The syndicated loan is become more and more important for firm's financing. We study three important aspects of loan syndication: the lead arranger's reputation effect on syndicated loan pricing, the switching behavior for repeat syndicate loans and the effect of country-specific bank-firm ownership structure on syndicated loan pricing and bank-firm relationship of repeat loans. The first chapter analyzes the reputation effect of the lead arranger on syndicated loan pricing, based on a sample of loan facilities to non-financial U.S. firms over the 1994-2006 period. Theory suggests that the reputation/spread relationship should generally be positive because more reputable lenders usually employ more costly loan screening and monitoring techniques and therefore must be compensated with a higher spread. After controlling for endogeneity in lender-borrower matching, the empirical results show that the reputable arrangers charge a "reputation premium" for monitoring and due diligence, and the commitment against extracting the information rent from borrowers. The results also show that the less-reputable arrangers offer a "reputation discount", since the market competition from both the loan market and bond market makes it more difficult for less reputable arrangers to sustain the reputation mechanism. In addition, the reputation effect on pricing becomes less significant when the borrower enters a repeat loan relationship with a prior or existing lender. Finally, the study finds that the arranger's reputation can reduce the lead share retained by the lead arranger in its loan portfolio, which serves as evidence that reputation also mitigates the information asymmetry between the lead arranger and participant banks. The second chapter analyzes the switching behavior for two types of repeat loans: migrating loans that remain within the same bank reputation class and loans migrating to a different reputation class. The theoretical literature argues that banks (lenders) and firms (borrowers) benefit from entering into a relationship-lending arrangement. In the syndicated loan market, however, it is very common for repeat loans to switch from one bank to another. We present a model that establishes conditions for implementing empirical investigations relating to relationship lending and the characteristics of the separating equilibrium in the loan market. Using explanatory variables describing firms, loans, and loan syndicates, we find that lending within the high quality bank sector reveals evidence that is consistent with relationship lending. That is, some firms forego longer maturity loans and less oversight to remain with their original lender. A similar finding does not hold for repeat lending in the lower quality bank sector. Regarding loans that migrate in either direction between the high and low quality banking sectors, firm risk is the most important determinant. Relatively riskier firms move down to lower quality lenders while relatively safer firms move up to higher quality lenders. The third chapter investigates the determinants of loan pricing and repeat loan relationship for a sample of 6,180 non-U.S.. firm-loan observations for the period 1998-2007. This paper focuses on the relation between a country-specific governance indicator and country-specific bank-firm ownership structures on loan pricing and the management of a lending relationship between the syndicate bank and firm. We evaluate the relationship between country-specific bank ownership structure and the main characteristics of loan, which are mainly measured by loan pricing and loan switching decision. The paper examines three interrelated questions: 1.How is loan pricing affected by country-specific bank-firm ownership structure? 2. Does country-specific bank-firm ownership structure influence the decision to switch lenders in the repeat loan market? 3. Is country-specific bank-firm ownership structure more important for a borrower to migrate to a higher reputation lender than to a lower reputation lender? We use loan-characteristic, bank-characteristic, and firm-characteristic variables as well as country-specific corruption and country-specific bank-firm ownership structure variables to explore the effect on loan pricing and loan-switching decisions. Using logistic regression analysis, we find that loan switching is less likely for firms when the bank controls the firm, especially in the case of a bank-controlled firm borrows from a low reputation syndicated loan lender. However, when the firm controls a local bank, there is no impact on the firm's switching decision in the syndicated loan market. The bank-controlling firm is as likely to switch as a firm that does not control a bank even though the firm is more opaque to the financial market. Our results suggest that in the international syndicated loan market, the bank-firm relationship is partly shaped by country-specific characteristics and information asymmetry of firms to the financial market. These chapters explores the bank and firm behavior in the syndicated loan market and make the contribution to the literature by offering further knowledge and deeper understanding about the bank-firm relationship and behavior in the loan syndication structure. / Business Administration

<p> The fast and easy global movement of capital throughout the financial system, from lenders to borrowers and through intermediaries and financial market participants, has been recognized as a source of instability associated with illiquidity and financial crises. The purpose of this research was to better understand how regulation either enables or constrains capital movement. The theoretical framework comprised 2 contrasting public policymaking models, Arrow's rational-comprehensive model and Kingdon's garbage can model, which were used to derive opposing hypotheses. The research question addressed the nature of the relationship between Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) regulations and the flow of capital into Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs) when lenders share their borrower-related loan risks through intermediaries with other market participants. This quantitative study was a quasiexperimental time series design incorporating an autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model using secondary data published by the U.S. government. The 2 independent variables were regulatory periods involving 2 CDSs regulations and the dependent variable was capital in the U.S. financial system that is deployed to CMOs. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000's ARIMA model (1,2,1) was significant at <i>p</i> &lt; .05 and was negatively correlated to the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008's ARIMA model (1,1,0), <i>r</i> = -.91, <i>n</i> = 18, <i>p</i> &lt; .001. These results suggest that regulations cannot be relaxed and then reinstated with predictable results. The potential for positive social change is from stable financial institutions that mutually benefit depositors and borrowers.</p>

Techn. Univ., Diss.--Berlin, 2005.

This thesis addresses the principles and technologies of Big Data and their usage in the banking environment. Its objective is to find business application scenarios for Big Data for purposes of delivering added value for the bank. Finding the scenarios have been achieved by studying literature and consultation with experts, they were also subsequently modeled by the author. Possibilities of application of these scenarios in the banking busi-ness environment were subsequently verified by the survey, which interviewed profession-als on issues relating to the found business scenarios. The thesis first explains the basic con-cepts and approaches of Big Data, the status of this technology compared to traditional technologies and issues of integration into the banking environment. After this theoretical beginning the business scenarios are found and modeled followed by the exploration and evaluation. Selected business scenarios are further verified for the purpose of determining the suitability or unsuitability for implementation using technologies and principles of Big Data. The contribution of this work is to find a real use of Big Data in banking, where most of the materials on this topic is very general and vague. This thesis verifies two business scenarios that can big a bank institution high added value if they are implemented with Big Data platform.

The content of the thesis is an analysis of selected banking for Komercni banka and create the design and evaluation of the issue of online and mobile banking mainly.

The implementation of neo-liberal policies in Mexico during the administrations of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) and Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) severely impacted the rural sector, especially areas of rainfed agriculture. In the framework of these policies, the institutional services provided by key state institutions in terms of technical assistance, crop insurance and agricultural credit was significantly diminished In light of such situation, farmers (especially low-resource farmers) were faced with great difficulties to carry out their agricultural activities. Their situation called for definition and implementation of new alternatives to provide the necessary means to return services to the countryside One of these alternatives was the foment of local organizations to provide credit services, mainly in the form of credit unions. This type of financial institution grew despite the obstacles created by certain public institutions (i.e. The National Bank and Stocks Commission-CNBV) which continuously increased the capital base legally needed to constitute a credit union One credit union that was created in the midst of this process in 1992 was the Union de Credito Mixta 'Plan Puebla-UCMPP.' The UCMPP is comprised of more than 3000 members and operating 8 branches in 12 Mexican States This study describes and analyzes the UCMPP experience, from its early stages of organization to its current situation. The underlying principle of this study is the contention that joint efforts by institutions of higher learning (Colegio de Posgraduados) and Mexican campesinos to provide rural populations with affordable credit is a viable alternative for (furthering) development in rural Mexico The investigator utilizes several methodological approaches to collect and analyze data. To collect information he relied on archival research and fieldwork using surveys, case study guides and focus groups. To analyze the data he uses primarily qualitative methods / acase@tulane.edu

Freie Univ., Diss.--Berlin, 2004.

The role of Institutional investors in alleviating the agent problem of management and its valuation effect has been studied extensively in corporate finance. We complement this stream of research by exploring management's control over institutional investors with misaligned objectives, particularly public pension fund, and the consequential valuation effect. We investigate the politic motive of public pension fund's shareholder activism and its impact on the target firms' operational performance, address the control of a strong management on public pension funds' self-serving agenda, and finally we compare the ownership adjustment pattern of public pension funds to other institutional investors to conclude public pension funds' ownership adjustment reflects their private pursuit. The first chapter explores the politic facet and performance effect of shareholder activism sponsored by public pension fund. In this study, we show that having a public pension fund as the leading sponsor of a shareholder proposal significantly improves the proposal's likelihood of being accepted by the target firm. The increased acceptance rate sources from the subset of proposals addressing a social responsibility issue, and targeting firms with weak insider control. An investigation of the public pension board reveals that the board's political profile is the primary determinant of public pension fund's propensity to lead a proposal, and the target firm's acceptance rate. We also assess the performance impact of shareholder proposals. For target firms with strong insider control, the performance impact of accepted social responsibility proposals is significantly positive; that of governance proposals is negligible. For target firms with weak insider control, the performance impact associated with public pension funds is either negative or negligible. These results suggest that the motive driving public pension funds' dominant presence in shareholder activism is not market based, but laden with purpose other than value creation. In the second chapter, we postulate that the widely documented negative valuation effect of ownership by public pension will be weak on firms with extra managerial control mechanism and/or whose managerial ownership of cash flow is high. For firms with high level managerial ownership of cash flow, management bears higher cost for a concession made with public pension fund's misaligned objective. An efficient market will expect this effect and value the managerial control over public pension fund to the extent that the management's benefit is aligned with outside shareholders. Consequently, the cross section valuation difference of firms held by public pension funds can be explained by the managerial ownership of cash flow, managerial control derived from extra mechanism such as dual class share, however, has no explanative power. The last chapter investigates the link between private benefits and institutional holding change. We assume the cross section equilibrium of block holding will break when market sentiment is high. Consequently, block holder tends to shed more shares loaded with less private benefits by taking advantage of opportunities available in a high sentiment market. The empirical results support this conjecture. When the market sentiment is high, Institutional block holders tend to shed more private benefits meager dual-class share than private benefits affluent non-dual class share. This pattern does not exist when the market sentiment is low. Most importantly, public pension fund is identified as the major driver of this effect. / Business Administration

No description available.

Many recent scandals in banking highlight the importance and challenges of risk governance due to non-financial risk issues such as misconduct and failed risk cultures of financial corporations. The study of risk culture and misconduct in banking requires addressing questions on corporate governance beyond compliance; next to the empirical level, it is important to focus fundamentally on normative aspects, such as ethical norms and values. The heuristic of the ethical focal point of moral symmetry is developed and used to unravel these complex culture and conduct issues on both the normative and empirical level to differentiate good conduct from misconduct in the banking industry, and to guide leaders and risk-takers in decision-making. Based on three case studies on recent banking scandals, the following main drivers of risk culture and misconduct issues in banking were derived: (i) bad leadership, (ii) decoupling of actions and values, and (iii) ignorance of risk policies due to the complexity and ambiguity of the banking business. Banks are requested to internalize a heuristic such as the ethical focal point of moral symmetry to overcome the issues of misconduct and its spill-over effects on risk-taking and risk culture in the banking industry.