In the information technology industry which has high network externalities, it is common for a firm to employ new product pre-announcements to promote their future products. However, false product pre-announcements are strategically anti-competitive. Under the two-stage game model, this paper examines the monopolistic firm¡¦s incentive of employing false pre-announcements when competing with a potential rival and whether those pre-announcements are strategically anti-competitive, provided that the market exhibits network externalities and the compatibility of system products is considered. This paper shows that if there are no potential rivals in the future, if the products have network externalities, and if the compatibility of cross-period products is relatively high, then the monopoly will have an incentive to exaggerate the pre-announcements. If potential rivals enter the market at the second stage, then the greater the monopoly¡¦s technological advantage is, the higher the extent of false pre-announcements will be. However, as long as the network effect is large enough, the monopoly is likely to employ pre-announcements, even if the product has no technological advantage. By excluding potential entrants from entering the market, established monopolistic firms keep their profits. And consumers may have false expectation¡Xa firm could win with an inferior technology¡Xwhich will in turn cause unfair competition. In addition, when the differences of the products are getting larger, a firm¡¦s incentive of employing false pre-announcements will raise. When the two products are totally compatible, the monopoly¡¦s new product pre-announcements are merely affected by the technological advantage. Then the greater the monopoly¡¦s technological advantage is, the higher the extent of false pre-announcements will be.

The identification of factors contributing to the farmers' non-retention of subsidy dollars is key in identifying the impact of the subsidy within and across the sector. Relaxing the assumption of perfect competition, amongst input suppliers, allows for an analysis of two upstream of complementary goods. Because it is the case that the farmers are price takers for some inputs (seed) and may negotiate over the price of others (land), I assume the upstream input providers are more akin to Bertrand competition. General findings, from the theoretical and experimental results, indicate upstream market power as having a significant impact on the economic subsidy incidence; and the complementary between the farmer’s inputs is the main driving force of the results.

In May 2021 the Swedish government decided to establish a trial period for an environmental bonus within the swedish reimbursement system, with the purpose to reduce the emissions of antibiotics and carbon dioxide from the pharmaceutical industry. This thesis examines the effect of the bonus on the pharmaceutical market and whether the goal set by the government can be met based on economic theory. By an in-depth analysis of the generic market, the implementation of the environmental premium is examined on the basis of the Bertrand model. The thesis finds that the environmental bonus will give different outcomes depending on the number of competing firms on the market. The main conclusion is that an environmental bonus will, in most cases, lead to higher prices for medicines. The thesis also finds that the bonus would probably give the best results in the substitution groups where many firms compete. / I maj 2021 beslutade regeringen att ett försök till miljöpremie ska implementeras i läkemedelsförmånssystemet. Syftet med miljöpremien är att minska utsläppen av främst restprodukter till antibiotika men även utsläppen av koldioxid vid produktionen. Denna uppsats undersöker vilka effekter denna miljöpremie kan tänkas ge på läkemedelsmarknaden utifrån nationalekonomisk teori samt om det mål som regeringen satt upp kan tänkas uppfyllas. Genom att djupgående analysera generikamarknaden undersöks implementeringen av miljöpremien utifrån Bertrandmodellen. Uppsatsen finner att miljöpremien troligtvis kommer ge olika utfall inom marknaden beroende på antal konkurrerande företag per utbytesgrupp. Analysens huvudsakliga slutsats är att en miljöpremien i de flesta fall kommer leda till högre priser på läkemedel samt att möjligheten för företag att upprätthålla tysta prissamordningar kan tänkas minska. Slutligen finner uppsatsen att en miljöpremie troligtvis får flest läkemedelsföretag att ställa om till grönt när den implementeras i utbytesgrupper med flera konkurrenter.

Cette thèse est composée de trois articles indépendants qui ont pour trait commun d’analyser le comportement d’investisseurs et de firmes en situation de concurrence imparfaite. Nous considérons d’abord un modèle de marché financier à la Kyle (1985) où les investisseurs peuvent produire soit un signal (fondamental) sur la valeur d’un actif risqué, soit un signal (non-fondamental) sur la demande aléatoire des noise traders. Nous montrons que réduire le coût du signal non-fondamental détériore l’efficience informationnelle du prix du titre et,sous certaines conditions, le bien-être des noise traders. Nous étendons ensuite le modèle au cas où les investisseurs non-fondamentalistes soumettent des ordres à cours limité. Leur activité s’apparente alors à du “front running”. Par ce biais, nous enrichissons nos résultats et montrons que l’effet potentiellement néfaste de l’accès à l’information non-fondamentale persiste.Nous considérons ensuite un marché à la Kyle (1985) où des agents non informés échangent pour un motif de partage de risque avec des investisseurs répartis sur un réseau.Ces derniers partagent leurs signaux avec leurs contacts, ce qui formalise une meilleure diffusion de l’information. Nous évaluons alors l’effet de cette hypothèse sur deux critères: le profit spéculatif et l’espérance d’utilité des agents non informés qui mesure l’efficacité du partage de risque sur le marché. Nous montrons que l’ajout du réseau peut simultanément améliorer ces deux critères ainsi que l’efficience informationnelle du prix. Un résultat original qui ne peut pas être obtenu sans l’ajout du réseau. Enfin, nous caractérisons la coopération graduelle entre deux firmes concurrentes de tailles différentes incapables de contracter et dont les contributions sont irréversibles. Nous montrons que l’asymétrie entre les deux firmes ralentit fortement le processus de collaboration,ce qui souligne l’importance des arrangements contractuels dans certaines situations. Nous montrons aussi qu’un renforcement de la concurrence entre les deux firmes peut nuire au bien-être social en réduisant leur capacité à collaborer. / This thesis contains three distinct papers related to the behavior of investors or firms acting under imperfect competition. First, we consider a Kyle’s (1985) model where investors can produce either a (fundamental) signal on the value of the risky asset, or a (non fundamental)signal on the forth coming demand from noise traders. We show that reducing the cost of the non-fundamental signal worsens price informativeness as well as the welfare of noise traders under some conditions. Then, we extend the model by allowing non fundamental traders to submit limit orders. Their activity is then analogous to front running. By this mean, we enrich our results and show that the potentially detrimental effect of non-fundamental information still pertains. Then, we consider a market à la Kyle (1985) where uninformed hedgers trade for risk sharing purposes with investors located on a network, who share their signal with their“contacts”. This hypothesis formalizes a better diffusion of information. We evaluate its effect on speculative gains and hedgers’ expected utility which depends on the risk sharing role of the market. We show that the introduction of the network might simultaneously improve these two welfare measures as well as price informativeness. An original result that cannot be obtained otherwise. Finally, we consider a contribution game between two competitors of different sizes. We obtain the value of their (irreversible) contributions during each period of the game. We show that the asymmetry between the two firms strongly slowers the collaboration process,high lighting the importance of contractual arrangements in some circumstances. Also, we obtain that increasing competition might be detrimental to social welfare, because it harms the ability of the two firms to set up a mutually beneficial process of collaboration.