Zugl.: Trier, Univ., Diss., 2008

No description available.

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No description available.

Imagine un sistema legal en el que se reconozca que la jurisprudencia constitucional es fuente de Derecho y que como tal, debe ser respetada no solo por todos los jueces, sino por todos los funcionarios y órganos del Estado. Imagine además, que en este sistema legal la corte que emite los precedentes cuenta con la potestad de seleccionar qué sentencias merecen el carácter de precedentes vinculantes y cuáles no. Por si fuera poco, dicho sistema legal, preocupado por generar seguridad jurídica al milímetro, concibe la parte vinculante del precedente como un instrumento que se expresa bajo la fórmula de una regla claramente delimitada, elegida por la misma corte que dicta el precedente. Los mecanismos para hacer cumplir el precedente constitucional de este sistema legal son muy rígidos y por lo tanto eficaces. No solo se conmina a los jueces a seguir cabalmente las reglas generales que contienen la parte vinculante del precedente constitucional, sino que se castiga con nulidad a las sentencias que, habiendo adquirido carácter de cosa juzgada, no siguieron el contenido vinculante del precedente. Incluso, se han establecido normas administrativas de sanción dirigidas a aquellos jueces que desobedecen el precedente constitucional, que pueden conducir a la destitución de dichos magistrados. Imagine ahora un segundo sistema legal en el cual la discusión acerca de si la jurisprudencia es una fuente de Derecho o no, resulta irrelevante. En este segundo sistema legal los casos considerados precedentes son usados como argumentos que acompañan a las pretensiones de las partes, manteniéndose abiertos a la interpretación que el juez crea conveniente aplicar. Imagine también, que en este sistema legal un precedente es dejado de lado inmediatamente si una ley dictada por el Parlamento postula el sentido contrario de lo que dicta el precedente judicial. Respecto a las sanciones, este segundo sistema legal no cuenta con una disposición normativa que obligue a los jueces a fundamentar con razones claras y prolijas las sentencias que expiden. Por supuesto, en este sistema legal tampoco se conoce de ninguna norma administrativa que sancione –y menos destituya- a ningún juez por no seguir un precedente específico, ni siquiera el de la Corte Suprema. / Tesis

Digitalisation and convergence continue to transform the ways in which audio-visual content is supplied and consumed. This thesis examines the implications for the legacy regulatory frameworks of the analogue era. It explores the relationship between the prevailing approach to concurrent regulation under sector-specific legislation and general competition law, and the competitive conditions for the supply of premium pay-TV in the UK and Australia. Theories of harm for the assessment of market power relating to horizontal concentration of ownership, exclusive rights and refusal to supply, are also reviewed. Whilst acknowledging an enduring role for sector-specific regulation, the thesis advocates an increasing residual role for the enforcement of general competition law. This is supported by the reinforcing effects of digitalisation and convergence upon the network industry aspect of pay-TV and the multi-sided platform characteristics of pay-TV providers. The thesis identifies the need for greater emphasis on the dynamic aspect of competition in the premium pay-TV context. This calls for a broader conceptualisation of competition which critically reflects the growth of online streaming, the global phenomenon around premium drama and the rise of multi-media firms in a global communications sector. These findings are significant and timely because failure to employ a sufficiently broad concept of effective competition may perversely deter competitive conduct and unduly impede the investment incentives that are critical to premium pay-TV. It may also produce outcomes that are ostensibly inconsistent with the normative basis for sector-specific regulation. The thesis suggests reform at the interface between sector-specific legislation and general competition law, and refinement of the principles of competition law in their application to premium pay-TV. In doing so, it proposes a model of regulation which aims to more effectively balance the shared interest of viewers, as consumers and citizens, in the future development of pay-TV and the wider communications sector.

This thesis explores the impact of the cuts to civil legal aid introduced by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act (2012) (“LASPO”) on the ability of those who are vulnerable to access justice. In doing so it focuses on the experience of UK Law Centres, a network of not-for-profit providers of legal advice and representation. Law Centres were established in the 1970’s as a response to acknowledged deficiencies in the legal aid scheme that existed at this time. Principal amongst these deficiencies was the failure of the scheme to provide legal assistance to those individuals who were most in need of it. Since their inception Law Centres have developed a reputation for specialising in the delivery of legal services to marginalised communities, making them an ideal lens through which to observe the impact of cuts to legal aid on the vulnerable. This thesis explores the relationship between the Law Centres movement and the legal aid scheme; characterising this as one of reluctant yet increasing dependency. By the time LASPO was introduced, contracts for the delivery of legal aid comprised 46% of the funding for Law Centres in England and Wales, leaving Law Centres highly exposed to the swingeing cuts brought about by this legislation. The thesis seeks to understand the impact of LASPO on Law Centres as a movement, and in particular on their ability to deliver services to those individuals who are most vulnerable. In the absence of a consensus definition of what a Law Centre is, the thesis reviews the extant literature on the Law Centres movement to propose an “ideal type” framework of Law Centre values, which can be used as a tool against which to evaluate the impact of different strategies for surviving the cuts. It proposes a novel definition of vulnerability, to assist in assessing whether the strategies adopted by Law Centres in response to LASPO are likely to prove more or less effective in enabling the movement to prioritise delivering their services to those who are in greatest need. The thesis then uses these analytical tools to evaluate the three most popular funding models adopted by Law Centres in response to the cuts, drawing on original empirical research. The thesis concludes that if Law Centres wish to retain both their unique position within the landscape of legal service providers and their ability to support those in greatest need, their response to LASPO must by driven by cognisance of and fidelity to the values that render them distinctive.

No description available.

This thesis examines common-law and civil-law jurisdictions in order to find differences between them. These differences are then being qualified as either relevant or irrelevant for the categorisation of individual jurisdictions. This reflects the argument that only features occurring in only one of the legal families can be relevant when categorising jurisdictions. Only such features can be, from the author’s point of view, specific and typical for their legal family and inherent features of them.The first thing to be considered under this premise is the respective sources of law (Chapter 1). These are in civil-law jurisdictions traditionally statutes and in commonlaw jurisdictions predominantly courts’ decisions. There are, of course, statutes also in common-law jurisdictions and previous courts’ decisions play an important role also in civil-law systems. The differences are not inherent. Furthermore, there are fundamental legal concepts, that is important concepts underlying the respective rules. These concepts may explain differences between the rules. The examination of sources of law, altogether, does not reveal any distinguishing factors.Chapters 2–5 discuss the issue of attitudes of common-law and civil-law judges to statutory interpretation. Chapter 2 examines the respective methods of statutory interpretation. This does not reveal any differences as to common-law and civil-law judges’ attitudes; for instance, greater adherence of common-law judges to the literal meaning of rules arguably does not exist. As shown in Chapter 3, this is true also in the area of Criminal Law under the special safeguards this subject provides. Chapter 4 asserts terminology causes differences between the systems; this is true even in case of identical terminology which is sometimes being interpreted in a diametrically different way. Moreover, differences can also be compensated for elsewhere in the legal system. Altogether, Chapter 4 does not reveal any inherent differences between the systems. As Chapter 5 shows, there is an ongoing process of convergence between common-law and civil-law systems, which means the categorisation into legal families becomes even less plausible.Chapter 6 shows that the categorisation into legal families is not only incorrect but also highly misleading and that there are numerous scholarly statements relying incorrectly on the family concept. The proposition (Chapter 7) is that it may nevertheless be feasible to structure comparative-law texts according to the wellknown legal families, as these show a common historical background. However, for conducting research into particular foreign legal rules (micro-comparative research), the family concept becomes a misleading starting-point. Insofar the concept should be abandoned or, at least, used only together with an appropriate warning.

Thesis (LL.M. (Labour Law))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2008.