Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Delaware, 2008. / Principal faculty advisor: Bernard L. Herman, Dept. of Art History. Includes bibliographical references.

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In this thesis, I explore the ways in which Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) have met a declared policy intention to create greater democratic accountability around policing and crime. I conceptualise PCCs as a piece of a broader democratic puzzle and explore both how they have been positioned and shaped within the broader policing and crime nexus across England and Wales. In considering the positioning of PCCs, I use data from case studies and interviews with 32 (out of 41) PCCs to identify how they have begun to develop relationships with the public and local, regional and national partners. The findings suggest that with the exception of their abilities to join up local crime reduction services, PCCs occupy an awkward space - not local enough to be meaningfully representative of the public they serve, but not outwardly-facing enough to manage wider co-ordination of policing. Subsequently, I investigate the shape of the PCC model to deliver greater accountability by focusing on the ways in which PCCs have begun to envisage the role and develop relationships with other key stakeholders. Varied responses from PCCs across the country reflected the broad-ranging nature of the role, which in some cases appeared to undermine their ability to fully perform all aspects of the job. I argue that this became particularly accentuated in emerging relationships with chief constables and Police and Crime Panels, where the single PCC model exposes accountability to dangers of personalities and politics. I conclude by arguing that while many PCCs have facilitated various components of democratic accountability within the management of policing and crime-reduction services, the PCC model appears to be misplaced and misshaped to effectively complete the puzzle of democratic policing.

At the end of 1818 the first duke of Wellington returned to Britain after making his name and fortune on the continent. Despite primarily being remembered as a military hero and diplomat, his excursion into party politics upon joining Lord Liverpool's cabinet constituted a second career that continued until the duke's death in 1852. This thesis sets out to analyse that political career from 1819 to the first Reform Act in 1832 through Wellington's unsolicited correspondence. This previously neglected source offers a revealing insight into the popular perception of politics, society and Wellington himself, which often challenges the assumptions made about press and public opinion. Indeed, these letters themselves can be regarded as a form of public opinion. Hundreds of ordinary people from across the country wrote Wellington on every matter of government and society, for personal, commercial, political or charitable reasons. They wanted patronage for themselves or friends, money and favours. They contributed to debates on Catholic Emancipation, Parliamentary Reform and Economic distress. A sizeable minority wrote anonymous, threatening letters in an attempt to intimidate Wellington, while others gave the duke their wholehearted support. These letters reveal the politicisation of 'The People' and their willingness to get involved in public debates. The correspondents often used the same language and terms of reference. They wrote with the same concerns, albeit for different reasons and with varying suggestions. These letters also provide a glimpse of the popular perception of Wellington - how this military hero was considered, in turn, to be a saviour, influential friend and 'evil nemesis' of the people. Wellington did not ignore this correspondence. Most people got a reply. Their letters were filed, discussed, forwarded to appropriate people, acted upon and investigated. Crucially, some of this correspondence influenced the duke's thinking and impacted on events. Writing a letter to a member of the ruling elite could make a difference.

Francis Fukuyama's End of History paradigm critiques the post-Cold War era. His premise is that liberal democracy is emerging as a global phenomenon because of the collapse of communism as a viable ideology. As a result, the states of the international system are then able to concentrate their efforts in economic maximization and in the building of an international consumer environment. Fukuyama's paradigm is compared to the integration scholarship of David Mitrany and Ernst B. Haas. As Fukuyama perceives nationalism becoming a less relevant issue in Western Europe because of the progressive elements of economic and political integration, Mitrany was one of the earlier political theorists to articulate that the purpose of politics was about the solving of practical problems of states through the development of functional international agencies. Haas believed that not only was nationalism dormant in Western Europe, but that its states would slowly but surely relinquish their sovereignty because of pressure from economic and political groups interested in the development of a supranational Europe. What Haas came to realize, however, was that the concepts of sovereignty and self-determination remain important variables in certain regions of Western Europe. The purpose of this dissertation, then, is to examine the clash between economic maximization and the role of ideas in Western Europe focusing particularly on a state not known for its nationalistic fervour. This dissertation examines the British Conservative Party's and the Scottish National Party's (SNP) position regarding devolution (the Union) and the future scope of the European Union. The SNP is important to analyse because it offers a radical alternative to the status quo and, moreover, this project examines the Party's internal divisions over the EU and its relevance to the devolution principle. There are certain factions within the Tory Party which perceive the establishment of a single currency as detrimental to parliamentary sovereignty and that there should be a repatriation of functions back to the member states. This empirical exercise adds credibility to the argument that despite the alleged and perceived benefits of further economic and political integration, there are political groups who perceive certain issues, like self-determination, worth defending. In a liberal democracy there can exist clashes over fundamental issues. This, thus, offers a sound contribution to the End of History debate.