The purpose of information acquisition for data and information fusion is to provide relevant and timely information. The acquired information is integrated (or fused) to estimate the state of some environment. The success of information acquisition can be measured in the quality of the environment state estimates generated by the data and information fusion process. In this thesis, we introduce and set out to characterise the concept of large-scale information acquisition. Our interest in this subject is justified both by the identified lack of research on a holistic view on data and information fusion, and the proliferation of networked sensors which promises to enable handy access to a multitude of information sources. We identify a number of properties that could be considered in the context of large-scale information acquisition. The sensors used could be large in number, heterogeneous, complex, and distributed. Also, algorithms for large-scale information acquisition may have to deal with decentralised control and multiple and varying objectives. In the literature, a process that realises information acquisition is frequently denoted sensor management. We, however, introduce the term perception management instead, which encourages an agent perspective on information acquisition. Apart from explictly inviting the wealth of agent theory research into the data and information fusion research, it also highlights that the resource usage of perception management is constrained by the overall control of a system that uses data and information fusion. To address the challenges posed by the concept of large-scale information acquisition, we present a framework which highlights some of its pertinent aspects. We have implemented some important parts of the framework. What becomes evident in our study is the innate complexity of information acquisition for data and information fusion, which suggests approximative solutions. We, furthermore, study one of the possibly most important properties of large-scale information acquisition, decentralised control, in more detail. We propose a recurrent negotiation protocol for (decentralised) multi-agent coordination. Our approach to the negotiations is from an axiomatic bargaining theory perspective; an economics discipline. We identify shortcomings of the most commonly applied bargaining solution and demonstrate in simulations a problem instance where it is inferior to an alternative solution. However, we can not conclude that one of the solutions dominates the other in general. They are both preferable in different situations. We have also implemented the recurrent negotiation protocol on a group of mobile robots. We note some subtle difficulties with transferring bargaining solutions from economics to our computational problem. For instance, the characterising axioms of solutions in bargaining theory are useful to qualitatively compare different solutions, but care has to be taken when translating the solution to algorithms in computer science as some properties might be undesirable, unimportant or risk being lost in the translation. / QC 20100903

Pourquoi les négociations de paix échouent-elles? Pour répondre à cette question, ce mémoire synthétise la littérature sur les théories de la négociation et l’intervention de tierces parties dans les conflits intra-étatiques. À l’aide de la méthode de l’étude de cas, j’applique ce cadre théorique au troisième cycle de négociations de paix entre la Turquie et le Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan, qui s’est tenu de la fin décembre 2012 à Juillet 2015. Le modèle de négociation de guerre met l’accent sur les problèmes d’information asymétrique et engagement crédible qui mènent à l’échec de négociations. Les problèmes d’information asymétrique et engagement crédible sont habituellement plus aigus dans les conflits intra-étatiques. Car il est plus difficile d’obtenir les informations sur les capacités militaires des groupes armés non-étatiques (GANE) et il y a généralement de grandes asymétries de pouvoir entre les États et les GANE. Cette étude de cas apporte ainsi quatre contributions à la compréhension du sujet. Premièrement, lors d’un processus de paix, les deux parties impliquées peuvent consciemment faire des choix qui ne leur permettront pas d’atteindre leurs objectifs. Deuxièmement, ces choix résultent des mesures mal-conçues dans les pratiques de négociation et/ou l’absence de tierce partie qui rétablirait l’équilibre relatif de pouvoir et qui le maintiendrait pendant les négociations de paix. En fin de compte, cela accentue les problèmes d’engagement crédible. Troisièmement, les changements exogènes perturbateurs en matière des capacités relatives, en particulier en faveur des GANE, peuvent produire les problèmes d’information asymétrique. Quatrièmement, certains conflits ne se prêtent pas à l’intervention de tierce partie. Il peut être très difficile ou lourd de conséquence pour les tierces parties de rétablir l’équilibre relatif des pouvoirs. / Why do peace negotiations fail? Answering this question, this dissertation synthesizes the literature on bargaining theory and third party involvement in intrastate conflicts. Using qualitative case study methods, I employ this theoretical framework to the third round of the peace talks between Turkey and Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which was held between December 2012 and July 2015. Bargaining model of war highlights the problems of information asymmetries and credible commitment that lead to bargaining failures. Information asymmetries and commitment problems are usually more severe in intrastate conflicts because it tends to be more difficult to obtain information about the military capabilities of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and there tends to be larger power asymmetries between states and NSAGs. The case highlights four sets of implications. First, both sides in a peace process can willingly make choices that fail to achieve the ends to which they aspired. Second, these choices result from ill-designed measures in bargaining practices and/or the lack of a third party that would redress the relative balance of power and maintain it during the peace talks. This ultimately intensifies the problems of credible commitment. Third, disruptive exogenous shifts in relative capabilities, especially in favor of the NSAG, may produce asymmetric information problems. Fourth, some conflicts do not lend themselves to third-party involvement, as it may be too difficult or costly for third parties to redress the relative balance of power.