ‘unconscious vice’. In the fourth chapter, I examine the (heterodox) Christian side of Jung’s ethics. Here I assess the role played by the psychologically ‘heavy’ notion of evil in Jung’s model and analyse the often-misunderstood link between evil and the Shadow. In Jung’s psychology, the individuated subject is the ethical subject, so depth psychology and ethics converge towards the same goal and can be mutually supportive endeavours.

The main focus of this PhD project is the development and validation of a psychometric instrument for the measurement of individual dispositions towards rules and principles. Literature review and focus groups were used to generate insights into the reasons why individuals prefer rules and principles. On the basis of that review, an initial item pool was created covering the conceptual space of dispositions towards rules and principles. The final instrument consists of 10 items, 5 items each for the rules and principles subscales. The psychometric analysis suggested that it is valid and reliable. The instrument has sound predictive power and was able to significantly predict individuals’ behavioral intentions in relation to rules and principles across contexts. I found there were gender and ethnic differences in the relationship between dispositions towards rules and principles scores and behavioural intentions. This PhD is relevant to an emerging literature in behavioural accounting research that examines how practitioners’ personal characteristics and styles affect financial reporting practice.

The present work is an exploration of the relationship between love and law in Islam and Christianity through the works of al-Ghazālī (c.1056-7-1111 C.E.) and Thomas Aquinas (c.1224/5-1274 C.E). In doing so, it aims to provide the historical theological perspective of two thinkers, each pivotal to their respective tradition, with a view to contributing to contemporary Christian-Muslim discourse, which, since the 2007 Common Word initiative, has had a strongly scholarly focus on love. Notably, however, this discourse has tended to avoid discussion pertaining to how we ‘act out’ such love, particularly in regard to legal frameworks. To redress the balance of scholarly discourse, this thesis aims to present key aspects of al-Ghazālī’s and Aquinas’ thought in order to provide the conceptual background necessary to understand and then synthesize how they likely conceived of the love-law relationship. From this, it becomes clear that for al-Ghazālī, the relationship between the heart, intellect, and various categories of knowledge is integral in fostering love for God. In a similar manner, the intellect for Aquinas is integral and its formation is based on our cumulative knowledge and experience. The key facet of the intellect for both is its ability to abstract from particulars to universals. This position is essential to the thought of both writers as God for them is beyond creation and yet in some sense also reflected in and intimately related to creation. As such, the intellect acts as a ‘bridge’ between the immanent and the transcendent. It is both affected by the knowledge gained through this-worldly legal frameworks and the other-worldly divine attributes in which it can share: this includes the divine attribute of love. The extent to which one can share the latter is dependent on the extent to which one is formed by the former. The intellect is, however, aided in this process by the gratuitous gift of revelation, which acts as immanent ‘certain’ knowledge of the transcendent. Such thinking provides the background for a detailed exploration of love and law. Towards this end, first noted is how both authors consider this-worldly law to be an appropriation of other-worldly law, represented by The Preserved Tablet for al-Ghazālī and the eternal law for Aquinas. Reasoning is essential in mankind’s attempt to understand this divine, other-worldly paradigm, although man is aided by a partial manifestation of ‘certain’ knowledge within the created order by way of revelation. Human reasoning on law results in this-worldly legal frameworks, which, in some sense, aim to provide knowledge of God either explicitly or implicitly by way of orientating towards the maintenance of the common good. However, as all good is derivative of God, this-worldly law, whether orientated to a temporal or ultimate good, should be understood as orientation to God. Inclining to our good according to our nature is something both al-Ghazālī and Aquinas maintain is ‘in-built’ within us. At its most fundamental level this good is God, but it does not exclude the material goods and objects that constitute the necessities of life. Thus law orientated towards the good (to whatever degree) encourages orientation to God (to some degree). Inclination to the good is natural within our being, and both al-Ghazālī and Aquinas define love, in the first instance, as inclination to the good according to our nature. The more we are inclined to the good, the more ‘goodness’ is made manifest within us; that is, the more we ‘participate’ in or ‘reflect’ the divine attributes. Thus the more law-abiding we are, the more we are drawn to the good. This eventually forms the intellect in such a way that it is drawn to the good in itself: al-Ghazālī calls this ‘contentment’ and Aquinas calls this ‘charity’. Based on their respective positions, this thesis will therefore firstly argue that the relationship between love and law for al-Ghazālī and Aquinas is as follows: before one can love, one must know, and law provides knowledge; however, such knowledge reflects a gratuitous gift from the creator and therefore divine love underpins the knowledge that enables human love. In course of this study, it will become evident that both al-Ghazālī and Aquinas have a strong apophatic-cataphatic emphasis to their work. That is, their methodologies affirm issues of immanence and transcendence, the knowability and unknowability of God. The only ‘certain’ knowledge for both authors is that which is represented by revelation, and to which all other knowledge should be correlated. However, all other knowledge is reflective of acquired knowledge and human reasoning, which are by nature imperfect. Providing we deploy ‘reason’ effectively in relation to the ‘certain’ knowledge of revelation, we can talk about God to an extent. In such an instance, human language points towards and reflects the divine, but does not totally encapsulate or definitively define the divine. Ultimately, the divine is beyond comprehension while equally somehow reflected or detectable within creation. Indeed, for both authors, genuine experience of the divine exhausted their prolific works and words; this realisation resulted in each adopting a state of ‘silence’ at various points in their respective careers. That is, both come to an appreciation of the insufficiency of words and concepts in the face of a transcendent, immutable God. Noting the centrality of this emphasis in both authors, this study then turns to the present day Christian-Muslim milieu touching upon the ‘reason debate’ that formed the background to the Common Word initiative. Using this as a platform, this thesis argues for a ‘re-emphasis’ or ‘re-discovery’ of the apophatic-cataphatic reasoning that both al-Ghazālī and Aquinas display for contemporary Christian-Muslim discourse. The final hope for the study is two-fold. Firstly, to encourage further discourse on how ‘love’ is ‘acted out’ between the two traditions. And secondly, to remind Christians that law has an important theological tradition within their heritage with a view to providing encouragement for further studies in the neglected area of comparative law in Christian-Muslim discourse.

Section A explores capacity to consent to healthcare in adults with an intellectual disability in a broad context. It examines the legal understanding of capacity to consent as defined by the Mental Capacity Act (2005), before going on to use decision-making theory as a framework for exploring the psychological understanding of capacity to consent. It then examines the empirical literature on what influences capacity to consent to healthcare interventions and research in people with an intellectual disability, highlighting what further research is needed. Section B reports an empirical study, which follows up on some of the further research suggested by Section A. Background: Capacity to consent has been identified as one of the significant barriers to healthcare faced by people with intellectual disabilities. In order to improve understanding, the literature has attempted to investigate factors that influence capacity to consent to healthcare. Materials and Method: This study had 32 participants with learning disabilities, 22 carers and 3 nurse participants. It examined the correlations between verbal ability, decision-making opportunities and previous health experience, with capacity to consent to healthcare in people with learning disabilities, before exploring a regression model to show how the factors interacted. Results: Previous health experience and verbal ability significantly positively correlated with capacity to consent, whilst the correlation with decision-making opportunities was almost significant. However, the regression model showed that only verbal ability was a significant predictor. Conclusion: The study reveals the importance of looking at how factors that influence capacity to consent to healthcare interact with each other, rather than just acting individually. Further research is required to expand this model to include other variables. Section C provides a critical appraisal for the whole project, exploring what was learnt and what could have been improved on, as well as considering the implications for clinical practice and further research.

This thesis is primarily a philosophical exploration of emotions. From a feminist, liberal perspective, I focus on the cultivation of morally appropriate emotions, particularly compassion, in education. My central claim is that emotions are essential elements of human intelligence and wellbeing. They are complex responses to events of significance to us and, because emotions play a central role in our lives, they help to define who we are and why we are as we are; they are expressions of our values and what we value. Emotions can motivate us to action, and so we need, if we want just institutions, to ensure that those actions are ethical and proportionate. On the view that emotions can be rational, and that they result from eudaimonistic judgements, if we want a society of healthy human beings who have concern for others, who know how to treat others fairly and sensitively, how to take action when things go wrong, then we need to attend, I argue here, to emotional health in education. We should aim to habituate the emotional capacities of all individuals as an enduring resource of good character. At issue, is how to educate young people to have healthy emotions that are ethical, proportionate, discerning and deliberative, that have ethical action as their goals, and which do not negatively discriminate on the basis of gender. In the development of emotional wellbeing and moral character, compassion is an emotion that merits particular attention. Such is the potential ethical power of this emotion, that I propose compassion to be the arch-guardian of the moral domain and, accordingly, a prerequisite for the cultivation of moral sentiment and respect for human dignity. A consideration of emotions will raise questions about who should feel, how we should feel, when, and to what extent, emotions such as compassion, sympathy or anger in acceptable and appropriate ways. I argue, too, that we should attend to the how and why of interpreting these emotions. Whilst a number of analyses reveal how powerful emotional interpretations are in stigmatising, labeling or stereotyping men and women, rarely, if ever, are questions raised in education about the assumptions on which gendered emotions rest. I respond here by proposing that if education is to serve a role in the cultivation of morally appropriate emotions, then we must question, and should no longer accept, gendered emotions, that is emotions that belong to, or are more ‘natural’ for one sex than another. Acknowledging the importance of care for wellbeing, I question the claims of some care ethicists who would have us believe that care does not require moral theory and that it is not an issue of justice. I assert, to the contrary, that unless an ethics of care rests on sound moral and conceptual constructs, it will perpetuate a bifurcation of emotion and reason whilst sustaining stereotypically gendered emotions. In order to illuminate my argument for the cultivation of de-gendered, just emotions, I draw upon empirical research on the effects of deformed emotional attitudes towards women and children which seriously impede their wellbeing and functioning. I draw, too, on novels, both for the exemplification of my arguments and as a vehicle which, creatively and sensitively used, can help us to shape our imaginative and empathic capacities to take into the folds of our consciousness people who are both similar to and remote and different from us. I am accompanied throughout the thesis by a fictional pupil ‘Nancy’ with and through whom I exculpate complex theoretical and philosophical issues. The thesis re-affirms the importance of cultivating morally appropriate de-gendered emotions, particularly compassion, and concludes with the proposal that we should incorporate and embed an understanding of the emotions in the education curricula, for both pupils and those who teach them. I propose, too, that emotions might be regarded as an architectonic capability anchoring and influencing all other human capabilities.

There is a growing consensus that the currently dominant economic practices, which excessively rely on incessant profitability‘, fails appropriately to value ethical components of environmental problems: valuation of bearers of intrinsic value (e.g. all creatures), or again bearers of inherent and instrumental value (e.g. species and ecosystems). This has led to a systematic defect in relevant decision-making with diverse associated economic, social and environmental disbenefits. Although the UN formulation of sustainable development (as opposed to the currently dominant development paradigm) provides us with guidance on formulating an alternative framework for sustainable development, it involves some serious problems. Some of these problems suggest the need for revisions, while others seem fatal to the definitions as they stand. This study argues that a different revision, suggested by the basic needs approach, can surmount the various problems, and present and defend a revised definition accordingly. The revised account recognises economic inequality and social injustice as the underlying causes for environmental injustice and thus appropriately focuses on the principles of environmental justice. This conveys a framework for corresponding systemically the interconnectedness between the seemingly competing aspects of sustainable development, the dynamic flux between development needs and environmental limits. I defend Attfield‘s version of biocentric consequentialism, which supplies a strong theoretical basis for such an ethically informed and comprehensive policy framework for sustainable development. Furthermore, I tackle different approaches to security and argue that it is hardly possible to attain a sustainable future,while disregarding the human security view in its wider sense. The study examines in close detail the applicability of the proposed policy framework for sustainable development to developing countries, with special reference to Bangladesh. It offers a list of recommendations for Bangladesh and concludes that a sustainable future for Bangladesh (and developing countries at large) is for the most part reliant on the successful implementation of recommendations of the broad general kind made in this study.

This thesis is a discussion of the ethical issues surrounding the allocation of donated sperm and eggs to patients at fe1iility clinics. It adopts an empirical bioethics approach in which traditional philosophical analysis is combined with the collection and analysis of empirical data in order to ensure that the views of those involved in the field are represented. Following the preliminary philosophical analysis, the second section of this thesis presents the results of a qualitative study, which was undertaken with fertility clinic staff and other relevant professionals such as academics and representatives of patient organisations. The views and ideas that emerged from these data were considered in light of the earlier philosophical analysis, and where relevant, initial conclusions were revised to account for these considerations. The results suggest that the prioritisation of patients based on age, violent history, and health and health behaviours is justified, that allowing conditional and known donations may benefit all patients by increasing the number of donors, and that a national system of allocation may confer similar benefits, as well as being fairer than current, local allocation.

This thesis considers George Orwell’s response to the emergency legislation of the Second World War. Considering legal and historical sources alongside his biography and corpus it reassesses the impact of Orwell’s works in the context of his patriotism, Englishness and views on the law. This thesis argues that Orwell’s experiences in Burma and Spain established his expectations – as an Englishman – for the law during a crisis. It juxtaposes Orwell’s pre-war anxiety regarding potentially ‘fascising measures’ to his relative silence when emergency powers were introduced in England, suggesting Orwell tacitly endorsed controversial measures, including internment, in the unique context of the early war. The thesis considers wartime compromises Orwell felt were necessary, noting his complicity in curtailing freedom of speech at the BBC, before his critical voice re-emerged regarding the normalisation of emergency powers. New readings of 'Animal Farm' and 'Nineteen Eighty-Four' highlight both their resonance with the English wartime regime and the dangers implicit in emergency legal systems, drawing out Orwell’s concern that eroding English values and legal traditions removed a bulwark against totalitarianism. Given his changing positions concerning individual freedoms this thesis consequently argues for a more nuanced appraisal of Orwell’s reputation as an unwavering defender of civil liberties.

Children are largely ignored in medical ethics, which concentrates on adults with capacities that children lack (including competence, or rationality). This thesis answers how medical decisions should be made for unquestionably incompetent children. The dominant approach to medical ethics in the West depends on respect for autonomy and this distorts medical ethics for children in two ways. Firstly, parental decisions for children may be taken to have the same authority as respect for autonomy. Secondly, theories of general well-being have focused on adult’s well-being with an endorsement of the components of that well-being by the adult themselves. This has hindered the development of an objective, impartial, conception of interests, arguably, the best fit for making decisions for very young children. I argue that although children are clearly demarcated from adults in medical ethics, there is not a clear explanation of why this is. For young children others must make decisions or be prepared to override the child’s decisions. More recently, the distinction between adults and children have become blurred, exemplified by the use of terms such as ‘young person’. Children’s rights at best draw attention to children and their interests, but do not help in resolving the medical treatment of incompetent children. The most promising approach depends on articulating an account of children’s interests. For several reasons the best interests standard is not defensible. I argue that a reasoned, or reasonable, agreement upon the child’s interests should determine medical treatment. Neither the child’s parents (nor the clinicians) can be taken to have an incorrigible grasp of the child’s interests, all should justify the reasons for their choices.

Why do we care for future generations? This work argues that the reason we care for future generations lies in our psychogenetic nature. When we think of future generations, we feel that we have to do something for them. If we all have a common feeling profile, it is plausible to assume that this common feeling profile includes &ldquo / caring for future generations&rdquo / , because all of us do care for at least our own future generations. This psychogenetic disposition enables us to explain why sometimes we act as if we do not care for future generations as well. I believe that instead of telling people what their obligations are, it would be more realistic to reach their feelings deep inside: once people are aware of their true feelings, the situation can change.