Exploring the main factors that determine bond spreads with respect to Treasury rates is one of the most critical issues in the corporate debt market. Credit risk has long been perceived as the most important determinant of bond spreads (Fisher, 1959). One of the most critical parameters in credit risk models is asset volatility, which includes idiosyncratic and systematic components. However, these models do not distinguish between them. Chapter 2 investigates the impact of idiosyncratic volatility on bond portfolio spreads between 2000 and 2010. While the prediction of traditional asset pricing models is that firm-specific risk should be diversified away at aggregate level, I find idiosyncratic volatility plays an incremental role in explaining bond portfolio spreads beyond the market factors. Recovery is an important measurement of credit risk additional to default probability. Chapter 3 focuses on the estimation of firm recovery after bankruptcy using the Leland and Toft (1996) model. Using a large sample of Chapter 11 filings from 1996 to 2007, I find that the recovery derived from the Leland and Toft model has strong explanatory power on the debt recovery observed in the market. Recent literature finds that all extant credit risk models significantly underestimate bond spreads, especially for investment grade bonds of short maturity. Chapter 4 identifies a heretofore ignored component, perceived accounting misstatement, by regressing bond spreads on the proxy of accounting misstatement propensity, while controlling for issuers’ default risk and bond illiquidity risk between January 1994 and June 2002. My thesis deepens the understanding of bond price discovery mechanisms and presents an important challenge for future research to incorporate the strong empirical relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and bond yields in asset pricing models. My thesis also sheds light on the accurate prediction of debt recovery, which is important to the valuation and hedging of risky debt and credit derivatives. Furthermore, my thesis assists in solving the credit spread puzzle by identifying a new risk factor. Overall, my thesis provides new insights into research on the corporate debt market and has important implications for academic scholars and market practitioners. / Thesis (Ph.D, Management) -- Queen's University, 2013-04-30 20:22:12.594

Prior research on conservative accounting and bondholder-shareholder conflict show that firms with higher degree of conservatism experience less austere conflict and lower cost of debt. However, since the implementation of IFRS in 2005, conservatism has been widely reduced in favor of fair value principles. This study sets out to examine if accounting conservatism still mitigates the conflict and reduces cost of debt. We regress two measures of conservatism on three conflict proxies and debt cost, respectively, for firms on the Norwegian market. Our results support the conclusion that conservative accounting mitigates the bondholder-shareholder conflict even after the introduction of IFRS, but we find no significant evidence that bondholders reward high level of conservatism with lower cost of debt.

Cette thèse est construite autour de trois essais empiriques centrés sur l'efficience rendement risque des banques européennes cotées et sur la tarification des obligations qu'elles émettent. Avec le premier essai, on mesure l'aptitude relative des banques à choisir efficacement le couple rendement / risque. On montre que cette aptitude relative est stable, surtout à court terme et que les banques les plus efficaces dans leurs choix rendement / risque partagent des caractéristiques communes et bénéficient d’une notation de solidité plus avantageuse. Le second essai apporte la preuve que l'introduction de cette mesure d'efficience du choix rendement / risque améliore de manière sensible l'explication de la prime de défaut qu'exigent les investisseurs sur les obligations émises par les banques et que les mesures traditionnelles du risque de défaut ne captent pas à elles seules l’intégralité de la prime de défaut. En outre, la capacité des banques à gérer efficacement le couple rendement / risque s’avère être un élément déterminant de la confiance que mettent les détenteurs d'obligations dans la mesure du risque effectif de défaut des banques. Avec le dernier essai on traite des conséquences d'une éventuelle divergence entre droits de contrôle et droits pécuniaires des actionnaires ultimes des banques sur la tarification des obligations qu'elles émettent. Si les obligataires ne semblent pas sensibles à une telle divergence avant la crise financière, les résultats montrent en revanche qu’ils le deviennent pendant la crise en exigeant un spread d'autant moins élevé que cette divergence est plus prononcée. Il est intéressant de noter que ce résultat ne tient que lorsque les banques font face à un risque de défaut élevé. / This thesis consists of three empirical essays with an emphasis on bank risk-return efficiency and bond pricing. Chapter 1 aims at a better understanding of the quality of banks’ risk management by providing, for a set of European listed banks, a measure of each bank’s relative efficiency in terms of risk-return trade-off. We show that the level of bank risk-return efficiency is quite stable in the short term, whereas in the long term low performing banks are not condemned to remain inefficient. We also identify some common characteristics for the most risk-return efficient banks, which are assigned, by rating agencies, a more attractive financial strength rating. In chapter 2, we investigate the determinants of bank bond spread and we show that bank managerial ability, proxied by bank risk-return efficiency, improves the explanation of the default premium required by bondholders. Our results underline that standard default risk measures do not entirely reflect the default premium and banks’ managerial ability turns out to be a determinant of bondholders’ confidence in the measure of the effective level of bank default. Chapter 3 examines the effect of divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights of ultimate owners in pyramid ownership structure on the pricing of banking bonds. Whereas before the financial crisis such a divergence does not affect bank bond yield spread, during downturns bondholders require a lower spread from banks controlled by an ultimate owner with excess control rights. The investigation on more restrictive subsets underlines that this result is only significant when banks experience a high level of default risk.