This paper studies the trends in the interpretation of Islamic Law in India with particular reference to the Fatawa literature of Deoband. It relates mainly to two important concepts in the interpretation of Islamic law: bid'ah and ijtihad. The introduction gives the historical background of the fatawa literature and analyzes the concepts of bid'ah and ijtihad, postulating working definitions for these concepts. The first chapter summarizes and the second analyses the arguments in the relevant fatawa. The study concludes that the relevant inventions and new social practices were not considered bid'ah and that the reasoning in these fatawa was based on analogies made to similar previous cases in fiqh literature. Such interpretations adhered strictly to the letter of the law.

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Magister Artium - MA / Our secular age is a period of scepticism and ubiquitous doubt. The epistemology of a paradigmatic figure like Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) is central to Islamic intellectual thought, but also speaks to our modern world. In this research dissertation we embark on a critical study of doubt (shakk) and certainty (yaqīn) in Ghazālī’s epistemology. We ask, what is the nature and function of doubt, and how do we best acquire truth and certainty according to Ghazālī? In our evaluation of scepticism in Ghazālī’s epistemology, we analyse the notion of existential doubt and his methodological doubt. In the latter, we look at his scepticism of the methods of knowing as a means to establish the foundations of knowledge. Also, we look at his scepticism as an instrument to cast doubt upon heterodox doctrines and show the limitations of philosophical logic. In this study we assess Ghazālī’s attitude to philosophical demonstration and Sufism as a means to certainty. In early scholarship surrounding Ghazālī, it was assumed that he was a vehement adversary to philosophy. On the other hand, in much of contemporary scholarship, Ghazālī has been understood to give preference to philosophy as the ultimate means to certainty, undermining the place of Sufism. In this study we evaluate these claims; we argue that he was not antagonistic to philosophy and regarded it as a legitimate approach to certainty, but recognised Sufism as a superior approach. Much of previous scholarship has either focused on Ghazālī as a Sufi or a philosopher; we attempt to embark on a parallel approach in which we acknowledge each discipline in its right place within Ghazālī’s epistemology. Thus, in analysing Ghazālī’s approach to acquiring certainty, we evaluate his foundationalism, his attitude to authoritative instruction (taʿlim), and the place of philosophical demonstration and Sufism.

Text in English and Arabic / In pre-colonial Africa, the Southwestern Sahara which includes Mauritania, Mali and Senegal belonged to what was then referred to as the Sudan and extended from the Atlantic seaboard to the Red Sea. The advent of Islam and the Arabic language to West Africa in the 11th century heralded an intellectual marathon whose literary output still fascinates us today. At a time when Europe was emerging from the dark ages and Africa was for most Europeans a terra incognita, indigenous African scholars were composing treatises as diverse as mathematics, agriculture and the Islamic sciences. A twentieth century Mauritanian, Arabic monograph, Irshād al- Muqallidīn ʿinda ikhtilāf al-Mujtahidīn1, written circa 1910/1332, by a yet unknown Mauritanian jurist of the Mālikī School, Bāba bin al-Shaykh Sīdī al- Shinqīṭī al-Ntishā-ī (d.1920/1342), a member of the muchacclaimed Shinqīṭī fraternity of scholars, is a fine example of African literary accomplishment. This manuscript hereinafter referred to as the Irshād, is written within the legal framework of Islamic jurisprudence (usūl al-fiqh). A science that relies for the most part on the intellectual and interpretive competence of the independent jurist, or mujtahid, in the application of the methodologies employed in the extraction of legal norms from the primary sources of the sharīʿah. The subject matter of the Irshād deals with the question of juristic differences. Juristic differences invariably arise when a mujtahid exercises his academic freedom to clarify or resolve conundrums in the law and to postulate legal norms. Other independent jurists (mujtahidūn) may posit different legal norms because of the exercise of their individual interpretive skills. These differences, when they are deemed juristically irreconcilable, are called ikhtilāfāt (pl. of ikhtilāf). The author of the Irshād explores a corollary of the ikhtilāf narrative and posits the hypothesis that there ought not to be ikhtilāf in the sharīʿah. The proposed research will comprise an annotated translation of the monograph followed by a synopsis and commentary on its dominant themes. / Religious Studies and Arabic / D. Litt. et Phil. (Islamic Studies)