This thesis is based on the regulations found in the OECD model and the OECD TP guidelines concerning the arm’s length principle. The core of the arm’s length principle is that transactions between associated enterprises should be treated the same as transactions between independent enterprises. This principle can be found in Article 9 of the OECD model. One transaction that may fall within the scope of Article 9 of the OECD model is business restructuring. Business restructuring was previously an unregulated TP area but with the new OECD TP guidelines, from 2010, regulations have been formulated. The aim with thesis is therefore to examine how the arm’s length principle should be applied to the new guidelines for business restructurings of intangibles with an uncertain value at the time of the restructuring. In order to answer the question set out in this thesis some of the factors that affect the application of the arm’s length principle have been examined separately. Firstly the arm’s length principle that is the generally accepted TP method used by both taxpayers and tax administrations in order to find a fair price for transactions between associated enterprises. The principle seeks to identify the controlled transaction and thereafter find a comparable uncontrolled transaction that is similar to the transaction performed between the associated enterprises. The second part examined the meaning of the term business restructuring according to the new guidelines since there is no other legal or general definition. Business restructurings are defined as cross-border redeployments of functions assets and risks, performed by MNEs. As long as a transaction falls within this definition it will be subjected to the arm’s length principle for tax purposes. The third part examined intangibles since that also lack a general definition. The identification and valuation of intangibles is a complex and uncertain thing to do for both taxpayers and tax administrations. When applying the arm’s length principle it is however found that the issue of identification of what constitutes and intangible may be unnecessary. The aspect that should be considered is instead the value of the intangible or more precise, the value that independent enterprises would have agreed upon in a similar situation. The applicability of the arm’s length principle to business restructurings of intangibles with an uncertain value at the time of the restructuring should be found by performing a comparability analysis. In order to perform a comparability analysis, the controlled transaction firstly has to be identified. Thereafter, a comparable uncontrolled transaction needs to be found. An equivalent uncontrolled transaction may not be found in all cases and it should in those cases be examined what independent enterprises would have done if they had been in a comparable situation. The arm’s length principle should be applied to business restructurings of intangibles with an uncertain value in the same manner as for any other uncontrolled transaction. The issues for this type of a transaction become the identification of what constitutes a business restructuring and also how to determine a fair value for the intangibles. The OECD TP guidelines lack some guidance as to the issues that can occur when a comparable uncontrolled transaction cannot be found. This creates an unsatisfactory guesswork for both taxpayers and tax administrations when trying to determine what independent enterprises would have done if they had been in a similar situation. This creates an unnecessary uncertainty when trying to apply the arm’s length principle.

Business restructurings within multinational enterprises (MNEs) are regular occurrences. Such restructurings are often carried out in order to increase the MNE‟s competitiveness on the market by making the supply chain and management more efficient in order to ac-quire benefits due to economies of scale. There is a risk that such cross-border business re-structurings will transfer the profit/loss potential that is associated with the assets, risks and/or functions that are transferred, to low-tax jurisdictions in order to minimize the MNEs tax burden. Germany amended its tax act in order to prevent such profit potential from being transferred out of the country. This amendment came into effect on the 1st of January 2008. The OECD, which is the normative body on the international tax arena, re-leased a Discussion Draft for the public in September 2008 with the purpose to highlight the transfer pricing aspects of business restructurings and to serve as an interpretation of the application of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines on business restructurings. In this thesis, the concepts of profit/loss potential and indemnification, as they are pre-sented in the Discussion Draft, will be analyzed. The interpretation of the OECD will then be contrasted with the German and Swedish regulation of these concepts. The OECD defines a business restructuring as a transfer including a bundle of assets, risks and/or functions which are transferred across borders within a MNE. If this transfer in-volves the shift of profit/loss potential it shall be included in the valuation of the transfer price of the transactions. The profit/loss potential shall only be included if it can be identi-fied as belonging to a specific asset, risk or function of the bundle. In Swedish legislation there is only one rule which tax authorities can use in order to adjust the income of related parties. This regulation is not a specific rule for business restructurings as such but a gener-al rule for all transfer pricing matters. Sweden has traditionally followed the OECD guide-lines and the Swedish courts and tax authorities will most likely apply the guidance set out by the OECD on business restructurings as well. Germany views a business restructuring as a transfer package which consist of assets, risks and/or functions which are transferred a cross borders within a MNE. The concept of business opportunities, i.e. the profit potential of the combined assets, risks and/or func-tions of the transfer package, shall be included in the valuation of the transfer package. In the valuation of the transfer package synergy effects for the MNE and location savings as a whole shall be included. This concept deviates from the view of the OECD. The OECD states that only local synergy effects and location savings shall be included in the valuation of the transfer package. The German approach leads to an inherent risk of overvaluation of the transfer package. The way of valuing the transfer package in Germany could lead to taxation without realization, i.e. profits that would never have been or never could be rea-lized in Germany will be taxed. This contradicts the principle of realization. The OECD, in the Discussion Draft, gives an account for the possibilities for an indemni-fication for the transferor. A business restructuring can sometimes be compared with the breach of a contractual relationship. In such a situation, associated parties would be entitled to an indemnity if independent parties would be indemnified. Such an approach will be dif-ficult to apply in practice since indemnification is closely linked to nations national com-mercial legislation. The matter of indemnifying a party shall be decided on the merits of each case, and it can thereby be complicated to formulate a general regulation. The ques-tion regarding which authority shall be competent to govern such a matter must thereby al-so be resolved.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse and compare the transfer pricing approaches held by the OECD, Germany and the United States when transferring an ongoing concern. The term “ongoing concern” in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines is to be interpreted as very wide and to cover every case where a function is bundled with assets and risks. Even though there is no legal definition of the term , the definition of the OECD can still be said to represent the common definition of the term. When transferring an ongoing concern or a function the three approaches are all that it should be given a value that independent enterprises under similar circumstances would agree upon. Besides some particular cases, the OECD and German approach is that the function, assets and risks should be aggregated when determining the arm’s length price. The approach of United States is somewhat different, where an aggregation of the transactions is not always the case and goodwill and going concern value are not subject to the transfer pricing legislation. The comparability approaches and the transfer pricing methodologies of the three are is very similar, where some factors should be taken into account when determinign the comparability between two transactions and with the selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method applied to the transaction. The comparable uncontrolled price method should be seen as a primary transfer pricing method, and if it is not possible to find comparable transactions or to make reasonable accurate adjustments the profit split method should be applied. The hypothetical arm´s length test is the method that would be applied in such case according to the German legislation. The selection of which valuation method to apply to the transfer depends on the facts and circumstances of the transfer.

<p><p>Business restructurings within multinational enterprises (MNEs) are regular occurrences. Such restructurings are often carried out in order to increase the MNE‟s competitiveness on the market by making the supply chain and management more efficient in order to ac-quire benefits due to economies of scale. There is a risk that such cross-border business re-structurings will transfer the profit/loss potential that is associated with the assets, risks and/or functions that are transferred, to low-tax jurisdictions in order to minimize the MNEs tax burden. Germany amended its tax act in order to prevent such profit potential from being transferred out of the country. This amendment came into effect on the 1st of January 2008. The OECD, which is the normative body on the international tax arena, re-leased a Discussion Draft for the public in September 2008 with the purpose to highlight the transfer pricing aspects of business restructurings and to serve as an interpretation of the application of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines on business restructurings. In this thesis, the concepts of profit/loss potential and indemnification, as they are pre-sented in the Discussion Draft, will be analyzed. The interpretation of the OECD will then be contrasted with the German and Swedish regulation of these concepts. The OECD defines a business restructuring as a transfer including a bundle of assets, risks and/or functions which are transferred across borders within a MNE. If this transfer in-volves the shift of profit/loss potential it shall be included in the valuation of the transfer price of the transactions. The profit/loss potential shall only be included if it can be identi-fied as belonging to a specific asset, risk or function of the bundle. In Swedish legislation there is only one rule which tax authorities can use in order to adjust the income of related parties. This regulation is not a specific rule for business restructurings as such but a gener-al rule for all transfer pricing matters. Sweden has traditionally followed the OECD guide-lines and the Swedish courts and tax authorities will most likely apply the guidance set out by the OECD on business restructurings as well.</p><p>Germany views a business restructuring as a transfer package which consist of assets, risks and/or functions which are transferred a cross borders within a MNE. The concept of business opportunities, i.e. the profit potential of the combined assets, risks and/or func-tions of the transfer package, shall be included in the valuation of the transfer package. In the valuation of the transfer package synergy effects for the MNE and location savings as a whole shall be included. This concept deviates from the view of the OECD. The OECD states that only local synergy effects and location savings shall be included in the valuation of the transfer package. The German approach leads to an inherent risk of overvaluation of the transfer package. The way of valuing the transfer package in Germany could lead to</p><p>taxation without realization, i.e. profits that would never have been or never could be rea-lized in Germany will be taxed. This contradicts the principle of realization. The OECD, in the Discussion Draft, gives an account for the possibilities for an indemni-fication for the transferor. A business restructuring can sometimes be compared with the breach of a contractual relationship. In such a situation, associated parties would be entitled to an indemnity if independent parties would be indemnified. Such an approach will be dif-ficult to apply in practice since indemnification is closely linked to nations national com-mercial legislation. The matter of indemnifying a party shall be decided on the merits of each case, and it can thereby be complicated to formulate a general regulation. The ques-tion regarding which authority shall be competent to govern such a matter must thereby al-so be resolved.</p></p>

The OECD Guidelines stipulates that a business restructuring resulting in shifted profit potential not automatically implies that compensation should be paid between the restructuring parties. This thesis examines when shifted profit potential should be remunerated from the perspective of the fictive Swedish distributor Enterprise A which is facing a business restructuring. The arm’s length principle does not require any remuneration for the mere shift of profit potential when applying the principle on business restructurings. Instead, the questions are whether there has been a transfer of something of value; or a termination or significant renegotiation of the current agreement. In the context of remuneration for shifted profit potential the questions can be rephrased to whether considerable assets and/or rights have been transferred which carry considerable profit potential that should be remunerated. And, whether the arm’s length principle requires remuneration to be paid by reference to the concept of “options realistically available”. Enterprise A’s shifted profit potential could be remunerated and thus have tax consequences if there are other options realistically available for the entity apart from entering into the business restructuring. Enterprise A’s bargain power would then have been greater and consequently the chances of being remunerated as well. Further, Enterprise A could be remunerated as a result of the shifted profit potential if the entity takes title to transferred marketing intangibles that can be identified and assessed valuable. The shifted profit potential should as well be remunerated and thus have tax consequences if the parties in Corporate Group C have included a compensation clause in their contract, and the clause can be assessed as at arm’s length when considering what independent parties would have agreed upon.

Multinational enterprises have been widely accused of using aggressive tax planning schemes to avoid paying tax all over the world. The purpose of this study is to analyse the methods used by multinational enterprises in the context of business restructurings to shift profits from high to low tax jurisdictions. Transactions between associated entities have generally been manipulated by applying non-arm’s length prices to these transactions, as well as devising agreements where the economic substance varies from the form of the transaction. The study aims to investigate some of the practical challenges faced by tax administrators in the application of the arm’s length principle. The study was conducted based on a literature review, as well as analysing specific examples reported in newspapers where multinational enterprises have used aggressive tax planning schemes to shift profits. International case law was also analysed to evaluate some of the factors considered by the courts in the determination of the arm’s length price. It was found that multinational enterprises definitely use aggressive tax planning schemes to shift profits. The practical challenges in the determination of arm’s length prices, complexity of the transactions involved, as well as a lack of resources, especially in the developing nations, are some of the factors that cause tax administrators to battle to find a solution to deter and detect these schemes. Other methods such as the unitary taxation method and the country by country reporting concept have been brought forward as alternatives to the arm’s length principle. These alternatives have been proposed in an effort to find a solution to the challenges posed by the arm’s length principle. Specific measures have also been recommended for developing nations’ tax administrators to resolve the issues that they currently experience in this context. / Thesis (MCom (South African and International Taxation))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2013

Multinational enterprises have been widely accused of using aggressive tax planning schemes to avoid paying tax all over the world. The purpose of this study is to analyse the methods used by multinational enterprises in the context of business restructurings to shift profits from high to low tax jurisdictions. Transactions between associated entities have generally been manipulated by applying non-arm’s length prices to these transactions, as well as devising agreements where the economic substance varies from the form of the transaction. The study aims to investigate some of the practical challenges faced by tax administrators in the application of the arm’s length principle. The study was conducted based on a literature review, as well as analysing specific examples reported in newspapers where multinational enterprises have used aggressive tax planning schemes to shift profits. International case law was also analysed to evaluate some of the factors considered by the courts in the determination of the arm’s length price. It was found that multinational enterprises definitely use aggressive tax planning schemes to shift profits. The practical challenges in the determination of arm’s length prices, complexity of the transactions involved, as well as a lack of resources, especially in the developing nations, are some of the factors that cause tax administrators to battle to find a solution to deter and detect these schemes. Other methods such as the unitary taxation method and the country by country reporting concept have been brought forward as alternatives to the arm’s length principle. These alternatives have been proposed in an effort to find a solution to the challenges posed by the arm’s length principle. Specific measures have also been recommended for developing nations’ tax administrators to resolve the issues that they currently experience in this context. / Thesis (MCom (South African and International Taxation))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2013