Thesis--Catholic University of America. / "Corrigenda" slip inserted. Bibliography: p. 152-156.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / The central problem of this dissertation is to test some aspects of the hypothesis that a modified version of Edgar Sheffield Brightman's Moral Laws constitutes a fundamental theoretical framework for social ethics. A test case is considered which compares the implicit assumptions made qy certain religious social ethicists with those characteristic of moral law social etlncs. It is hypothesized that if social ethics based on moral laws do represent fundamental principles, then evidence of dependence on them will be found in the writinr,s of those who hold to other systems. These investigations allow six propositions to be made on the proper components of a viable social ethic. These are derived from the investigation of the presuppositions of moral laws and the consequences of the types of appeals made to moral law social ethics by Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Ramsey. Two methodological procedures are used. The first is an analytic and synthetic exposition of the central theoretical problem of outlining particular aspects of moral law foundations for social ethics. This exposition includes contributions of philosophy and social science. These data are incorporated into a fourfold re-classification of Brightman's Noral Laws as amended to include a law of the ideal of community. The second methodological procedure involves the use of content analysis of selected works of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Ramsey. The analysis is made by examining the arguments in specific ethical considerations in terms of the adequacy of their theoretical framework. It is noted that the authors rely on arguments analogous to the principles of moral law social ethics where their theory seems inadequate, and that the theoretical framework often makes no improvement on moral law social ethics. The limitations of this study are uncerstood in terms of the use of the data. In the work on the expansion of Edgar S. Brightman's Horal Laws, contributions by other philosophers and by social scientists are limited to the areas where their thinking is consonant with that of Brightman, although new insights of these thinkers are incorporated. The thought of neither Reinhold Niebuhr nor Paul Ramsey has been exhaustively analyzed. This dissertation is not primarily concerned with this problem but rather, only with their thought as illustrative material. The limits of the conclusions regarding this illustrative material are that some forms of Christian social ethics may be subsumed in moral law social ethics without doing violence to the ethical efficacy of Christian theory. This excludes, however, accepting the exclusiveness of revelatory data as a presupposition. It is concluded that at least six aspects of moral law foundations for social ethics are universally valid. First, that the term "normative system" must be understood as capable of development; second, that any valid social ethics must be adequately grounded in an empirical approach; third, that empiricism must be broadly understood in terms of a theory of reality which is organic and pluralistic; fourth, that ethics must always find its locus in the category of personality which, in social ethics, is integral to the concept of community; fifth, that ethical terms and their validity may only be understood in the light of one's understanaing of the nature and function of culture; sixth, that religious ethics should be included as part of the data of moral experience. / 2031-01-01

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / The purpose or the dissertation is to compare the epistemology and theodicy or Edward John Carnell with that or Edgar Sheffield Brightman in order to draw out philosophic conructs between the two philosophers. Their basic epistemological conflict concerns philosophic starting point. For Brightman, epistemological starting points other than the diversified unity or present consciousness (datum self, shining present) are either limiting abstractions or inferences (reliable and unreliable) from this datum self. For Brightman the datum self (with its experiences immediately given) is undeniable tact. Since the truth or claims is not directly given, claims must be tested. However, insisting that starting point dominates method, conclusion, and criterion or truth, Carnell rates one area or experience (namely, "internal ertable experience," innate norms, or Augustine's "eternal concepts") as well as a truth-claim (namely, the Bible as infallible) as having superior epistemological value [TRUNCATED]. / 2031-01-01

This dissertation comprises exegesis and critique of the personalistic idealism of Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1884 - 1953). Chapter One offers a biography of Brightman's life and identifies the intellectual heritage out of which he emerged and in which his thought may be situated. Chapters Two to Seven contain major exegesis of Brightman's metaphysical system relevant to the detailed critique and redefinition of person which follows in the remaining two Chapters. In these chapters the implications of Brightman's account of experience are examined extensively. The critique develops from relatively minor difficulties to a comprehensive analysis of the relationship that holds between the way he viewed experience and the category of substance. The argument will show that there is a distinction between experience and person which Brightman failed to recognize. The person is discovered to be (what will be called) a functional unity of purposive will and body with experience being one dimension of the person rather than its defining criterion. The concept of person as a functional unity of purposive will and responsive body with experience being a dimension in the person is found to be a more consistent outworking of Brightman's experiential foundation than his own bifurcation of person and body.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1994. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 101-104).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University. / The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate, by an examination of four philosophic points of view, the nature of selfhood. Although their thoughts diverge, the common assumption of Ralph Barton Perry, Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Soren Kierkegaard appears to be that the self, rather than society, nature, or God, is the root of morality. Perry's philosophy, operating from the springboard of his polemic against idealism, is an expression of his doctrine of scientific method: that reality, including the reality of the self, is best discovered when the distorting effects of the observing self are minimized. These distortions include the several "fallacies of idealism" as well as the general idealistic error of assuming that being and being known are synonymous. Removal of the distortions reveals a self integrated with nature; a) epistemologically, in that consciousness means a structural unity of the objects of consciousness without residue; b) naturalistically, in that responses of the self to its environment are those of a natural, organic entity; c) morally, in that interest is the determiner of value, and the consummation of values--harmonious happiness--is derivable from that interest.[TRUNCATED]