Submitted by Gustavo Lôpo Andrade (gustavo.lopo@gmail.com) on 2017-07-18T22:57:10Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Gustavo Lôpo Andrade.pdf: 938243 bytes, checksum: db6777e4df90285643a4ac5de9fb14fa (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by GILSON ROCHA MIRANDA (gilson.miranda@fgv.br) on 2017-07-21T14:26:04Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Gustavo Lôpo Andrade.pdf: 938243 bytes, checksum: db6777e4df90285643a4ac5de9fb14fa (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-27T12:40:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Gustavo Lôpo Andrade.pdf: 938243 bytes, checksum: db6777e4df90285643a4ac5de9fb14fa (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-05-30 / In several markets, cost hikes are passed through to consumers to a larger extent than cost reductions. This is a widely document phenomenon in the literature, yet under-explored in Brazil. Collusion is one of the theoretical explanations for that. This study examines pass-through asymmetry in the Brazilian beer market where in 2013 four major brewing companies held over 98% of the market. Our results indicate asymmetry insofar as cost hikes are passed through but cost reductions don’t seem to affect prices. Moreover, supermarkets pass-through cost hikes more strongly than bars and restaurants. / Aumentos de custo são repassados ao consumidor em maior proporção do que reduções de custos em diversos mercados. Esse fenômeno é largamente documentado na literatura, mas ainda é um tema pouco explorado no Brasil. Colusão é uma das explicações teóricas para esse fenômeno. Este estudo objetiva examinar a assimetria na transmissão de preços no mercado de cerveja brasileiro onde, em 2013, quatro grupos de cervejarias detinham mais de 98% do mercado. Os resultados apontam assimetria na medida em que, no curto prazo, aumentos de custo são repassados e reduções de custo parecem não ter efeitos. Além disso, mercados repassam aumentos mais fortemente que bares e restaurantes.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Accurate estimation of alcohol price elasticity is important for policy analysis – e.g.., determining optimal taxes and projecting revenues generated from proposed tax changes. Several approaches to specifying and estimating the price elasticity of demand for alcohol can be found in the literature. There are two keys to policy-relevant specification and estimation of alcohol price elasticity. First, the underlying demand model should take account of alcohol consumption decisions at the extensive margin – i.e., individuals' decisions to drink or not – because the price of alcohol may impact the drinking initiation decision and one's decision to drink is likely to be structurally different from how much they drink if they decide to do so (the intensive margin). Secondly, the modeling of alcohol demand elasticity should yield both theoretical and empirical results that are causally interpretable. The elasticity estimates obtained from the existing two-part model takes into account the extensive margin, but are not causally interpretable. The elasticity estimates obtained using aggregate-level models, however, are causally interpretable, but do not explicitly take into account the extensive margin. There currently exists no specification and estimation method for alcohol price elasticity that both accommodates the extensive margin and is causally interpretable. I explore additional sources of bias in the extant approaches to elasticity specification and estimation: 1) the use of logged (vs. nominal) alcohol prices; and 2) implementation of unnecessarily restrictive assumptions underlying the conventional two-part model. I propose a new approach to elasticity specification and estimation that covers the two key requirements for policy relevance and remedies all such biases. I find evidence of substantial divergence between the new and extant methods using both simulated and the real data. Such differences are profound when placed in the context of alcohol tax revenue generation.