Previous studies of the influence of personality on behaviour in experimental games have provided conflicting and inconclusive results. The present investigation was designed to search on a broad front for personality correlates of behaviour in a two-person bargaining game, the one used being a derivation of the Deutsch and Krauss Trucking Game. Five personality tests, covering fifty-three personality traits, were administered to 192 undergraduate students attending courses at The University of Stirling, and from these the experimental groups were randomly chosen, the only constraint being the sex of the subjects. The tests were The Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire, The Guilford/Zimmerman Temperament Survey, The Study of Values Test, The Edwards Personal Preference Schedule, and The Test of Social Insight. The trucking game was played for 30 trials by two groups of subjects, each containing 24 male dyads and 24 female dyads, under two experimental conditions: Condition I, where subjects had access to full information regarding the other's payoffs, and Condition II, where only incomplete information of the other's payoffs was available. It was hypothesized that behaviour in the game would be influenced by (i) amount of information available about the payoffs of the other; (ii) sex of the players (comparing single-sexed dyads); and (iii) players' personality. No differences due to either amount of information available about the other's payoffs, or sex of the players, were found. An analysis of the data provided by the combined experimental groups, however, successfully located indications of personality effects on behaviour in the game, as measured by total joint payoff summed over 30 trials, total time taken, the number of concessions made to the other player, and first strategy-choice on individual trials. The personality variables concerned were Emotional Stability and Radicalism/Conservatism, (Factors C and Ql of The Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire); Personal Relations, (Factor P of The Guilford/Zimmerman Temperament Survey); Theoretical Value, (T scale of The Study of Values Test); Exhibition, ('exh' variable of The Edwards Personal Preference Schedule); and Cooperativeness, (Scale III of The Test of Social Insight). It is suggested that the relationship of these personality variables to game-playing behaviour should be the subject of further investigation.

本篇論文所探討的重心為公司接管策略之賽局應用，首先解釋公司接管時可採行的方法有那些，之後再將賽局理論導入不同的接管方法中，我們試著從賽局的理論模型中得到一些關於公司接管策略較強的結果。 公司接管之可採行方式有自集中市場買進股權、公開收購、委託書收購，資產收購、策略聯盟 …等，而這些策略所面對的參賽者是有所不同的，譬如股權收購為目標公司股東，資產收購和策略聯盟為目標公司管理當局。因此我們可運用不同的賽局理論模型來解釋這些策略的進行過程及其結果如何。因此本論文擬應用的賽局模型有：訊號賽局、出價賽局、Kalyan C. & Larry S. (1988)談判賽局及Rubinstein (1985)談判賽局。 更進一步，我們希望能獲得關於接管者的管理能力大小是如何影響公司接管的策略？於是本論文最後結論證明結果為：當接管者的管理能力（綜效水準）很強時，建議他採股權收購；當接管者的管理能力綜效水準）很弱時，建議採取委託書收購；然而當接管者的管理能力不強不弱時，則採策略聯盟。