This thesis is an analysis of the bank insolvency process in Canada. The phenomenon of bank bailouts is examined and three possible rationale for bailouts are put forth. The conclusion is reached that bank bailouts can be justified on the basis of these rationale, and, therefore, that bank insolvency legislation should recognize the bailout process and provide an adequate and appropriate framework for this process. Three recent bank failures, Canadian Commercial Bank, Northland Bank and the Bank of British Columbia, are discussed, with particular emphasis on the different bailout tools used by the government in each case. These case studies are used as a framework within which to assess current Canadian bank insolvency legislation. The conclusion is reached that the legislative framework is inadequate to deal effectively with bank insolvency. By examining the American approach to bank insolvency and two recent Canadian studies on the subject, a model for reform is proposed. The model contemplates a more highly-structured legislative framework, with broad powers granted to the deposit insurer to implement a bailout in circumstances which justify this form of government intervention. Finally, this model is used as a basis on which to evaluate recent financial sector reform initiatives made by the federal government. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

A person on the eve of bankruptcy may enter into transactions or arrangements that are intended to, or that have the effect of, preserving its property from being seized and distributed among creditors. Such transactions may provide a bankrupt with collateral benefits such as the continued use and enjoyment of property, or they may benefit third parties such as members of the bankrupt's family, or they may benefit selected creditors to the detriment of others. The effect of such transactions is to frustrate the legislative scheme which provides for the distribution of a bankrupt's residual property. This effect may be desired by a bankrupt or by a recipient of the bankrupt's property, or it may be unintended. Insolvency legislation confers wide powers upon a trustee in bankruptcy to "review" such transactions by bringing proceedings to reverse their effect and recover the value lost to the bankrupt's estate. Reviewable transactions comprise two main categories: dispositions or unequal transactions in which a debtor parts with property for no or insufficient consideration (such as a transfer of property to a spouse or a sale in which a bankrupt does not receive a fair price) and preferential repayments of debts owed to certain creditors to the detriment of others. Reviewable transaction laws in Canada and England have a subjective basis in that they focus upon the intent of a debtor to defeat creditors or prefer one creditor over others. In contrast, relevant Australian and New Zealand laws have an objective focus and provide remedies where the effect of a transaction, rather than the intent of a debtor, is to defeat the interests of creditors. This paper conducts a comparative critique of reviewable transaction regimes. It makes the argument that subjective regimes tend to reflect their historical origins in fraud law and a desire to punish and frustrate the fraudulent intent of a bankrupt; an inappropriate policy foundation that fails to address the competing interests and policy considerations which should form the basis of reviewable transaction law. Objective regimes, which focus upon the effect of impugned transactions, provide more appropriately for the balancing of creditors' and recipients' interests and the making of provision for policy considerations. This paper also considers collateral effects of reviewable transaction regimes upon creditors' interests (such as effects upon claims to property recovered by a trustee) in a variety of circumstances and concludes that the results are often inconsistent and undesirable. In this respect the relative positions of secured and unsecured creditors are described in detail and proposals for reform are ventured.

A person on the eve of bankruptcy may enter into transactions or arrangements that are intended to, or that have the effect of, preserving its property from being seized and distributed among creditors. Such transactions may provide a bankrupt with collateral benefits such as the continued use and enjoyment of property, or they may benefit third parties such as members of the bankrupt's family, or they may benefit selected creditors to the detriment of others. The effect of such transactions is to frustrate the legislative scheme which provides for the distribution of a bankrupt's residual property. This effect may be desired by a bankrupt or by a recipient of the bankrupt's property, or it may be unintended. Insolvency legislation confers wide powers upon a trustee in bankruptcy to "review" such transactions by bringing proceedings to reverse their effect and recover the value lost to the bankrupt's estate. Reviewable transactions comprise two main categories: dispositions or unequal transactions in which a debtor parts with property for no or insufficient consideration (such as a transfer of property to a spouse or a sale in which a bankrupt does not receive a fair price) and preferential repayments of debts owed to certain creditors to the detriment of others. Reviewable transaction laws in Canada and England have a subjective basis in that they focus upon the intent of a debtor to defeat creditors or prefer one creditor over others. In contrast, relevant Australian and New Zealand laws have an objective focus and provide remedies where the effect of a transaction, rather than the intent of a debtor, is to defeat the interests of creditors. This paper conducts a comparative critique of reviewable transaction regimes. It makes the argument that subjective regimes tend to reflect their historical origins in fraud law and a desire to punish and frustrate the fraudulent intent of a bankrupt; an inappropriate policy foundation that fails to address the competing interests and policy considerations which should form the basis of reviewable transaction law. Objective regimes, which focus upon the effect of impugned transactions, provide more appropriately for the balancing of creditors' and recipients' interests and the making of provision for policy considerations. This paper also considers collateral effects of reviewable transaction regimes upon creditors' interests (such as effects upon claims to property recovered by a trustee) in a variety of circumstances and concludes that the results are often inconsistent and undesirable. In this respect the relative positions of secured and unsecured creditors are described in detail and proposals for reform are ventured. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

Bill C-55 proposes amendments to the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act tailored on the procedural framework contemplated by the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. This thesis demonstrates that implementation of these amendments will bring Canadian insolvency law into closer---but by no means complete---alignment with the doctrine of modified universalism reflected in the Model Law. To this end, the thesis undertakes an analysis of the different theoretical approaches to cross-border insolvency, shows the importance of instrument choice in determining the level of global harmonization attained, and reviews recent projects of harmonization. This is followed by a close comparative analysis of the extent of compliance of the provisions of Bill C-55 with the Model Law, an analysis that demonstrates the shortcomings of model laws and, somewhat paradoxically, their important role and function in eventually bringing about global legal harmonization.

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