By combining a descriptive meihod with a comparative one, this thesis attempts to understand the ideas of method of Muslim learning as illustrated in a medieval Muslim treatise, Ta'lim al-Muta'allim Tariq al-Ta'allum (Instruction of the Student: the Method of Learning), of Burhan al-Din al-Zarnuji (flourished circa 620/1223). It is apparent throughout the present study that the method of Muslim learning is not simply a technique by which a student seeks to deal, in an appropriate manner, with any academic assignment, but rather, an approach, the very heart of which rests on the problem of ethics, which brings a student into a situation where he maintains his commitment to God, his respect to his teacher, and his invigorated desire in the search for knowledge. The fundamental reason for such an approach to learning is that knowledge ('ilm) in Islam is placed in a religiously special position in that it is recognized as derived from God and given by Him for the nobility of human beings, so that the search for knowledge is a part of the Muslim's religious manifestations of submission to God ('ibadah li-Allah).

Magister Artium - MA / Our secular age is a period of scepticism and ubiquitous doubt. The epistemology of a paradigmatic figure like Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) is central to Islamic intellectual thought, but also speaks to our modern world. In this research dissertation we embark on a critical study of doubt (shakk) and certainty (yaqīn) in Ghazālī’s epistemology. We ask, what is the nature and function of doubt, and how do we best acquire truth and certainty according to Ghazālī? In our evaluation of scepticism in Ghazālī’s epistemology, we analyse the notion of existential doubt and his methodological doubt. In the latter, we look at his scepticism of the methods of knowing as a means to establish the foundations of knowledge. Also, we look at his scepticism as an instrument to cast doubt upon heterodox doctrines and show the limitations of philosophical logic. In this study we assess Ghazālī’s attitude to philosophical demonstration and Sufism as a means to certainty. In early scholarship surrounding Ghazālī, it was assumed that he was a vehement adversary to philosophy. On the other hand, in much of contemporary scholarship, Ghazālī has been understood to give preference to philosophy as the ultimate means to certainty, undermining the place of Sufism. In this study we evaluate these claims; we argue that he was not antagonistic to philosophy and regarded it as a legitimate approach to certainty, but recognised Sufism as a superior approach. Much of previous scholarship has either focused on Ghazālī as a Sufi or a philosopher; we attempt to embark on a parallel approach in which we acknowledge each discipline in its right place within Ghazālī’s epistemology. Thus, in analysing Ghazālī’s approach to acquiring certainty, we evaluate his foundationalism, his attitude to authoritative instruction (taʿlim), and the place of philosophical demonstration and Sufism.

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