無 / Since 1980, due to the reform and opening door policies, the economy has developed rapidly and the demand for energy has greatly increased in China. Nowadays China needs to continue economic growth to last the survival of CCP regime. Therefore economic growth is the core of China. Since Chinese economic growth depends on its energy supplies. To sustain economic growth, China not only tries to acquire offshore oil deposits, but also must rely upon oversea oil. China has become heavily reliant on foreign oil supplies and also becomes the highly competitive country in oil resource on the world. The majority of China’s oil import is through sea transportation. This over-reliance on sea lanes of communication (SLOC) causes China to fall into face great risks. Beijing feels vulnerable in its Oil transporting lanes and therefore attempts to maintain the stability of its imported oil supplies by securing SLOC to sustain its economic growth. Under these circumstances, the development of the PLA Navy thus becomes a key factor of Chinese prosperity. Beijing becomes aware that a strong navy could protect its oil transporting lanes. However, China does not have a strong navy to acquire its oil transporting lanes. However, China does not have a strong navy to acquire its oil transporting lanes and offshore oil deposits. For this reason, the development of PLA Navy is a natural trend for Chinese expanding national interests. China wants to defend its SLOC far away from its coast to sustain oil supplies stability so that conducts its naval” far sea defense” policy to build a blue-water navy.

Ce mémoire a pour objectif d’analyser la pertinence d’une culture stratégique particulière, celle de l’Inde. Au moins quatre variables culturelles à dimension sécuritaire – l’identité, les valeurs, les normes et les perceptions – permettent d’expliquer la conception de la sécurité et du pouvoir indiens. L’hypothèse avancée dans ce mémoire est la suivante : à cause de l’influence de la culture stratégique indienne, l’océan Indien est perçu par l’élite indienne comme l’endroit où réside la principale menace à la sécurité de l’Inde. En outre, cette perception particulière de la menace permet de mieux comprendre les ambitions maritimes de l’Inde dans l’océan Indien à l’aube du 21e siècle. Afin de confirmer l’hypothèse, nous analysons l’influence de la culture stratégique indienne sur les approches stratégiques privilégiées par les décideurs Indiens au sein de l’océan Indien. Nous concluons, sur la base de l’étude cas, que l’objectif stratégique de New Delhi est de devenir la puissance maritime dominante de l’océan Indien. Le moyen privilégié est la création d’une marine océanique puissante, capable de maintenir en permanence une escadre en patrouille loin de ses bases navales. Sur le plan théorique, les actions indiennes – qui ont surtout un caractère défensif – sont justifiées par une doctrine de non-ingérence des grandes puissances dans les affaires indiennes, doctrine calquée sur la doctrine Monroe. Selon la doctrine indienne, seules les puissances régionales sont à même de préserver la stabilité dans la région de l’océan Indien. Conséquemment, le Gouvernement indien œuvre à réduire l’ingérence des marines de guerre étrangères au sein de l’océan Indien. / This thesis aims to analyze the relevance of a particular strategic culture, that of India. At least four cultural variables, each with a specific security dimension - identity, values, norms and perceptive lens - help us understand the Indian notions of security and power. The main hypothesis put forward in our paper is as follows: because Indian elite are deeply influenced by the prevailing Indian strategic culture, they perceive the Indian Ocean as the place where the main security threat to the country’s security lies. In addition, this particular security perception makes it possible to better understand India’s maritime ambitions in the Indian Ocean at the dawn of the 21st century. To confirm this, we analyze the influence of Indian strategic culture on strategic approaches privileged by Indian decision-makers within the Indian Ocean. We conclude that New Delhi’s strategic objective is to become the dominant maritime power in the Indian Ocean. The means to bring about this end is the creation of a strong blue water navy capable of sustaining a permanent squadron on patrol far from its naval bases. Furthermore, Indian naval activities - which are mainly defensive in nature - are justified by a doctrine of non-interference by major powers in Indian domestic affairs, a doctrine modeled on the Monroe Doctrine. According to the Indian doctrine, only the regional powers are able to preserve stability in the Indian Ocean region. Consequently, the Indian Government works to reduce the presence of foreign naval forces in the Indian Ocean.

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