The budget system is one of the important tools in the management accounting control system. However, in the budget goal setting process, budgeting managers may insert slack into their budgets. Budget slack will erode the effectiveness of the budget system. Agency researchers recognize that well-designed contracts can be used to solve this incentive problem. Therefore, truth-inducing schemes are widely discussed and analyzed. However, many empirical studies report that such schemes can decrease, but not eliminate slack completely. In the meanwhile, they can not increase performance. This study points out that the parameters of the schemes are not well-designed, therefore, the effectiveness to induce subordinates to disclose private information and increase performance is of failure. This paper analyses the relationship among parameters of the truth-inducing pay scheme, risk preference and budget slack by Minimax law under uncertainty, and points that this scheme will lose its effectiveness under some condition. At the meanwhile, this thesis also explains how to design a compensation contract to provide a reference for practical application.

The dysfunctional consequences of budgetary controls have received a great deal of attention. One motivation for the current study was to test whether effects exist between two alleged dysfunctional consequences of a rigid budgetary control form: budget slack creation and managerial short-term orientation. According to the research: A rigid budgetary control will reduce budget slack creation and increase managerial short-term orientation. Reducing one form of dysfunctional behavior (slack creation) through rigid controls seems to raise another form (stronger management focus on business matters that affect short-term results). However, the budgetary control forms that organizations implement may be affected by two important antecedents: past business unit performance and environmental uncertainty. The results indicate that business units that have been more profitable are subject to more rigid budgetary controls, which reduce the propensity to build slack and, as a result, lead indirectly to managers¡¦ emphasis on short-term effects. The high environmental uncertainty of the business units is subject to less rigid budgetary controls from upper management allowing them to build slack, which seems in line with the flexibility required to respond effectively to changes in their environment as well as the tendency for managers to think about long-term effects. We collected 138 samples from 1,017 respondents, who are business unit managers of public owned companies in Taiwan, and used path analysis to test our hypotheses.

To motivate effort, organizations commonly use budget-based tangible rewards (e.g., gift cards, merchandise) in lieu of or in addition to cash rewards and they can distribute tangible rewards to employees either directly (employees are given merchandise directly) or indirectly (via a redeemable points program). In conjunction with various budget-based financial rewards, employees can receive feedback about how they performed relative to other employees. However, employees can intentionally misstate their expected performance (i.e., create budget slack) when participating in the budgeting process, impairing the usefulness of budgets for planning and motivation. This dissertation investigates the effects of different types of budget-based rewards (cash, tangible, or redeemable points) on budget slack creation and performance, and whether relative performance information [RPI] moderates these effects. As predicted, results from an experiment completed by 166 undergraduate students show that participants eligible to earn redeemable points create less slack (i.e., set more difficult performance budgets) than those eligible for cash or direct tangible rewards. Further, RPI provides participants with a descriptive norm that slack creation is socially acceptable, resulting in more slack. Although I do not find support for the predicted indirect relationship between reward type or RPI on performance via their effects on budget slack, I do find that the provision of RPI has a direct positive effect on performance. Finally, supplemental analysis shows that those provided with RPI and cash rewards outperform all others. These results suggest that firms choosing to provide budget-based tangible rewards and allowing employees to participate in the budgeting process should consider using a redeemable points system rather than providing rewards directly to eligible employees. Further, before deciding whether to provide RPI to employees, firms should weigh the positive direct effects of RPI on performance against its negative effects on budget slack creation. Last, if a firm does choose to provide employees with RPI because of its positive effects on employee effort, firms may be well-advised to offer employees budget-based cash rewards instead of budget- based tangible rewards or budget-based points rewards.

Denna uppsats behandlar ämnet budgetslack samt olika faktorers påverkan inom tre skildaverksamheter. Budgetslack är vanligt förekommande inom de flesta verksamheter och sessom ett problem som minskar verksamheters konkurrenskraft. Det råder dock delademeningar om vilka faktorer som ökar respektive minskar existensen av slack samtförekommande studier som motsäger varandra. Vi ansåg därför att det vore intressant attstudera ämnet närmare och valde att fördjupa oss i hur faktorerna budgetstyrning,företagsmiljö, agerande i eget intresse, informationsasymmetri, deltagandegrad ibudgetförhandlingen samt budgetmålens inverkan samverkar. Utifrån vår empiriska dataupprättade vi en egen modell som visar hur dessa faktorer påverkade förekomsten av slackinom de tre olika verksamheterna.Syftet med denna uppsats är att förstå hur olika faktorers påverkan på budgetslack skiljer sigåt mellan olika verksamheter. Vidare syftar studien till att presentera existerande attitydersamt förekomsten av budgetslack.Resultatet av vår studie visade att olika faktorers påverkan på budgetslack skiljer sig åtberoende på vilken typ av verksamhet det gäller. Vi identifierade slack av något slag inomåtminstone två verksamheter men inte några förebyggande åtgärder. Detta kan i det ena falletbero på att slack inte ansågs existera och i det andra på att det inte var något somprioriterades. Utöver de påverkande faktorer som nämndes i teorin har vi även identifierat enhög kostnadskontroll som en åtgärdande faktor av slack. Vidare har vi i denna studie sett attslack inte nödvändigtvis måste vara något dåligt då det bland annat bidrar till en högarbetstillfredsställelse och ansvarskänsla hos personalen vilket i sin tur minskar förekomstenav det så kallade ”dåliga” slacket. / Program: Civilekonomprogrammet