Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2005. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-08, Section: A, page: 3030. Chair: Michael R. Baye. Title from dissertation home page (viewed Oct. 5, 2006).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, 2006. / "Title from dissertation home page (viewed June 27, 2007)." Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-06, Section: A, page: 2259. Adviser: Michael R. Baye.

<p> Social enterprises (SEs) are businesses managed by entrepreneurs who seek to improve society, and they represent an important trend in social change work. However, there is little empirical knowledge about which blended value accounting (BVA) methods are used by SE managers, and whether the use of BVA is perceived by SE managers as a critical success factor. Blended value accounting is a conceptual framework for measuring combined social and financial outcomes in SEs, and some believe that the use of BVA may be a critical success factor for SEs. This research was based on Covin and Slevin&rsquo;s conceptualization of entrepreneurial orientation. The main research question was whether the use of BVA methods was correlated with SE success from the perception of the SE managers. Surveys were sent to 3,682 SE managers in North America, the United Kingdom, Asia, and Africa (<i>n</i> = 280). Data were analyzed using multiple regression, with the dependent variable SE success, and the independent variables: the use of BVA method, number of employees, length of time in business, economic sector, and country of registration. Findings indicated no statistically significant correlation between the use of BVA method and SE success, though most SE managers, 73% of 280 respondents, were using BVA methods for other reasons, including complying with state laws. The BVA method B-Impact Rating System was used by 59% of survey respondents who used any method of BVA. These findings suggest that SE managers should select a BVA method that is inexpensive to implement, aligns with industry standards, and provides them with management information. Supporting agencies should create a global registry of SEs, report on the social change impact they create through their businesses, and encourage all businesses to adopt the social-change orientation of SEs.</p>

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Instructional Systems Technology, School of Education, 2005. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-01, Section: A, page: 0067. Adviser: Thomas Schwen. "Title from dissertation home page (viewed Jan. 22, 2007)."

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<p>Prior studies argue that the board and management of a firm should maximize shareholder value. Also, there is evidence that compensation levels are linked to firm performance as well as monitoring, in other words, the composition of the board influence compensation.</p><p>We document no correlation between CEO compensation and firm performance for a sample of Swedish companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) over the sample period 1999 to 2008. However, the Industry firms might pay the CEO for performance. Also, stock ownership influence compensation levels; when the five largest shareholders increase their holdings, CEO compensation levels decrease. We interpret this finding as that monitoring is important and the agency costs can be reduced by higher holdings by institutional investors.</p>

<p>The shareholder is supposed to be indifferent if one share costs 100 SEK, or 10 shares cost 10 SEK each. In an efficient market, shares should be valued directly to new expectations as a result of the announcement of the reverse split. We investigate whether abnormal returns incur surrounding reverse split and if owner structure change.</p><p>One reason for the reverse share split is that most companies have plans to imple-ment other company’s specific events in order to survive rather than to change the price range to a more attractive level. We found a negative return in the ex-day at 8,1 per cent. When the ex-day is pure enough from other price driving information should the outcome be a reaction to how the market perceives changes in future divi-dends after the reverse split. In consideration of stock ownership of votes accounted for a reduction of individual owners, and increasing institutional owners, more in companies with low Market to Book. This may suggest that the institutional share-holders have increased their share of votes to increase their power in the companies.</p>

Prior studies argue that the board and management of a firm should maximize shareholder value. Also, there is evidence that compensation levels are linked to firm performance as well as monitoring, in other words, the composition of the board influence compensation. We document no correlation between CEO compensation and firm performance for a sample of Swedish companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) over the sample period 1999 to 2008. However, the Industry firms might pay the CEO for performance. Also, stock ownership influence compensation levels; when the five largest shareholders increase their holdings, CEO compensation levels decrease. We interpret this finding as that monitoring is important and the agency costs can be reduced by higher holdings by institutional investors.

The shareholder is supposed to be indifferent if one share costs 100 SEK, or 10 shares cost 10 SEK each. In an efficient market, shares should be valued directly to new expectations as a result of the announcement of the reverse split. We investigate whether abnormal returns incur surrounding reverse split and if owner structure change. One reason for the reverse share split is that most companies have plans to imple-ment other company’s specific events in order to survive rather than to change the price range to a more attractive level. We found a negative return in the ex-day at 8,1 per cent. When the ex-day is pure enough from other price driving information should the outcome be a reaction to how the market perceives changes in future divi-dends after the reverse split. In consideration of stock ownership of votes accounted for a reduction of individual owners, and increasing institutional owners, more in companies with low Market to Book. This may suggest that the institutional share-holders have increased their share of votes to increase their power in the companies.

No description available.