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Thesis--Michigan State University. / Photocopy of typescript. Ann Arbor, Mich. : University Microfilms International, 1980.--20 cm. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 194-233).

Thesis--Michigan State University. / Photocopy of typescript. Ann Arbor, Mich. : University Microfilms International, 1980.--20 cm. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 194-233).

Thesis--University of Michigan. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Bibliography: leaves 215-226.

Este trabalho analisa o diálogo entre Cass Sunstein e Ronald Dworkin. Enquanto Dworkin desenvolveu uma abordagem da prática jurídica como a continuação de uma grande teoria baseada em valores morais, Sunstein recomenda um caminho supostamente mais modesto, baseado em passos obtidos em acordos que pudessem ser alcançados por pessoas com convicções morais diversas. A escolha por esse caminho é justificada não só por razões institucionais, mas também por razões morais e políticas substantivas. A crítica central de Sunstein a Dworkin é um suposto ponto cego quanto às questões de capacidade institucional. Sunstein pode ser lido de duas maneiras: como um autor essencialmente pragmático (e incompatível com Dworkin) ou como um interpretativista ao modo Dworkiniano. Conforme o caso, os contornos do seu diálogo com Dworkin são diferentes. De acordo com a primeira leitura, o argumento do ponto cego levantado por Sunstein tem o objetivo de desqualificar todo o projeto teórico Dworkiniano, na medida em que o problema das capacidades institucionais seria tomado como fundamento para um tipo específico de ceticismo moral, o que inutilizaria o critério de correção moral que embasa o interpretativismo Dworkiniano. Essa visão considera que o debate entre Sunstein e Dworkin seria um capítulo do debate entre Dworkin e os pragmatistas céticos. Nos termos da segunda leitura, Sunstein não é um cético na verdade, ele pressupõe um interpretativismo Dworkiniano e sua posição é complementar à obra de Dworkin. No capítulo I, analiso alguns trabalhos centrais de Sunstein e concluo que ele é melhor lido como um Dworkiniano, visto sua teoria pressupõe valores independentes. No capítulo II, estudo os principais pontos da teoria do direito de Dworkin e sugiro que o conceito de integridade, entendido como um conceito corretivo que serve para construir um sistema judicial no qual os juízes podem barganhar uma concepção de justiça ideal por outros fatores do mundo real, indica que a teoria Dworkiniana pode sim ser sensível às questões empíricas e de capacidade institucional. No capítulo III, identifico os pontos do confronto direto entre Sunstein e Dworkin e exponho o proveito que pode ser extraído do estudo desse debate. / This dissertation analyzes the dialogue between Cass Sunstein and Ronald Dworkin. While Dworkin developed an approach that sees the legal practice as a continuum of a greater theory based on moral values, Sunstein recommends a supposedly more modest approach, based on steps obtained in agreements which could be achieved by people holding different moral convictions. The choice of this path is justified not only for institutional reasons, but also for moral and political reasons. The central criticism of Sunstein against Dworkin is a \"blind spot\" with respect to the institutional capacities of judges. Sunstein can be read in two ways: as an essentially pragmatist author (and incompatible with Dworkin) or as an interpretative Dworkinian. As the case may be, the contours of his debate with Dworkin are different. Under to the first reading, the \"blind spot\" argument raised by Sunstein aims to disqualify any Dworkinian theoretical project to the extent that the problem of institutional capacities should be taken as the basis for a specific type of moral skepticism, which would deny the claim to moral correctness that supports Dworkinian interpretativism. In this case, that the debate between Dworkin and Sunstein should be seen as a chapter of the debate between Dworkin and the skeptic legal pragmatists. Under the the second reading, Sunstein is not a skeptic - in fact, he presupposes a Dworkinian interpretativism and his position is complementary to Dworkins work. In Chapter I, I analyze Sunsteins central work on legal interpretation and conclude that he is best read as a Dworkinian, as his theory assumes independent values. In Chapter II, I study the main points of Dworkins jurisprudence and I suggest that the concept of integrity, understood as a \"corrective\" concept used to build a judicial system in which judges can bargain an ideal conception of justice by other factors of the real world, indicates that Dworkin´s theory can be sensitive to the empirical institutional capacities raised by Sunstein. In Chapter III, identify the points of direct confrontation between Sunstein and Dworkin and explain the agenda that can be extracted from the debate.

This academic work is based on remarkable works of economists Ramsey, Cass, Koopmans and Kaldor, it brings closer the intertemporal growth theory and its empirical implications on the Czech economy. Simply the purpose of this academic work is to analyse investment and its development in the Czech economy, theoretically identify and empirically study it. Furthermore, to monitor investments by different types and sectors. The study also is committing to better comprehension of mutual effects of capital formation and economic growth.

Este trabalho analisa o diálogo entre Cass Sunstein e Ronald Dworkin. Enquanto Dworkin desenvolveu uma abordagem da prática jurídica como a continuação de uma grande teoria baseada em valores morais, Sunstein recomenda um caminho supostamente mais modesto, baseado em passos obtidos em acordos que pudessem ser alcançados por pessoas com convicções morais diversas. A escolha por esse caminho é justificada não só por razões institucionais, mas também por razões morais e políticas substantivas. A crítica central de Sunstein a Dworkin é um suposto ponto cego quanto às questões de capacidade institucional. Sunstein pode ser lido de duas maneiras: como um autor essencialmente pragmático (e incompatível com Dworkin) ou como um interpretativista ao modo Dworkiniano. Conforme o caso, os contornos do seu diálogo com Dworkin são diferentes. De acordo com a primeira leitura, o argumento do ponto cego levantado por Sunstein tem o objetivo de desqualificar todo o projeto teórico Dworkiniano, na medida em que o problema das capacidades institucionais seria tomado como fundamento para um tipo específico de ceticismo moral, o que inutilizaria o critério de correção moral que embasa o interpretativismo Dworkiniano. Essa visão considera que o debate entre Sunstein e Dworkin seria um capítulo do debate entre Dworkin e os pragmatistas céticos. Nos termos da segunda leitura, Sunstein não é um cético na verdade, ele pressupõe um interpretativismo Dworkiniano e sua posição é complementar à obra de Dworkin. No capítulo I, analiso alguns trabalhos centrais de Sunstein e concluo que ele é melhor lido como um Dworkiniano, visto sua teoria pressupõe valores independentes. No capítulo II, estudo os principais pontos da teoria do direito de Dworkin e sugiro que o conceito de integridade, entendido como um conceito corretivo que serve para construir um sistema judicial no qual os juízes podem barganhar uma concepção de justiça ideal por outros fatores do mundo real, indica que a teoria Dworkiniana pode sim ser sensível às questões empíricas e de capacidade institucional. No capítulo III, identifico os pontos do confronto direto entre Sunstein e Dworkin e exponho o proveito que pode ser extraído do estudo desse debate. / This dissertation analyzes the dialogue between Cass Sunstein and Ronald Dworkin. While Dworkin developed an approach that sees the legal practice as a continuum of a greater theory based on moral values, Sunstein recommends a supposedly more modest approach, based on steps obtained in agreements which could be achieved by people holding different moral convictions. The choice of this path is justified not only for institutional reasons, but also for moral and political reasons. The central criticism of Sunstein against Dworkin is a \"blind spot\" with respect to the institutional capacities of judges. Sunstein can be read in two ways: as an essentially pragmatist author (and incompatible with Dworkin) or as an interpretative Dworkinian. As the case may be, the contours of his debate with Dworkin are different. Under to the first reading, the \"blind spot\" argument raised by Sunstein aims to disqualify any Dworkinian theoretical project to the extent that the problem of institutional capacities should be taken as the basis for a specific type of moral skepticism, which would deny the claim to moral correctness that supports Dworkinian interpretativism. In this case, that the debate between Dworkin and Sunstein should be seen as a chapter of the debate between Dworkin and the skeptic legal pragmatists. Under the the second reading, Sunstein is not a skeptic - in fact, he presupposes a Dworkinian interpretativism and his position is complementary to Dworkins work. In Chapter I, I analyze Sunsteins central work on legal interpretation and conclude that he is best read as a Dworkinian, as his theory assumes independent values. In Chapter II, I study the main points of Dworkins jurisprudence and I suggest that the concept of integrity, understood as a \"corrective\" concept used to build a judicial system in which judges can bargain an ideal conception of justice by other factors of the real world, indicates that Dworkin´s theory can be sensitive to the empirical institutional capacities raised by Sunstein. In Chapter III, identify the points of direct confrontation between Sunstein and Dworkin and explain the agenda that can be extracted from the debate.

Humans have now amassed a sizable knowledge of widespread, nonconscious cognitive biases which affect our behavior, especially in social and economic contexts. I contend that a democratic government is uniquely justified in using knowledge of cognitive biases to promote pro-democratic behavior, conditionally justified in using it to accomplish ends traditionally within the scope of government authority, and unjustified in using it for any other purpose. I also contend that the government ought to redesign institutional infrastructure to avoid triggering cognitive biases where it is not permitted intentionally to manipulate such biases and to optimize the effects of such biases where permissible. I shall use the United States of America as an example throughout, but my conclusions apply equally to any democracy which values the political autonomy of its populace.

Background: Very occasionally, when a fetus is developing in the womb, problems occur with the normal processes controlling closure of the muscles of the abdominal wall and, as a result, some of the abdominal contents develop outside of the body. This is known as an abdominal wall defect. If the pregnancy continues to term, the newborn infant will need specialised surgical care. This situation occurs so infrequently that even a dedicated surgical centre will care for very few of these women and their babies in a year. Many centres have shared their experiences of managing these babies in the published literature but the majority of reports have included only a few infants. The focus of most previous studies has been to describe what happens to these newborn infants between birth and first discharge from hospital from a purely clinical perspective. Aim: To explore methodologies to holistically understand the short and longer-term outcomes of children born with abdominal wall defects and to use the information to improve the care of future affected infants. Methods: The quality of the published literature on short-term outcomes of children born with gastroschisis was scrutinised in a systematic review. The accompanying meta-analysis used published data as a means of identifying population outcome estimates. Two national population-based cohort studies were undertaken, exploring the short-term outcomes of children born with exomphalos and the outcomes at seven to ten years of children born with gastroschisis. The latter study included an assessment of childhood outcomes from the point of view of the children themselves, along with their parents. Further parental perspectives on experiences of care were explored in a qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews with parents of children born with exomphalos. Findings: Short-term outcomes of children born with gastroschisis have been published in a large number of small studies. Pooling the published data, where possible allowed the production of population estimates but heterogeneity between studies was marked. One in fourteen children born with gastroschisis died before their first birthday when managed in developed countries. Those who developed bowel complications in utero, had an increased risk of dying before one-year. The assessment of childhood outcomes for this latter group of children, who made up 11% of the population cohort, revealed a bleak outlook for many, of with one in three either dying or requiring complex surgery to gain allow them to be able to be fed via their gut, before their ninth birthday. Due to methodological limitations, the extent of neurological and gastrointestinal morbidity among survivors in the cohort is unclear, but the findings of both the highly selected responses from the parent report and those of the clinical study provide enough concern to suggest that alternative methodologies need to be explored to identify the extent of ongoing sequelae as children grow older. The live-born population of children with exomphalos is highly varied and a large burden of comorbidity was identified, however, two-thirds of infants were able to be have their abdominal wall defect surgically closed with a low-rate of early complications. A variety of techniques are employed by UK surgeons when the defect cannot be easily closed and evidence to guide management choice will be difficult to obtain using standard techniques due to the small number of these infants born annually in the UK. Parental experiences echoed the variability in management approach and in some cases highlighted a lack of respect for parental perspectives on management choice. Conclusion: Children born with abdominal wall defects represent a spectrum from those with severe comorbidity who will need ongoing care, to those who have a straightforward course and a relatively short stay in hospital. Methods of risk-stratifying infants for the purposes of outcome assessment have been explored. This approach is crucial to contextualising the progress of an individual infant and counselling their parents about their likely prognosis.

News CASS (fall, 1994), a newsletter of the Center for Appalachian Studies and Services at East Tennessee State University. / https://dc.etsu.edu/news-cass/1000/thumbnail.jpg