Abstract not available

I analyzed a sample of 228 U.S. bank acquisitions announced from January 1996 to December 2015. This dissertation explores whether acquiring banks pay more for targets with a higher capital ratio using a better measure of goodwill than previous studies. Specifically, this study uses manually collected goodwill to evaluate the value of bank capital, a measure that I argue is superior to those used in prior studies. I collect information about goodwill for 203 merger and acquisition (M&A) deals. I find a positive relation between the target's capital ratio and the goodwill paid for targets, which is consistent with previous cross sectional analysis on the relation between bank equity capital and value. This positive relation exists in the deals with a bank target, but not when the target is a savings institution. Furthermore, I find that the positive association between the target's capital ratio and goodwill paid by the acquirer only exists in the sample of acquisitions of banks announced before the 2007 financial crisis. This dissertation also evaluates the value of bank capital by analyzing the changes in shareholders' wealth around the announcement of M&As. My empirical analysis shows that banking mergers create value for the shareholder of targets. However, I find a significantly negative association between target's capital ratio and cumulative abnormal return to acquirers in M&As. Furthermore, I also report that this negative association only holds in M&As announced during and after the financial crisis. This dissertation also investigates the impact of bank capital on the cost of equity, another channel through which capital can influence banks' value. This dissertation tests the potential impact of bank capital on the cost of equity in the context of bank M&As. M&As are a good laboratory to study the relation between bank capital structure and the cost of equity capital because M&A transactions alter capital structure, and thus could change the cost of equity capital of the acquiring bank. My empirical results show a positive association between the target's capital ratio and the change in acquirer's annual cost of equity capital after the completion of the deals. Additionally, I also analyze a sample of non-US bank M&As and find a negative association between the target's capital ratio and the cumulative abnormal return of banks acquired in M&As.

Philosophiae Doctor - PhD / The aim of this study is to construct and propose continuous-time mathematical models for optimal management of bank capital, reserves and liquidity. This aim emanates from the global financial crisis of 2007 − 2009. In this regard and as a first task, our objective is to determine an optimal investment strategy for a commercial bank subject to capital requirements as prescribed by the Basel III Accord. In particular, the objective of the aforementioned problem is to maximize the expected return on the bank capital portfolio and minimize the variance of the terminal wealth. We apply classical tools from stochastic analysis to achieve the optimal strategy of a benchmark portfolio selection problem which minimizes the expected quadratic distance of the terminal risk capital reserves from a predefined benchmark. Secondly, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced strategies to protect banks from running out of liquidity. These measures included an increase of the minimum reserves that the bank ought to hold, in response to the global financial crisis. We propose a model to minimize risk for a bank by finding an appropriate mix of diversification, balanced against return on the portfolio. Thirdly and finally, in response to the financial crises, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) designed a set of precautionary measures (known as Basel III) for liquidity imposed on banks and one of its purposes is to protect the economy from deteriorating. Recently, bank regulators wanted banks to depend on sources such as core deposits and long-term funding from small businesses and less on short-term wholesale funding.

This dissertation examines four specific aspects of capital structure and dividend policy. The first issue concerns the determinants of capital structure dynamics. The primary objective is to examine whether stock returns are important factors in firm???s capital structure choice, and if so, whether this effect is persistent. In so doing, we use a data set which (1) avoids the complexity of tax rates faced by previous studies, (2) we introduce new variables that are unique to Oman, and (3) we distinguish empirically between bank debt and non-bank debt. We find stock returns are a first order determinant of capital structure. Firms do show some tendency to rebalance towards their target capital structure. However, the impact of stock returns dominates the effects of rebalancing. We also find new evidence that firms do take countermeasures to offset changes in their leverage that stem from equity value variations, but do so at a low speed. The next topic studied concerns the ex-dividend day behaviour. We investigate this issue using a unique data set where there are no taxes on dividends and capital gains and stock prices are decimalized. In this economy, any price decline that is smaller than the dividends can not be attributed to taxes and price discreteness. We find that the stock price drops by less than the amount of dividends and there is a significant positive ex-day return. We are able to account for our results using market microstructure models. The third issue investigated is the stock price reaction to dividend announcements. Tax-based signaling models argue that dividends would not have information and be informative if it is not for the higher taxes on dividends relative to capital gains that they apply to shareholders. The absence of personal taxes in Oman presents a valuable opportunity to test this prediction. Our results show that the announcements of dividend increases (decreases) are associated with a stock price increase (decrease) which contradicts the tax-based signaling models. The final chapter analyzes the determinants and stability of dividend policy of financial and non-financial firms. Investigating this issue is important for at least two reasons. First, Omani firms distribute almost 100% of their profits in dividends which led the Capital Market Authority (CMA) to issue a circular (number 12/2003) arguing that firms should retain some of their earnings for ???rainy days???. This allows us understand the characteristics of firms that pay dividends. Second, firms are highly levered mainly through bank loans which render the role of dividends in reducing the agency costs less important. Unlike most previous studies, we include both dividend paying and non-dividend paying firms to avoid a selection bias. We find that there are some common factors that determine dividend policy of both financial and non-financial firms and there are some factors that affect only non-financial firms. We also find that the factors that influence the probability to pay dividends are the same factors that drive the amount of dividends paid for both financial and non-financial firms. We document that non-financial firms adopt a policy of smoothing dividends while financial firms do not have a stable dividend policy.

This dissertation examines four specific aspects of capital structure and dividend policy. The first issue concerns the determinants of capital structure dynamics. The primary objective is to examine whether stock returns are important factors in firm???s capital structure choice, and if so, whether this effect is persistent. In so doing, we use a data set which (1) avoids the complexity of tax rates faced by previous studies, (2) we introduce new variables that are unique to Oman, and (3) we distinguish empirically between bank debt and non-bank debt. We find stock returns are a first order determinant of capital structure. Firms do show some tendency to rebalance towards their target capital structure. However, the impact of stock returns dominates the effects of rebalancing. We also find new evidence that firms do take countermeasures to offset changes in their leverage that stem from equity value variations, but do so at a low speed. The next topic studied concerns the ex-dividend day behaviour. We investigate this issue using a unique data set where there are no taxes on dividends and capital gains and stock prices are decimalized. In this economy, any price decline that is smaller than the dividends can not be attributed to taxes and price discreteness. We find that the stock price drops by less than the amount of dividends and there is a significant positive ex-day return. We are able to account for our results using market microstructure models. The third issue investigated is the stock price reaction to dividend announcements. Tax-based signaling models argue that dividends would not have information and be informative if it is not for the higher taxes on dividends relative to capital gains that they apply to shareholders. The absence of personal taxes in Oman presents a valuable opportunity to test this prediction. Our results show that the announcements of dividend increases (decreases) are associated with a stock price increase (decrease) which contradicts the tax-based signaling models. The final chapter analyzes the determinants and stability of dividend policy of financial and non-financial firms. Investigating this issue is important for at least two reasons. First, Omani firms distribute almost 100% of their profits in dividends which led the Capital Market Authority (CMA) to issue a circular (number 12/2003) arguing that firms should retain some of their earnings for ???rainy days???. This allows us understand the characteristics of firms that pay dividends. Second, firms are highly levered mainly through bank loans which render the role of dividends in reducing the agency costs less important. Unlike most previous studies, we include both dividend paying and non-dividend paying firms to avoid a selection bias. We find that there are some common factors that determine dividend policy of both financial and non-financial firms and there are some factors that affect only non-financial firms. We also find that the factors that influence the probability to pay dividends are the same factors that drive the amount of dividends paid for both financial and non-financial firms. We document that non-financial firms adopt a policy of smoothing dividends while financial firms do not have a stable dividend policy.

This dissertation examines four specific aspects of capital structure and dividend policy. The first issue concerns the determinants of capital structure dynamics. The primary objective is to examine whether stock returns are important factors in firm???s capital structure choice, and if so, whether this effect is persistent. In so doing, we use a data set which (1) avoids the complexity of tax rates faced by previous studies, (2) we introduce new variables that are unique to Oman, and (3) we distinguish empirically between bank debt and non-bank debt. We find stock returns are a first order determinant of capital structure. Firms do show some tendency to rebalance towards their target capital structure. However, the impact of stock returns dominates the effects of rebalancing. We also find new evidence that firms do take countermeasures to offset changes in their leverage that stem from equity value variations, but do so at a low speed. The next topic studied concerns the ex-dividend day behaviour. We investigate this issue using a unique data set where there are no taxes on dividends and capital gains and stock prices are decimalized. In this economy, any price decline that is smaller than the dividends can not be attributed to taxes and price discreteness. We find that the stock price drops by less than the amount of dividends and there is a significant positive ex-day return. We are able to account for our results using market microstructure models. The third issue investigated is the stock price reaction to dividend announcements. Tax-based signaling models argue that dividends would not have information and be informative if it is not for the higher taxes on dividends relative to capital gains that they apply to shareholders. The absence of personal taxes in Oman presents a valuable opportunity to test this prediction. Our results show that the announcements of dividend increases (decreases) are associated with a stock price increase (decrease) which contradicts the tax-based signaling models. The final chapter analyzes the determinants and stability of dividend policy of financial and non-financial firms. Investigating this issue is important for at least two reasons. First, Omani firms distribute almost 100% of their profits in dividends which led the Capital Market Authority (CMA) to issue a circular (number 12/2003) arguing that firms should retain some of their earnings for ???rainy days???. This allows us understand the characteristics of firms that pay dividends. Second, firms are highly levered mainly through bank loans which render the role of dividends in reducing the agency costs less important. Unlike most previous studies, we include both dividend paying and non-dividend paying firms to avoid a selection bias. We find that there are some common factors that determine dividend policy of both financial and non-financial firms and there are some factors that affect only non-financial firms. We also find that the factors that influence the probability to pay dividends are the same factors that drive the amount of dividends paid for both financial and non-financial firms. We document that non-financial firms adopt a policy of smoothing dividends while financial firms do not have a stable dividend policy.

This dissertation examines four specific aspects of capital structure and dividend policy. The first issue concerns the determinants of capital structure dynamics. The primary objective is to examine whether stock returns are important factors in firm???s capital structure choice, and if so, whether this effect is persistent. In so doing, we use a data set which (1) avoids the complexity of tax rates faced by previous studies, (2) we introduce new variables that are unique to Oman, and (3) we distinguish empirically between bank debt and non-bank debt. We find stock returns are a first order determinant of capital structure. Firms do show some tendency to rebalance towards their target capital structure. However, the impact of stock returns dominates the effects of rebalancing. We also find new evidence that firms do take countermeasures to offset changes in their leverage that stem from equity value variations, but do so at a low speed. The next topic studied concerns the ex-dividend day behaviour. We investigate this issue using a unique data set where there are no taxes on dividends and capital gains and stock prices are decimalized. In this economy, any price decline that is smaller than the dividends can not be attributed to taxes and price discreteness. We find that the stock price drops by less than the amount of dividends and there is a significant positive ex-day return. We are able to account for our results using market microstructure models. The third issue investigated is the stock price reaction to dividend announcements. Tax-based signaling models argue that dividends would not have information and be informative if it is not for the higher taxes on dividends relative to capital gains that they apply to shareholders. The absence of personal taxes in Oman presents a valuable opportunity to test this prediction. Our results show that the announcements of dividend increases (decreases) are associated with a stock price increase (decrease) which contradicts the tax-based signaling models. The final chapter analyzes the determinants and stability of dividend policy of financial and non-financial firms. Investigating this issue is important for at least two reasons. First, Omani firms distribute almost 100% of their profits in dividends which led the Capital Market Authority (CMA) to issue a circular (number 12/2003) arguing that firms should retain some of their earnings for ???rainy days???. This allows us understand the characteristics of firms that pay dividends. Second, firms are highly levered mainly through bank loans which render the role of dividends in reducing the agency costs less important. Unlike most previous studies, we include both dividend paying and non-dividend paying firms to avoid a selection bias. We find that there are some common factors that determine dividend policy of both financial and non-financial firms and there are some factors that affect only non-financial firms. We also find that the factors that influence the probability to pay dividends are the same factors that drive the amount of dividends paid for both financial and non-financial firms. We document that non-financial firms adopt a policy of smoothing dividends while financial firms do not have a stable dividend policy.

Thesis (M.S.)--Auburn University, 2007. / Abstract. Vita. Includes bibliographic references (ℓ. 45-47)

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Michigan, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 126-129).

>Magister Scientiae - MSc / Commercial banks play a dominant role in facilitating the economic growth of a country by acting as an intermediary between the de cit spending unit (borrowers) and the surplus spending unit (lenders). In particular, they transform short-term deposits into medium and long-term loans. Due to their important role in the economy and the nancial system as a whole, commercial banks are subject to high regulation standards in most countries. According to an international set of capital standards known as the Basel Accords, banks are required to hold a minimum level of capital as a bu er to protect their depositors and the nancial market in an event of severe unexpected losses caused by nancial risk. Moreover, government regulators aim to maintain public con dence and trust in the banking system through the use of a deposit insurance scheme (DIS). Deposit insurance (DI) has the e ect of eliminating mass withdrawals of deposits in an event of a bank failure. However, DI comes at a cost. The insuring agent is tasked with estimating a fairly priced premium that the bank should be charged for DI.