The thesis analyzes how the administrations of Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush used force in response to incidents of international terrorism. Key players in each administration and whether they advocated a law enforcement approach or a war paradigm approach to counterterrorism are examined. In addition, Koh's pattern of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance forms a theoretical lens through which to compare and contrast administrations. An assessment of the role of Congress in making the administrations' counterterrorism policies confirms the vitality of this pattern, and suggests future administrations will adhere to it. During the George W. Bush administration, Koh's pattern of executive initiative (led by personalities like Vice President Cheney), congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance combined with the 9/11 tragedy and pervasive fears of another attack to create a 'perfect storm' known as the 'war on terror'. The research also analyzes to what extent the four administrations were constrained by international legal norms on the use of force, i.e. articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter. On the domestic side, the thesis analyzes the extent to which American legal norms on the use of force constrained the administrations. Although the lack of compelling constraints on the use of force is present in all four administrations, the thesis indicates that the George W. Bush administration embodied an extreme example of this trend.

The thesis analyzes how the administrations of Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush used force in response to incidents of international terrorism. Key players in each administration and whether they advocated a law enforcement approach or a war paradigm approach to counterterrorism are examined. In addition, Koh¿s pattern of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance forms a theoretical lens through which to compare and contrast administrations. An assessment of the role of Congress in making the administrations¿ counterterrorism policies confirms the vitality of this pattern, and suggests future administrations will adhere to it. During the George W. Bush administration, Koh¿s pattern of executive initiative (led by personalities like Vice President Cheney), congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance combined with the 9/11 tragedy and pervasive fears of another attack to create a ¿perfect storm¿ known as the ¿war on terror¿. The research also analyzes to what extent the four administrations were constrained by international legal norms on the use of force, i.e. articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter. On the domestic side, the thesis analyzes the extent to which American legal norms on the use of force constrained the administrations. Although the lack of compelling constraints on the use of force is present in all four administrations, the thesis indicates that the George W. Bush administration embodied an extreme example of this trend.