Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 306-310). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1965. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Bibliography: l. 97-99.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2008. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 125-136).

No description available.

No description available.

This thesis looks at House budgetary actions in the 97th Congress in 1981 and 1982. In 1981, despite the opposition of the economic committees and the Democratic majority leadership, the House voted through a budget drawn up by the White House. In 1982, however, they refused to pass a budget drawn to President Reagan's blueprint. The first chapter is a narrative of the events of those two years. The second chapter is an account of the theoretical literature on the subject which pose several questions about those events and also suggest some answers. The third chapter is a statistical analysis of nine House roll calls over the two years. It attempts, first, to identify those Representatives who made the difference between Presidential victory in 1981 and frustration in 1982. Second, it tries to explain what these marginal presidential supporters had in common and what made them switch sides. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

This study addresses in an exploratory fashion the following questions. 1. Would non-monetary performance measures grouped into a statement of public efforts and accomplishments significantly reduce the uncertainty of decision makers concerning past entity performance? 2. Would knowledge of such data alter their resultant budgetary decisions?

No description available.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008. / Committee Chair: Willoughby, Katherine; Committee Member: Eger, Robert; Committee Member: Kingsley, Gordon; Committee Member: Sjoquist, David; Committee Member: Wallace, Sally.

Unanticipated economic fluctuations exert pressure on state governments to adjust their discretionary fiscal policies to accommodate the changing fiscal situation. Even though states adjust fiscal policy as the economy fluctuates, the typical cyclical economic factors are not the sole determinant of such adjustments. State governments budgeting systems in the United States operate under a variety of budgetary institutions. The most prominent state government budgetary institutions include balanced budget rules (BBRs), tax and expenditure limits (TELs), and supermajority voting requirements for tax increases. This dissertation examines how these budgetary institutions affect state government choices of fiscal policy under different economic conditions. To better understand the effect of state level TELs, a stringency index of state level TEL is constructed considering the major structural features. The fixed-effect panel regressions are used for the analysis of impact of TEL and BBR and tax changes and the fixed-effect Tobit is adopted to test the impact of TEL and BBR on spending cuts after the budget is adopted. The result suggests that TEL plays a more important role affecting states discretionary fiscal adjustment from the tax side, while BBR plays a more important role affecting states discretionary fiscal adjustment from the expenditure side. Results of this research show that TEL exerts pressure on states that hinder state ability to deal with volatile fiscal situations, especially in the case of periods of budget crises.