La recente crisi internazionale ha acceso un intenso dibattito sulla composizione degli organi di governo societario delle istituzioni finanziarie. Questo studio si pone l’obiettivo di indagare le determinanti della struttura del consiglio di amministrazione nel settore bancario europeo. Il primo capitolo è dedicato all’analisi dei fattori capaci di condizionare la dimensione del consiglio e la presenza di componenti non esecutivi e di componenti indipendenti. I risultati ottenuti dimostrano l’esistenza di un equilibrio complessivo tra i fattori idiosincratici propri delle singole banche e le caratteristiche dei Paesi in cui esse operano nell’influenzare la dimensione dell’organo amministrativo. Di contro, le peculiarità del contesto di riferimento spiegano la maggior parte della variabilità nelle percentuali di amministratori non esecutivi e di amministratori indipendenti. Con riferimento alle caratteristiche specifiche degli intermediari, vengono identificate relazioni sistematiche tra la struttura del consiglio di amministrazione e l’operatività aziendale o la struttura proprietaria, in funzione del trade-off tra i costi e i benefici associati a configurazioni alternative dell’organo di gestione. Nel secondo capitolo, viene sviluppata l’analisi delle determinanti della presenza di amministratori di genere femminile. Il modello empirico integra le variabili esplicative relative alle caratteristiche delle singole banche con un ampio numero di indicatori della condizione della donna in ciascun Paese, attinenti all’istruzione, alla famiglia, al bilanciamento tra vita privata e lavoro, all’occupazione e al coinvolgimento nella politica e nelle istituzioni pubbliche. Le evidenze dell’analisi fanno emergere con chiarezza che la partecipazione femminile al consiglio delle banche è uno specchio dell’immagine della donna nell’ambiente esterno. In questo senso, i Paesi con costumi più emancipativi e un più efficace sistema di welfare a supporto della parità tra i generi presentano la più elevata partecipazione femminile al consiglio di amministrazione degli intermediari nazionali. / The recent financial crisis has brought board of directors of financial institutions into the spotlight. This study investigates the determinants of board structure in the European banking industry. In the first chapter, we analyze factors that can affect the number of board members, the percentage of non executive directors and the percentage of independent directors. We prove the existence of an overall equilibrium between bank-specific and country-specific characteristics in explaining variation in board size. In contrast, country-specific characteristics explain most of the variation in the percentages of non executive directors and independent directors. As regards bank-specific characteristics, we find systematic relationships between board composition and bank’s operating variables or ownership structure variables, according to benefits and costs embedded in different board structures. In the second chapter, we examine the determinants of female participation in the boardroom. In this case, bank-specific characteristics are complemented by country-specific explanatory variables of women’s status covering the areas of education, family life, economic activity and employment, work-life balance, participation in public life and decision making. The results provide evidence that female representation on bank boards is a mirror of the general status of women in the country in which the banks operate. In this sense countries that exhibit more emancipative values, as well as more advanced welfare systems to promote effective equality between women and men, are the ones that present higher percentages of female board directors in their banks.

Šiuo metu vyraujanti pasaulinė ekonominė krizė, taip pat ankstesni bendrovių bankrotų pavyzdžiai (tokių kaip Enron, Parmalat) signalizuoja apie būtinybę tinkamai sureguliuoti bendrovių valdymo teisinę bazę, o ypač aspektus susijusius su bendrovės akcininkų ir valdymo organo santykiais. Todėl šiame magistro darbe yra analizuojamos teisinės priemonės, kurios padeda sumažinti interesų konfliktus kylančius tarp bendrovių, kurių vertybiniais popieriais yra prekiaujama reguliuojamoje rinkoje, akcininkų ir valdymo organo. Šiam tikslui pasiekti yra išskiriamos penkios teisinio reguliavimo sritys: bendrovių kontrolės rinkos ir bendrovių perėmimo, informacijos atskleidimo, valdymo organo narių finansinio skatinimo, valdymo organo struktūros bei bendrovės akcininkų teisių teisinis reguliavimas. Kiekviena reguliavimo sritis yra aptariama dviem aspektais, pirmiausia, analizuojant Europos Sąjungos lygiu egzistuojantį teisinį reguliavimą, po to vertinant tokio reguliavimo įgyvendinimą Lietuvos Respublikoje bei pateikiant pastabas ir pasiūlymus. Darbe padaroma išvada, kad norint sumažinti neigiamas pasekmes atsirandančias dėl nuosavybės teisės ir valdymo atskyrimo bendrovėse, reikia, kad visos aukščiau išvardintos priemonės papildytų viena kitą ir būtų taikomos sistemiškai. / The ongoing economic crisis around the world and the recent events in corporate bankruptcy sector (including Enron and Parmalat cases) have shown a clear signal to regulate more efficiently the corporate governance laws and especially the relations between shareholders and the governance body of the company. This thesis paper addresses the regulatory framework issues, which mitigate the conflict of interests between the shareholders and the governance body of publicly traded companies. Five legal instruments are analyzed in order to achieve this objective: market for corporate control and takeovers, information disclosure, director remuneration, structure of governance body and shareholder empowerment. Each legal instrument is analyzed from two legal perspectives, first, the European Union legal framework is described and then analysis concentrates on the implementation of European law in the Republic of Lithuania. Comments and proposals are given to existing implementation problems. The conclusion emphasizes that a systematic use of all the above mentioned legal instruments is required in order to mitigate the costs of separation of ownership and control in publicly traded companies.