by So Ying-lun. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 82-91). / ABSTRACT --- p.ii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iii / Chapter / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Focus of the Study / Chapter 1.2 --- Importance of the Study / Chapter II --- LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.4 / Chapter 2.1 --- Definitions --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Illegal or Unethical? --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Public Sector vs. Private Sector Corruption --- p.8 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- What are 'Private' Gains? --- p.10 / Chapter 2.1.4 --- Defining Corruption for This Study --- p.11 / Chapter 2.2 --- Extent of the Problem of Corruption in the PRC --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Official Figures on Corruption --- p.13 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Perceptions of the Seriousness of Corruption in the PRC --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Open Admission of Direct Experience of Corruption in China --- p.16 / Chapter 2.2.4 --- Extent of the Problem in Terms of the Amount of Briber Taken --- p.17 / Chapter 2.3 --- Causes of the Problem in China --- p.18 / Chapter 2.4 --- Characteristics of Corruption in the PRC --- p.21 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Generalizations about the Details of Corruption in the PRC --- p.21 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Factors Affecting Frequency of Corruption Encountered --- p.22 / Chapter 2.5 --- Different Considerations Relating to How Graft is Handled --- p.23 / Chapter 2.5.1 --- Ethical Issues --- p.24 / Chapter 2.5.2 --- Legal Considerations --- p.29 / Chapter 2.5.3 --- Political Considerations --- p.36 / Chapter 2.5.4 --- Pressures of the Marketplace --- p.38 / Chapter 2.6 --- Coping with Corruption --- p.39 / Chapter 2.7 --- Research Questions --- p.43 / Chapter III. --- METHODOLOGY --- p.45 / Chapter 3.1 --- Research Approach --- p.45 / Chapter 3.2 --- Data Collection --- p.46 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Sampling --- p.46 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- The Interview --- p.47 / Chapter 3.3 --- Data Analysis --- p.50 / Chapter IV. --- RESULTS --- p.52 / Chapter 4.1 --- Informants' Perception of the Extent of the Problem --- p.52 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- How Serious is the Problem? --- p.52 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Seriousness in terms of Effects on PRC Business --- p.53 / Chapter 4.2 --- Respondents' Perception of the Causes of the Problem --- p.54 / Chapter 4.3 --- Characteristics I: Details of Corruption in China --- p.55 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Who and How are Bribes Initiated? --- p.55 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- What Favours are Provided y Bribes? --- p.56 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Corruption Becoming More Organized --- p.57 / Chapter 4.4 --- Characteristics II: Factors Affecting Level of Corruption Encountered --- p.58 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- Country of Origin of Foreign Company --- p.58 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Location in China --- p.59 / Chapter 4.4.3 --- Experience in Dealing with Foreign Companies --- p.60 / Chapter 4.4.4 --- Size of the Deal --- p.60 / Chapter 4.4.5 --- Degree of Government Regulations --- p.60 / Chapter 4.4.6 --- Size and Reputation of the Chinese Partner --- p.60 / Chapter 4.4.7 --- Other Factors Influencing the Level of Corruption Encountered --- p.60 / Chapter 4.5 --- Considerations Leading to A Decision on How to Handle the Problem --- p.62 / Chapter 4.5.1 --- Importance Placed on Each Aspect --- p.62 / Chapter 4.5.2 --- Ethical Aspects --- p.63 / Chapter 4.5.3 --- Legal Aspects --- p.63 / Chapter 4.5.4 --- Political Aspects --- p.64 / Chapter 4.5.5 --- Profitability Considerations --- p.65 / Chapter 4.6 --- Coping with Corruption --- p.66 / Chapter 4.6.1 --- Standing Firm --- p.66 / Chapter 4.6.2 --- Besides Saying “No´ح --- p.67 / Chapter 4.7 --- Expectations About the Future of Corruption in the PRC --- p.68 / Chapter V. --- DISCUSSIONS --- p.70 / Chapter 5.1 --- Extent of Problem --- p.70 / Chapter 5.2 --- Causes of the Problem --- p.72 / Chapter 5.3 --- Characteristics I: Details of Corruption Encountered --- p.72 / Chapter 5.4 --- Characteristics II: Factors Affecting Level of Corruption Encountered --- p.73 / Chapter 5.5 --- Considerations Leading to A Decision on How to Handle the Problem --- p.76 / Chapter 5.6 --- Coping with Corruption --- p.77 / Chapter 5.7 --- Causes and Future Development of the Problem --- p.77 / Chapter VI. --- CONCLUSION --- p.80 / Chapter 6.1 --- Where Do We Go from Here --- p.80 / Chapter 6.2 --- Limitations of the Study --- p.80 / APPENDIX --- p.92 / REFERENCES --- p.91

This study investigates reputational penalties for two main types of corporate scandals in China: accounting scandal vs. corruption. Compared with U.S. firms that experienced an average of 41% drop in firm value if accounting scandal was disclosed, I find that accounting scandals are less destructive to firm value in a relationship-based economy such as China. However, while pure accounting scandals are relatively innocuous in China, I find that corruption charges against the firms' senior executives have serious consequences. I explore several explanations for such difference in market reaction to the two types of scandals, including political network effect, accounting write-off effect, corporate governance effect, incentive effect, and executive turnover effect. My empirical evidence provides consistent support to the political relationship explanation which indicates that the damaged social and political networks and the ability to contract caused by the corruption charges would have a more negative impact on firms' operations and performances. Although my results do not fully eliminate all the other alternative explanations, they are likely to be a less important reason for the stronger reputation penalties for corruption charges than accounting scandals in China. / Zhang, Fang. / Adviser: T.J. Wang. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-11, Section: A, page: . / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 60-61). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese.

The other study distinguishes the effects of political connection and governmental intervention on firm value. The event study of 371 scandals from 1997 to 2004 confirms the hypothesis that governmental intervention is the de facto reason. Scandal firms controlled by the state sustain less negative cumulative abnormal returns than non-state controlled firms, because the market expects that those state controlled scandal firms will surely receive governmental bailout or support while those non-state controlled ones not. For state controlled samples, the degree of political connection does not produce any significant effect on the market reactions. For non-state controlled scandal firms, however, closely politically connected firms have more negative CAR than loosely politically connected ones. This is because the governments get away from the scandal firms in trouble, and those non-state controlled firms that once gained the governmental intervention via political connection suffer more as the support withdraws. The results highlight the effect of governmental intervention on the firm valuation, and address a misconception that political connection is the source of firm value. / The thesis includes two empirical studies concerning corporate scandals in China. One investigates the intra-industry effect of 356 scandals from 1997 to 2004. The empirical results show that contagion effect and competitive effect are conditioned by degree of industry competition and ownership type of scandal firms. Because state controlled firms dominate in most industries and share common characteristics as the legacy of planned economy, their scandals can typically reveal the industry wide information on poor corporate governance problem. In highly competitive industries, the negative information of state controlled scandal firms spills over to state controlled peers, creating net contagion (negative) effect. In low competitive industries, contagion effect is offset by competitive effect that mainly stems from non-state controlled rivals. Comparatively, non-state controlled scandal firms, because of their marginal status in the market, do not produce evident externality in the industry. This study supports the hypothesis of informational contagion effect, and contrasts with the traditional view that scandals are idiosyncratic. The conclusions in previous studies are biased because they fail to consider the role of ownership on intra-industry effects. / Zhang, Peng. / "August 2007." / Adviser: Larry H. P. Lang. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-08, Section: A, page: 3259. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 109-113). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

Thesis (LLM (Mercantile Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / Corporate governance is defined as the system by which companies are managed and controlled. The concept came to the fore with the Cadbury Report in England in 1992 and has since been the topic of much academic discussion. The recent collapse of companies like Enron and WorldCom raised serious questions about international corporate governance practices. This has resulted in widespread reform. In the United States large-scale prescriptive measures were implemented through the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The United Kingdom persisted with their principle-based approach of comply or explain, although some amendments were made to the Combined Code through a joint effort by the Co-ordinating Group on Audit and Accounting Issues, the Smith Report and the Higgs Report. In Australia change took the form of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and CLERP 9. South Africa, influenced by its common law background, followed a similar approach to that of the United Kingdom but has recently adopted a more prescriptive approach similar to that of the US. The King Committee was set up to review corporate governance in South Africa and two reports report were published – one in 1994 and another in 2002. Amendments to the JSE Listings Requirements followed. The Konar Report made recommendations on the reform of the accounting and auditing profession. The Department of Trade and Industry has recently launched a review of South African company law in conjunction with a review of the audit and accounting professions. These recent developments in company law will however not be discussed in depth as it is at a very early stage and is still subject to change. The aim of this study is to evaluate and determine whether or not the reform in South Africa is adequate to address the questions raised by recent corporate scandals in South Africa. The question also has to be asked whether South Africa should follow international trends in reform just for the sake of reforming. This requires an understanding of the principles underlying corporate governance and the reasons for the existence of corporate governance rules. With the increasing separation between ownership and control the accountability of directors has waned considerably. When addressing corporate governance issues, this must be kept in mind constantly. While the focus of recent reform has been on the company, its directors and auditors, the role of shareholders should not be ignored. What is needed to prevent directors and managers from abusing their positions of power are more informed and involved shareholders. The different role players must also cooperate in developing a culture of ethical behaviour and an environment of openness and accountability.