published_or_final_version / Law / Master / Master of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / Business Administration / Master / Master of Business Administration

by Wong Wai-chung, Rex, Tsang Kit-may, Carol. / Abstract also in Chinese / Bibliography: leaves 74-76 / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1983

by Daisy Cheng Siu-ling, Andrew Mak Yip-shing. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1981. / Bibliography: leaves 76-77.

by Lau Man Pong, Siu Lai Lai Ying, Joan, Tsui Siu Kwan, Stephen. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 120-121). / Abstract --- p.i / Table of Contents --- p.ii / List of Tables --- p.iii / List of Appendies --- p.iv / Chapter / Chapter I. --- "An, Overview of BIS Rulings" --- p.1-2 / Chapter 1.1 --- Definition --- p.2-8 / Chapter 1.2 --- Reasons For the creation of BIS Ruling on Capital Adequacy --- p.8-10 / Chapter II. --- The Banking Industry of Hong Kong --- p.11 / Chapter 2 .1 --- Backgound --- p.11-12 / Chapter 2 .2 --- Lending Activities Of Hong Kong's Commercial Banks In 1993 --- p.12-14 / Chapter 2.3 --- Application Of Capital Adequacy Ratio In Hong Kong --- p.14-16 / Chapter III . --- Objective of the study --- p.17-19 / Chapter IV. --- Research Methodology --- p.20 / Chapter 4.1 --- Research Design --- p.20 / Chapter 4.2 --- Data Collection Method --- p.20 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Questionnaire --- p.20-21 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Direct interview --- p.21 / Chapter 4.3 --- Sampling Method --- p.22 / Chapter 4.4 --- Analysis Techniques --- p.22-23 / Chapter V. --- Research Findings --- p.24 / Chapter 5.1 --- Introductions --- p.24-25 / Chapter 5.2 --- Limitations On Data Analysis --- p.26 / Chapter 5.3 --- Data Analysis --- p.27 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- Section A: Opinion Towards BIS Standard On CAR --- p.27-36 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Section B： Bank' s Reaction --- p.36-41 / Chapter VI. --- Conclusions --- p.42-44 / Appendix --- p.45-119 / Bibliography --- p.120-121

Summary in Chinese. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong. / Bibliography: p. l. 111-115.

Essay one. For banks, good governances can reduce both the abilities and incentives of insiders to expropriate bank resources and promote bank efficiency, and are supposed to have real economic effect on their customers and firms in that country. This study examines how banking sector's ownership structure is related to the firm-level investment efficiency on a sample of 88,764 firm-year observations across 36 developed and developing countries between 1995 and 2006. I find that, ceteris paribus, a country's banking sector with more cash flow rights by controlling owners improves firms' investment efficiency; whereas, a country's banking sector with larger divergence between cash flow rights and control rights by controlling owners reduces firms' investment efficiency. In addition, I find that the relation between a country's banking sector ownership structure and firms' investment efficiency is stronger for low growth firms, suggesting banks' stronger debt monitoring role on firms with free cash flow problem. Besides, banks have more influence on investment efficiency of firms, which rely on more external financing. Finally, the relation between banking sector's ownership structure and firms' investment efficiency is more pronounced in countries with stronger private monitoring for banks and better information environment of banks. On the whole, the results suggest that banking sector's ownership structure is an important instrument to govern banks' operation with regard to efficient lending and sound governances on firms' investment decision. / Essay two. In this study, we examine whether and how incentives in bank lending, in emerging market like China, influence firms' investment behaviors, the key determinant of firms' productivity. First, being connected with bureaucrats provides firms with a comparative non-economic advantage of access to debt in China. Our empirical results show that loans granting to political connected firms is less sensitive to those firms' profitability, which is consistent with "rent-seeking" hypothesis. Second, political connection is a violated factor in debt markets and politically connected lending is accompanied by less monitoring posted by banks. Consequently, we find that firms with political tie invest less efficiently than firms without political tie when they can access to abnormal debt through political tie. Moreover, the negative relation between politically connected lending and firms' investment efficiency is stronger for SOE firms and low growth firms. Finally, we find that region development with regard to financial development and government quality improvement reduces politically connected lending's negative impact on firms' investment efficiency. In sum, soft lending, like politically connected lending, destroy economic growth because of misallocation of scary resources among firms and also because of less incentive to monitor firms' project selection. / essay 1. Bank ownership structure, bank regulation, and firm investment: international evidence -- essay 2. Bank lending incentives and firm investment decisions in China. / Zheng, Ying. / Adviser: Joseph P.H. Fan. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2173. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 88-90). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest dissertations and theses, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

published_or_final_version / Business Administration / Master / Master of Business Administration

published_or_final_version / abstract / Real Estate and Construction / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

This thesis studies the Chinese banks’ credit risk assessment using the Post Keynesian approach. We argue that bank loans are the major financial sources in emerging economies and it is uncertainty, an unquantifiable risk, rather than asymmetric information about quantifiable risk, as held by the mainstream approach, which is most important for the risk attached to credit loans, and this uncertainty is particularly important in China. With the universal existence of uncertainty, borrowers and lenders have to make decisions based on convention and experience. With regard to the nature of decision-making, this implies the importance of qualitative methods rather than quantitative methods. The current striking problem in Chinese banking is the large amount of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) and this research aims to address the NPLs through improving credit risk management. Rather than the previous literature where Western models are introduced into China directly or with minor modification, this work advocates building on China’s conventional domestic methods to deal with uncertainty. We briefly review the background of the Chinese banking history with an evolutionary view and examine Chinese conventions in the development of the credit market. Based on an overview of this history, it is argued that Soft Budget Constraints (SBC) and the underdeveloped risk-assessing mechanism contributed to the accumulation of NPLs. Informed by Western models and experience, we have made several suggestions about rebuilding the Chinese convention of credit risk assessment, based on an analysis of publications and interviews with Chinese bankers. We also suggest some further development of the Asset Management Companies (AMCs) which are used to dispose of the NPLs.