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企業CEO之權力型態與融資偏好關聯性之研究-以上市公司為例 / CEO Power Type and Preference on Financing Instruments-Evidences from Listed Companies in Taiwan鍾依玲 Unknown Date (has links)
在企業中擔任領導者的CEO,對於公司決策之執行具有重大影響力,對於擁有不同權力型態之CEO,在公司面臨外部資金需求時,是否因其自身的條件因素,而影響其作出不同的融資決策。本研究之CEO權力乃參考Finkelstein(1992)與Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia(2002)之定義,將CEO權力分類為專家知識權力、聲望權力、結構權力與所有權權力四種型態,以2006至2015年的台灣上市公司為樣本,探討CEO之權力型態如何影響公司外部融資偏好。研究結果顯示,具備不同權力之CEO會因其權力指標不同而作出不同的融資決策,高聲望權力與高所有權之CEO傾向權益融資為主,高專家知識權力與高結構權力的CEO則選擇優先採取負債融資之方式。 / CEO plays a key role in forming a variety of business strategies. This study investigates the relation between CEO power type and preference on financing instruments when company needs external funds.
Based on Finkelstein(1992), Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia’s(2002), the CEO power is classified as four types: expert knowledge power, reputation power, structure power and ownership power. In addressing how CEO power type influences her/his preference on financing instruments, this sample consists of all listed companies in Taiwan for the period for 2006 to 2015.
The empirical result indicated that CEO power type does matter in choosing financing instrument. CEO with high reputation power or high ownership power prefers equity financing while those with high expert knowledge power or high structure power prefer liability financing.
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