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Crimes against humanity have become a global concern, garnering widespread media coverage over the past decade. Boko Haram's actions pose a threat to both domestic and international security, with frequent attacks on civilians, churches, security forces, and even international organizations like the United Nations. The group's impact is felt across all 36 states of Nigeria, impacting the country's socio-political and economic development. The absence of agreement on whether non-state actors can be held responsible for crimes against humanity in the same way as states, can create a potential risk of serious crimes going unpunished. As non-state actors are increasingly gaining influence and have the capacity to plan and execute widespread atrocities, it is crucial to address this issue. This research project aims to investigate whether there is an Organizational Policy behind Boko Haram’s atrocities and how it can be categorized as committing crimes against humanity under Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute.

With the rise of global transnational terrorist networks (GTTNs), there has been an increase in scholarly output on the subject. While many scholars have focused on the ways in which these networks enable terrorist organizations to achieve their goals, few have studied the transformative impact that GTTNs have on group cohesion. In order to fill this gap, I seek to answer the question how, if at all, GTTNs affect the likelihood of armed groups experiencing fragmentation. In doing so, I propose three ways in which GTTNs can influence cohesion among their members and explore these in the cases of al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, while using the Taliban as a counterfactual. Although I find that both GTTN members and non-members experience fragmentation, the ways in which fragmentation manifests itself differs. Whereas the Taliban experienced fragmentation following key events, al-Shabaab and Boko Haram experienced splits as a result of long-term processes. Thus, GTTN membership ostensibly reinforces internal processes that may cause factions to split from the organization, thereby increasing the risk of fragmentation. However, more research is required on the different ways through which GTTNs exert influence over their members and the effect this has on the risk of fragmentation.

In our era, digital technology is one of the fastest-changing areas. It impacts our private life, well-being, economics, politics and warfare. This essay intends to answer how digital transformation affects combats and state and non-state actors and also how these digitalised combats compromise social sustainability. The findings include social media and online platforms, dark web and cyberterrorism, cryptocurrency, remote sensing and surveillance, machine learning and AI, and digitally enabled strategies. The analysis was done by the Centre of Gravity model, social sustainability and securitisation theory. The thesis follows a comparative case study approach about Kenya and Nigeria therefore the essay address al-Shabaab and Boko Haram as the two prominent terrorist groups and the empirical data are related specifically to these countries and these diasporas.

This study investigates the use of violence by Salafi-Oriented Movement Organisations. Drawing mostly from Social Movement Theory’s “political opportunity” and “resource mobilisation” thesis, it uses the Northern Nigerian-born Boko Haram (BH) to study how such organisation evolved and used different forms of violent activisms for goal attainment. On that basis, three main research questions were formulated: (1) What socio-political structures enabled the evolution of the organisation in Northern Nigeria? (2) Under what conditions did BH begin to use armed violence against the Nigerian State? (3) What specific forms of armed violence did BH use and how were such forms of strategy sustained within the organisation? In answering these questions, the study relied on data collected through one-on-one semi-structured interviews from religious leaders in Northern Nigeria (particularly those within the Salafi networks); selected politicians in the areas where the group operates; some Nigerian security personnel, and on focus group interviews from victims of BH violence. In addition, the study also drew from other documentary sources (videos and audio recordings from different leaders in the group), and from internal correspondence between BH leaders and those of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Along the primary data, these documentary sources showed a striking historical continuity about the emergence and activities of BH from inception, up until they began using violence as a means for goal attainment. The data showed that while the emergence of the group was dependent on specific Northern Nigerian socio-political and mobilisatory structures, the adoption and sustenance of different forms of violence in the group were re-enforced by the interactions between the group’s leadership and the Borno state government; the violent response of the Nigerian government to the group's initial anti-state rhetoric; the mobilisation of different material resources (accruing from the organisation’s interactions and collaborations with similar international Salafi networks) and the internal dynamics in the group (competition between the different factions in the organisation). These inter-related conditions provided the windows of opportunity upon which both the establishment of the group, as well as the internal logic for the development and justification of different forms of violence were sustained within the organisation. / Religious Studies and Arabic / D. Litt. et Phil. (Religious Studies)

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The question of how armed group ideology influences its behaviour has been tentatively explored in the past decade. However, which role distinct ideological commitments play in civilian targeting has not been satisfactorily discussed thus far. This thesis turns to research on genocide and mass violence and incorporates the concepts of ‘exclusionary ideologies’ and ‘threat perceptions’ to fill this research gap. It addresses the following question: to what extent do exclusionary ideologies of armed groups influence their use of violence against civilians during civil conflicts? When revolutionary armed groups pursue their goals, threat perceptions determine which groups are considered legitimate targets for attack. Therefore, it is hypothesized that exclusionary groups will employ more violence against civilians than inclusionary groups because the former have a more expanded understanding of legitimate targeting than the latter. Through a structured focused comparison, discourse analysis and process tracing applied to the cases of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, moderate support for this hypothesis is found. It is shown that both armed groups to varying extents invoke threat perceptions regarding certain out-groups to legitimize and rationalise their patterns of violence. Nonetheless, a descent into indiscriminate violence by Boko Haram and data shortage of Al-Shabaab attacks warrant caution.

Boko Haram est un groupe terroriste dont l’épicentre se situe au nord du Nigéria. Ce groupe qui avait au départ comme activité la dénonciation des tares de la société nigériane a plongé dans actions de terrorisme à partir de 2009 suite à la répression militaire de l’armée nigériane. Face à la difficulté du Nigéria de contenir Boko Haram, ce groupe s’est régionalisé, faisant ainsi ressortir les problèmes de coopération sécuritaire régionale dans le Bassin du Lac Tchad et au-delà. Malgré l’application de ces mécanismes régionaux de sécurité, Boko Haram a continué ses activités avec un bilan lourd : plus de 30 000 morts en sept années de conflit armé, plus 1.5 million de réfugiés et déplacés, 4.2 millions de personnes en situation d’insécurité alimentaire et sanitaire. Ceci nous amène à qualifier Boko Haram comme étant un des groupes terroristes islamistes les plus féroces des temps contemporains. En s’appuyant sur des ressources documentaires, ce mémoire vise à expliquer pourquoi les mécanismes régionaux de sécurité n’ont pas permis d’endiguer la menace Boko Haram. Ma démonstration se base sur deux arguments : tout d’abord, l’absence de leadership dans la lutte contre Boko Haram, manifesté par l’attitude du Nigéria au niveau régional et le manque d’intérêt du Tchad, a causé une difficulté d’alliance régionale. Le second argument stipule que la multiplication des organisations régionales dans le Bassin du Lac Tchad a créé des difficultés de coordination entre elles et des problèmes de monopole institutionnel empêchant à ces organisations d’agir efficacement contre le groupe terroriste Boko Haram. / Boko Haram is a terrorist group from northern Nigeria. This group promoting the application of Sharia in northern Nigeria, became a terrorist group in 2009 after military repression by the Nigerian state. With the inability of the Nigerian army to contain this terrorist threat, Boko Haram increased its activities around the Lake Chad Basin and beyond. During several years of Boko Haram's atrocities, one of the most important problems comes from the failure of regional security mechanisms to stem this group. Despite the implementation of these regional security mechanisms, Boko Haram remains a serious threat that has taken a heavy toll: more than 20,000 deaths in seven years of armed conflict, more than 1.5 million refugees and displaced persons, 4.2 million facing health problems and food insecurity. This leads us to consider Boko Haram one of the most ferocious Islamist terrorist groups in modern times. Using resources such as books, scientific articles, newspapers, governments and NGO reports and documents published by international organizations, this thesis seeks to explain why the regional security mechanisms failed to contain Boko Haram. I focus on two arguments: first, the lack of leadership in the fight against Boko Haram, manifested by Nigeria's regional attitude and the lack of interest of Chad, led to the failure of collective action against the Boko Haram phenomenon. Then, the second argument states that the multiplication of regional organizations in the Lake Chad Basin created difficulties of coordination between them and problems of institutional monopoly, preventing these organizations from acting effectively against the terrorist group Boko Haram.

Créé à la fin des années 90, Boko Haram est passé, en l’espace de dix ans, du stade de secte islamiste à celui de mouvement terroriste capable de défier l’État fédéral nigérian (première puissance militaire de l’Afrique de l’Ouest) et de mener des incursions dans des pays limitrophes (Cameroun, Tchad, Niger). Les objectifs, les méthodes et les cibles du groupe ont considérablement varié au cours de son évolution, ce qui obère toute tentative de catégorisation de la violence qu’il revendique. Les recherches existantes sur Boko Haram l’analysent en fonction de sa radicalisation à la fin des années 2000 et voient dans l’explosion de la violence au Nord du Nigeria une résultante du terrorisme international et transnational qui affecte le Sahel et plusieurs pays de la sous-région ouest-africaine. Or, la violence politique sur fond de revendications ethniques, économiques et religieuses fait partie de l’histoire politique du Nigeria, et Boko Haram est loin d’être une génération spontanée dans le pays qui abrite la plus forte population musulmane du continent africain. À partir d’un niveau d’analyse intraétatique, cette recherche propose une lecture sociohistorique et politique du contexte structurel à partir duquel Boko Haram a émergé au Nord du Nigeria. Puis, à partir d’une conception relationnelle du rôle de la violence politique, elle utilise l’approche de la violence instrumentale de Martha Crenshaw pour conceptualiser l’évolution des confrontations entre Boko Haram et l’État nigérian. Par rejet d’un système fédéral qu’il considère comme une survivance de l’administration coloniale, Boko Haram revendique effectivement la création d’un État islamique à l’image du Califat de Sokoto [1800-1903] dont les limites géographiques couvraient aussi bien le Nord du Nigeria que certaines parties du Niger, du Cameroun et du Tchad.

Includes bibliographical references (leaves 130-136) / The study focuses on the impact of the Boko Haram Muslim terrorist group on the socioeconomic well‐being and livelihood of the population in the north‐east of Nigeria. To research the social, economic, religious and political impact of attacks leading to the disruption of people in the north‐east who fled their homes for the safety of southern refugee camps, the study relies on three research questions to be answered, namely: Does the Boko Haram terrorist group pose a threat to the socio‐economic well‐being of people in north‐eastern Nigeria? How have Boko Haram terrorist attacks impacted on the livelihood of the population? What is a viable solution or intervention strategy to deal with the impact of and fight against terrorism in Nigeria in particular? The study adopts an in‐depth qualitative methodology. Different related research techniques are used in data collection and analysis. Focus group discussions, in‐depth interviews and documentary sources have different complementary strengths, which are more comprehensive when used together. Questionnaires will guide the discussions with groups of internally displaced people, who are the units of analysis. Data is gathered through snowball sampling of willing, available respondents to understand and explain their personal views and experiences, creating the meanings they have constructed around their disrupted livelihoods and well‐being in refugee camps. An overarching, broad conflict perspective is chosen, related to Dahrendorf’s views on power struggles of dominant interest groups, authority, inequality and marginalisation of opponents, which also includes complementary concepts of religiously inspired fundamentalist theory focusing on indoctrination, dominance, manipulation and marginalisation of interest groups. This broad conflict perspective will investigate the social, economic, political and religious impacts of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The findings indicate that the Boko Haram attacks had a negative effect on the livelihood of citizens and displaced persons in refugee camps, as well as on the social cohesion and development of the north‐eastern Nigerian state. Conflict resolution and intervention strategies will be implemented to curb the violence. Societal transformation is recommended for infrastructural development and job creation to solve poverty and gainfully cater for educated, unemployed youths, now recruited into the ranks of the Boko Haram Muslim sect. / Sociology / M.A. (Sociology)