This thesis examines the recruitment of the political elite in Burma from 1962 to 1967, the first five years of the second Ne Win regime. The political elite is defined as consisting of officers of the rank of Colonel or higher, and civilians who hold administrative or party offices similar to those held by these high-ranking officers. The aspects of recruitment considered are (1) the extent of representation of ethnic groups; (2) the extent of achievement orientation; and (3) the nature and scope of recruitees' experience in dealing with the leadership of minority ethnic groups. These recruitment variables are chosen for their relevance to political development, and this will be demonstrated by consideration of some of the implications of elite recruitment practices in Burma for the development of equality, system capacity, and structural differentiation. Research into the ethnic origins and career experience of the current Burmese elite was conducted by a review of the existing literature and secondary historical sources, as well as a survey of the English-language press of Burma and foreign periodicals for the years 1962 to 1967. The Burmese periodicals surveyed were The Guardian (daily) and Forward (fort-nightly); and the non-Burmese periodicals were The New York Times and the Far Eastern Economic Review. Use was also made of a Who's Who in Burma, published in 1961. It was found that according to the rank of offices held, the Burmese political elite is by no means exclusively military. The military component of the elite consists of a large proportion of the veterans of the Burma Independence Army, which has comprised the officer corps of the Burma Army since shortly after Independence. Many of the administrative offices continue to be held by veterans of the colonial Civil Service, although their superiors are Army officers. In addition, many posts in the single Army-sponsored party are held by veterans of former extremist "left-wing" parties. Very few positions in the current regime are held by former political leaders. It was found that representation of ethnic groups other than the Burman majority was very low, being restricted to 2 out of 54 from the military component and 9 out of 44 of the civilian component, 6 of the latter being Ambassadors. The current elite is shown to be considerably less representative of minority ethnic groups than that of the civilian governments, and this difference is partly explained by institutional changes. The extent of achievement orientation in recruitment is considered by an examination of the formal education and professional experience of elite members. It is shown that the level of formal education of the current elite is at least slightly lower than that of the civilian governments, with less than half holding university degrees. The period in question also shows a decline in the professionalism of the military as compared to the period of civilian government and to the military Caretaker Government of 1958 to 1960. This is explained as a consequence of the recruitment to party and administrative posts of former "oppositionist" politicians, which has upset a balance between professional and political orientations in the military. The experience of elite members is also found to include service as military administrators in minority ethnic group areas, a position not conducive to the stimulation of attitudes of equality and non-discrimination. This, then, eliminates a possible substitute for ethnic group representation in the elite. It is concluded, finally, that none of these recruitment practices are conducive to further political development in Burma, but constitute part of a defensive posture oriented towards counter-insurgency, minority-group regulation, and the short-run political security of the elite. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

This thesis examines the nature of Burma's military regime which came to power in March 1962, and which has portrayed itself, somewhat successfully until 1988, as a regime which has constructed a "Burmese" socialist political order in Burma. Though this self-image was more or less accepted by many observers, there nonetheless could be detected in writings on the regime some degree of scholarly unease regarding the nature of the regime stemming from its many glaring failures not only in economic management, but also in arresting political decay which has transformed Burma into a poverty-stricken, debt-ridden, and almost pre-modern authoritarian polity. This thesis is an attempt to provide a less particularistic explanation of the regime, to show that such a regime is not unique, and that the downward slide of Burma can be understood with reference to existing theories and concepts derived from the study of Third World politics and conditions. Accordingly, the anti-colonial "nationalist" movement in Burma, the Dobama Asiayone of the Thakins, and the various Dobama "armies" which became the national armed forces, the Tatmadaw, and the underlying historical and socio-economic and political conditions are re-examined and analysed within the theoretical framework of comparative Third World politics. The thesis argues that the leaders who led the Tatmadaw to the summit of power in 1962 were not modernizing military leaders, but were foremostly politicians in military garb whose agenda was shaped by parochial Burman ethnonationalism, a peculiar kind of anti-foreign "Burmese" socialism, and the myth of their triumph over powerful foreign opponents — the British and the Japanese. The thesis examines the military regime -- Ne Win's Tatmadaw dictatorship -- and endeavors to explain the paradoxical configuration, subsequent to the military seizure of power, of a strongly autonomous and highly coercive state in Burma, on the one hand, and the clear evidence of political and economic decay (stemming from the regime's poor performance and/or capacity), on the other hand, from the perspective of Third World politics. The explanation is framed in terms of Ne Win's personal rulership; the transformation of the Tatmadaw, on which the state and the regime is based, into a patrimonialized personal instrument of the patrimonial ruler, Ne Win; the subsequent general and widespread erosion of the integrity of various institutions; the undermining of legal-rational norms; and the increasing reliance of Ne Win and the regime on the use of terror to maintain power as its legitimacy waned over time, and the corresponding greater degree of disengagement of society from the control and perview of the state. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

No description available.

This thesis is a study of the pattern of politics and its effects on foreign policy advocacies in contemporary Burma. The focal point of the analysis is an examinatian of the various Burmese societal interests and their respective foreign policy demands.1 The methodology employed defines Burma's societal interest groupings in terms of ideology, interests, and objectives, While providing a functional mode! for the understanding of Burmese political processes. Foreign policy demands are to be classified as to bilateral relations with neighbours, to the Southern Asian international system, and to the global state system. The purpose of this study is to discover the socio-political mainsprings of the foreign policy demands articulated by both incumbent and competing societal interests. [...]

No description available.

The purpose of this thesis is to study the dynamics of two successive military coups in Burma and Peru. Both of these nations have had a military coup, which was subsequently, after a relatively short period of civilian rule, followed by another coup. All four of these coups have had some impact on the civil bureaucracy, yet in both cases the impact after the second coup was much more pervasive. The question that the thesis is concerned with answering is why did the impact on the bureaucracy change as it did the second time around. The answer lies in the military's dissatisfaction with the civil bureaucracy after the 2nd coups. This dissatisfaction resulted from the following three factors: (1) changes in the goals and purposes of the second coups; (2) changes in military personnel between the first and second coups; (3) experiences of military between coups. (a) Both of the first two coups were carried out for restricted goals and purposes. Consequently, the military had little opportunity or need to extensively concern itself with the civilian bureaucracy. For their less ambitious goals the bureaucracy was quite suitable. The second time around, both military coups occurred under quite different circumstances and for different goals and purposes. Contrary to the static orientation of the first coups, the second ones were carried out for the purpose of moving the nation to a more progressive condition and due to the inability of civilian groups to achieve this goal. The civil bureaucracy had serious weaknesses which did not allow it to meet the military's governing needs and the military carried out extensive actions to rectify this. (b) Younger and more radical officers tended to displace the older and more conservative officers in the second coup, whereas the latter dominated the first coup in both countries. These younger officers more rural and of different social origins from the older officers, tended to be much more hostile to the urban middle civil servants. (c) Some experiences between the coups exacerbated the officers' hostility toward the bureaucracy. That is, in one case betrayal by civil servants of military's programs initiated during the first coup, in the other case having to step into an administrative void in rural areas which the military attributed to a weak and inefficient civil service. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

This thesis concerns the cultural construction and mechanics of violence, domination, and survival under a Southeast Asian totalitarian regime. It entails an examination of the modern character of violence and domination in Myanmar (Burma) through the inscription of State power upon the bodies of Burmans and via the ramifications of the regime's alliance with the drug lords upon the urban struggle for survival. At times of extreme domination, fear, and degradation, very little space exists for psychological and physical resistance. Burmans seek escape from this situation by withdrawing into domains characterized by denial, numbness, and temporary madness. My concern is with the lived experience of totalitarianism, the way that individuals respond differently according to a prior series of lived experiences, and the particular idioms drawn upon to construct survival strategies. / An important culturally constructed strategy of survival in Myanmar entails the detaching of agency from the body while the mind "flies" to freedom. This strategy has a long history not only in Burmese, but also in other Southeast Asian histories, myths, and legends. Just as Burmese wizards fly to a mythical landscape in the foothills of the Himalayas when released from their physical bodies, so too do heroin addicts, prostitutes, psychiatric patients, and the urban poor flee to Burmese fantasylands to escape the domination of the military regime. This strategy, one of many adopted by urban residents, denies the State the final prize it so desperately craves: the willing participation of Burmans in a military society, the complete internalization of totalitarian ideology such that no other ideologies can exist and no space is left for their creation and negotiation. In the conclusion I argue that the regime is aware that it has faded in this task. / I also examine the possibility that the existence of multiple Burmese worlds or realities, in conjunction with a strong belief in the miraculous may offer new ground for research into the trauma of survivors of violence and terror. The construction of madness, death, and reanimation in Burmese culture, grounds particular survival strategies in logical, hopeful, and perhaps curative, rationalities.

No description available.

Most studies in environmental politics have traditionally examined three broad areas: the degradation of the environment; the regulatory regimes governing the environment; or environmental activism within the affluent North. This thesis provides an alternative perspective, exploring environmental activism in the less affluent South. In particular, while human rights and social justice perspectives have historically been largely absent from many environmental movements of the North, this thesis argues that, due to precarious living conditions and authoritarian governance, these issues are of primary importance for environmentalists in the South. As a result this thesis contends that most environmental movements in the South are part of a growing global justice movement and that important cultural diversities within this movement can result in novel forms of resistance and environmental governance. The focus here is on the emancipatory actors within these movements in the South who challenge existing power structures within society. Likewise, by adopting a critical perspective, this thesis argues that large business interests pursue energy projects in the South in the name of energy security and large scale industrial development that are often inappropriate for local development and security needs. To test these hypotheses, four case studies were undertaken that examine transnational gas pipeline and large dam projects at various stages of their development which originate in either Burma (Myanmar) or Thailand. Empirical research, primarily in the form of interviews, undertaken in the countries hosting the various energy projects demonstrated that although environmental activists in the South were assisted by transnational activist networks there were also important local factors that impacted on the emancipatory philosophies, strategies and tactics of many activists in this region. These strategies have achieved some success, with environmental impact assessment (EIA) processes in Thailand now providing a potential opening for the political engagement of communities. Nevertheless, this thesis finds that the power of corporate interests in the international political economy often poses insurmountable barriers for activists to achieve both their short and long term aims. The findings suggest that despite the efforts of activists, local indigenous and ethnic minority communities continue to bear the brunt of the social and environmental costs of transnational energy projects in the South while receiving few of the benefits. Rather than safeguarding these communities from deprivation, these projects often exacerbate existing social tensions and conflicts, resulting in increased community insecurity. / http://proxy.library.adelaide.edu.au/login?url= http://library.adelaide.edu.au/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?BBID=1474397 / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of History and Politics, 2009

Most studies in environmental politics have traditionally examined three broad areas: the degradation of the environment; the regulatory regimes governing the environment; or environmental activism within the affluent North. This thesis provides an alternative perspective, exploring environmental activism in the less affluent South. In particular, while human rights and social justice perspectives have historically been largely absent from many environmental movements of the North, this thesis argues that, due to precarious living conditions and authoritarian governance, these issues are of primary importance for environmentalists in the South. As a result this thesis contends that most environmental movements in the South are part of a growing global justice movement and that important cultural diversities within this movement can result in novel forms of resistance and environmental governance. The focus here is on the emancipatory actors within these movements in the South who challenge existing power structures within society. Likewise, by adopting a critical perspective, this thesis argues that large business interests pursue energy projects in the South in the name of energy security and large scale industrial development that are often inappropriate for local development and security needs. To test these hypotheses, four case studies were undertaken that examine transnational gas pipeline and large dam projects at various stages of their development which originate in either Burma (Myanmar) or Thailand. Empirical research, primarily in the form of interviews, undertaken in the countries hosting the various energy projects demonstrated that although environmental activists in the South were assisted by transnational activist networks there were also important local factors that impacted on the emancipatory philosophies, strategies and tactics of many activists in this region. These strategies have achieved some success, with environmental impact assessment (EIA) processes in Thailand now providing a potential opening for the political engagement of communities. Nevertheless, this thesis finds that the power of corporate interests in the international political economy often poses insurmountable barriers for activists to achieve both their short and long term aims. The findings suggest that despite the efforts of activists, local indigenous and ethnic minority communities continue to bear the brunt of the social and environmental costs of transnational energy projects in the South while receiving few of the benefits. Rather than safeguarding these communities from deprivation, these projects often exacerbate existing social tensions and conflicts, resulting in increased community insecurity. / http://proxy.library.adelaide.edu.au/login?url= http://library.adelaide.edu.au/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?BBID=1474397 / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of History and Politics, 2009