Purpose – The purpose of this research project is to explore the research question – how does the pursuit of agenda of regulatory reforms, post the crisis, influence governance arrangements at banks and assist them in maintaining resilience during subsequent episodes of crises?Research methodology – The project adopts a comparative case study approach involving a mixture of review of secondary resources and fieldwork interviews across East Asian nations. Findings – The project applied the Minskian Financial Instability Hypothesis to the 1997 East Asian crisis. It explored the macro-economic and policy environment during 1990s for highlighting institutional failures at the heart of the crisis. The interview findings offered contextual setting and diverse perspectives for regulatory reforms aimed at improving bank governance, post the crisis. The experience of case study banks outlined the impact of regulatory reforms on banking business models, post the crisis. The role of post-1997-crisis regulatory reforms in bringing about East Asian resilience, during the 2007 crisis, is thus analysed in the research project. Practical implications – The research project provides emerging economy perspective to regulatory reforms and offers policy-level recommendations for banks, regulatory authorities, corporate borrowers, and statutory auditors in maintaining governance standards conductive to financial stability in the long run. Originality – The project claims originality of application, interpretation and evaluation (which are considered as building blocks for “academic contribution”) of an important academic theory in the context of financial crises – Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis. It integrates the aspects of financial instability, regulatory reforms and bank governance in the context of East Asian financial crisis by introducing the concept of “economic responsibilities” of market participants from emerging economies.

Cette thèse porte sur l’étude des mécanismes internes de gouvernance bancaire et leurs effets sur le risque de crédit et la performance bancaire. A partir d’un échantillon composé de 13 banques françaises, 13 allemandes et 20 japonaises cotées durant la période 2005 – 2012, nous essayons de détecter l’impact des caractéristiques de gouvernance bancaire, à travers les conseils d’administration et leurs différents comités, en premier lieu sur le risque du crédit, et en deuxième lieu sur la performance bancaire. Nos résultats montrent que les mécanismes internes de gouvernance affectent certes, le niveau des crédits non performants et la performance financière des banques, mais avec des effets plutôt mitigés. Ils révèlent également des divergences entre les banques des pays étudiés. / The study of the internal mechanisms of governance in particular the board of directors and its relationship with the credit risk as well as the performance is the main subject of this thesis. From a sample of 13 French banks, 13 German and 20 Japanese rated during the period 2005 - 2012, we are trying to detect the impact of the characteristics of the Board of Directors and its committees on the credit risk, and on the banking performance. Our results show that the internal mechanisms of governance affect certainly, the level of appropriations non-performing assets and the financial performance of banks, but with mixed effects; they reflect this divergence between countries.

This thesis consists of three empirical papers on central bank institutional design.Chapter 1 contributes to the debate on the importance of central bank independence (CBI) in lowering inflation rates. It stresses the relevance of employing indices of central bank independence computed dynamically in two ways. First, it recomputes the evolution of the Grilli et al. (1991) index of CBI and shows that the timing of large legislative reforms is closely related to inflation rate dynamics. Using unit root tests with endogenous structural breaks, I find that reforms that modify the degree of CBI represent structural breaks in the inflation rate dynamics. Second, employing the dynamic Grilli et al. (1991) index of independence confirms the negative relationship between CBI and inflation in a sample of 10 advanced economies.Chapter 2 presents a new and comprehensive database of central bank institutional design for 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. This chapter describes in detail the sources of information and the coding rules used to create a new index of central bank independence. It also compares this new index with the classical measures of CBI and highlights the new aspects of central bank institutional design included in this database such as financial independence and accountability. An important innovation of this new index is its dynamic nature. This enables an investigation of the endogenous determination of the level of independence of central banks and suggests several instruments for the CBI index. Using an instrumental variable approach, this chapter provides strong support for a causal, negative CBI-inflation nexus.Chapter 3 uses a political economy framework to investigate the drivers of reforms in central bank institutional design. Using the new CBI index developed in Chapter 2, this Chapter investigates the determinants of central bank reforms in a sample of 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. The results obtained suggest that the incentives generated by initial reforms which increased the level of independence, as well as a regional convergence, represent important drivers of reforms in central bank design. At the same time, an external pressure to reform, such as obtaining an IMF loan or joining a monetary union, also increases the likelihood of reforms, while government changes or crises episodes have little impact. / This thesis consists of three empirical papers on central bank institutional design.Chapter 1 contributes to the debate on the importance of central bank independence (CBI) in lowering inflation rates. It stresses the relevance of employing indices of central bank independence computed dynamically in two ways. First, it recomputes the evolution of the Grilli et al. (1991) index of CBI and shows that the timing of large legislative reforms is closely related to inflation rate dynamics. Using unit root tests with endogenous structural breaks, I find that reforms that modify the degree of CBI represent structural breaks in the inflation rate dynamics. Second, employing the dynamic Grilli et al. (1991) index of independence confirms the negative relationship between CBI and inflation in a sample of 10 advanced economies.Chapter 2 presents a new and comprehensive database of central bank institutional design for 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. This chapter describes in detail the sources of information and the coding rules used to create a new index of central bank independence. It also compares this new index with the classical measures of CBI and highlights the new aspects of central bank institutional design included in this database such as financial independence and accountability. An important innovation of this new index is its dynamic nature. This enables an investigation of the endogenous determination of the level of independence of central banks and suggests several instruments for the CBI index. Using an instrumental variable approach, this chapter provides strong support for a causal, negative CBI-inflation nexus.Chapter 3 uses a political economy framework to investigate the drivers of reforms in central bank institutional design. Using the new CBI index developed in Chapter 2, this Chapter investigates the determinants of central bank reforms in a sample of 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. The results obtained suggest that the incentives generated by initial reforms which increased the level of independence, as well as a regional convergence, represent important drivers of reforms in central bank design. At the same time, an external pressure to reform, such as obtaining an IMF loan or joining a monetary union, also increases the likelihood of reforms, while government changes or crises episodes have little impact.

L’étude des déterminants internes du risque de crédit des banques tunisiennes est l’objetprincipal de cette thèse. Il s’agit en particulier de la gouvernance bancaire et de la relationbancaire. À partir d’un échantillon de 10 banques tunisiennes cotées durant la période 1998-2009, nous essayons de détecter l’impact de la concentration de la propriété et descaractéristiques du conseil d’administration sur le risque de crédit. Nos résultats montrent queles mécanismes internes de gouvernance n’ont pas assuré jusqu’à présent leur rôle de contrôleet de garant de la bonne gestion des banques tunisiennes et qu’ils ont contribué à une gestionimprudente du risque de crédit. À partir de l’étude de dossiers de crédits accordés par unebanque tunisienne à une clientèle d’entreprises, nous essayons de détecter l’impact del’information hard et soft sur le risque de crédit. Nos résultats plaident en faveur del’hypothèse du laxisme des banques envers certains clients importants et surtout de longuedate. Ce laxisme pourrait être la cause d’une augmentation du risque de non remboursementdes crédits accordés en Tunisie. / This research aims to analyse the internal determinants of Tunisian bank risk. We particularlyfocus on the role of bank governance and relationship banking. Based on a sample of 10Tunisian listed banks during 1998-2009, we examine the impact of ownership concentrationand board characteristics on credit risk. Our results demonstrate that the importance ofTunisian banks’credit risk is rooted in bank governance deficiency. This latter wascontributed to implement a reckless credit policy. From the analysis of credit files granted bya Tunisian bank to corporate customers, we attempt to detect the impact of soft and hardinformation on credit risk. Our results suggest a lax attitude of the bank towards someimportant clients, particularly long-standing ones. This attitude may be the root of the creditrisk increase in Tunisia.