Parenthood is generally marked as a joyous event, though some research indicates that the birth of a child can possibly involve a difficult and complicated adjustment period for new parents (Ceballo, Lansford, Abbey, & Stewart, 2004). Questions regarding heritage and biological ties typically occur after developmental milestones, for example, births, marriages, and deaths, for adult adoptees. Horowitz (2011) offered that in order to understand the uniqueness of adoptees’ experiences and the specific needs they may have during childhood, it is vital to study the entire adoptee trajectory into adulthood, in order for adoptive parents and society to prepare successfully and launch adoptees into adulthood. This study explored how adult adoptees view parenthood through the lens of their own upbringing in Canada. There are gaps of information in the literature on how adoptees undertake parenting and how they approach becoming parents. In addition, how adoptees recognize themselves in their own children whether their children are adopted or not and how adoptees bond with their children. This study is an effort to address this gap offering recommendations for future research. Using an attachment theory framework while employing a mixed methods approach through an exploratory-sequential design, highlighted results include: adult adoptees struggle with identity issues and their adoption experiences do impacted the way they become parents and how they view themselves as parents.

The study reported in this dissertation compares the learning effectiveness of two experimental methods that can be used in the teaching of kinematics to Grade 11 learners in Physical Science. The first method is the conventional ticker-timer experiment, while the second utilises high-technology microcomputer-based equipment. The purpose is to make recommendations for improved teaching of basic kinematics concepts and graphs, which learners have difficulties with (Halloun & Hestenes, 1985; McDermott et al., 1987). A group of 48 Grade 11 learners from Thuto-Boswa Secondary School, Ventersdorp, were used in the empirical research. They were divided into two groups of comparable abilities. Group A used the conventional apparatus and group B the microcomputerbased apparatus. The results of the pre- and post-tests were analysed statistically to compare the learning effectiveness of the two methods in terms of the outcomes reached, the gains obtained as well as d-values. Three months after the experiments were conducted the learners were tested again to determine the long-term effect of the methods. Both groups obtained a gain of approximately 0,2 in the pre- versus post-test analysis. The literature (e.g. Thornton, 1998) reveals larger gains with microcomputer-based experiments. Three possible reasons that could contribute to this discrepancy were investigated, namely the learners' acquaintance with the microcomputer, the educator's experience with the apparatus as well as the learners' cultural background and language. All three these factors were found to have a detrimental effect on the learning effectiveness, especially with the microcomputer-based method. Recommendations are made in connection with the teaching of basic kinematics concepts and graphs to Grade 11 learners in South African secondary schools. In addition, it is emphasised that educators should be adequately computer literate before expensive high-technology equipment is purchased for classroom use. It is also pointed out that the implementation of the computer as teaching aid can be a first step to improve computer literacy of disadvantaged learners in our schools. / Thesis (M.Ed.)--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2004.

This thesis argues that one can fruitfully think of Nelson Goodman's New Riddle of Induction as a reductio ad absurdum of a certain set of views of the relationship between similarities, on the one hand, and properties, concepts, or predicates, on the other. It argues that any view which takes similarities between particulars to be most fundamentally explained by those objects' sharing a property, satisfying a concept, or falling under a predicate leaves itself without the resources to provide a satisfying answer to a Goodmanian sceptic who proposes that inductive inferences using "grue" are equally as warranted as those using "green". I argue for an alternative view of similarity and inductive warrant which holds that the content of perceptual experience includes non-conceptual content the satisfaction conditions of which include that concept-independent similarities obtain. I argue further that it is only on the basis of that non-conceptual content that we are able satisfactorily to distinguish predicates like "grue" from those like "green." We must make such a distinction if we are to provide an acceptable account of inductive warrant. In the course of developing this view, I critique a range of mainstream, contemporary accounts of the relationship between similarities, concepts and properties, and of the role of perceptual experience in justifying empirical beliefs. Chapter 1 argues for a realist view of similarities between particulars which takes our concepts of properties to spring from our observations of those similarities. This view is contrasted with David Armstrong's universal realism, which is rejected. Chapter 2 argues that Goodman's approach to his New Riddle based on entrenchment fails, and argues that if and only if one embraces the view of similarity and concepts that I favor then the New Riddle can be reduced to traditional Humean concerns about induction. Chapters 3 through 5 discuss difficulties for Donald Davidson's approach to the New Riddle, his account of the justification of empirical belief, and his rejection of the very idea of a conceptual scheme, tracing each of these difficulties to Davidson's view that similarities must always be understood in terms of concepts under which particulars fall. Using John McDowell's Mind and World as an example, Chapter 6 argues that any account of perceptual justification of empirical belief according to which the content of perception is limited to conceptual content will fall into the New Riddle, while accounts which permit non-conceptual content can avoid this problem.

The acquisition of relational concepts plays an integral role and is assumed to be a prerequisite for analogical reasoning. Language and token-trained apes (e.g. Premack, 1976; Thompson, Oden, and Boysen, 1997) are the only nonhuman animals to succeed in solving and completing analogies, thus implicating language as the mechanism enabling the phenomenon. In the present study, I examine the role of meaning in the analogical reasoning abilities of three different primate species. Humans, chimpanzees, and rhesus monkeys completed relational match-to-sample (RMTS) tasks with either meaningful or nonmeaningful stimuli. For human participants, meaningfulness facilitated the acquisition of analogical rules. Individual differences were evident amongst the chimpanzees suggesting that meaning can either enable or hinder their ability to complete analogies. Rhesus monkeys did not succeed in either condition, suggesting that their ability to reason analogically, if present at all, may be dependent upon a dimension other than the representational value of stimuli.

This thesis examines the effects of linguistic input on the development of children’s epistemic concepts. It draws upon two fundamental questions in the field of cognitive development: (a) whether distinctions between automatic and controlled forms of cognitive processing are indicative of underlying conceptual differences, and (b) whether language is critical to the process of concept development. To establish the background of the current research, a summary of how these theoretical questions have been addressed in other fields of cognitive psychology is first provided (Chapter 1). These questions are then re- examined within the specific domain of epistemic concept development (Chapter 2). Changes in false-belief processing that occur between infancy and the early preschool years are discussed in relation to two competing theories of false-belief development. A framework to explain how language promotes children’s transition between automatic and controlled forms of processing is then provided. It is suggested that language facilitates change by both reducing the cognitive demands associated with controlled response tasks as well as assisting with the formation of robust epistemic representations. An empirical study that was designed to examine the effects of epistemic language (i.e., verbs and syntax) on children’s automatic and controlled processing of belief is then described (Chapters 3 to 5). Eighty-four children (Mage = 3;5 years), who initially failed elicited measures of false-belief, were trained with visual contexts of true- and false-belief. The critical manipulation across three conditions was the linguistic input presented in conjunction with these contexts. Children heard narrations that contained either (a) the description of an agent’s actions without an epistemic verb, (b) a familiar epistemic verb (thinks) across both contexts, or (c) the familiar epistemic verb in contexts of true-belief and a novel epistemic verb (gorps) in contexts of false-belief. Results demonstrated a significant advantage for children who were trained with epistemic verbs on spontaneous measures of false-belief (i.e., anticipatory gaze). Significant effects of epistemic verb exposure were also demonstrated in novel contexts of belief induction. Implications of these findings are discussed in relation to theories that make distinct predictions about the role of language in epistemic concept development (Chapter 6).

This dissertation is about biological sex and how we ought to make sense of it. By biological sex I mean those elements of an individual’s body that are involved in reproduction of the individual’s species; by make sense of it I mean the way in which the occurrence of these elements and their interactions are conceptualized in our minds. Given certain things that are known about sex and reproduction, I argue in this dissertation that sex, maleness, and femaleness ought to be conceptualized in a specific way: this specific way is what I call the multidimensional model of sex. My argument challenges what I call the folk understanding of biological sex, which is (generally speaking) the understanding that most people in most places have about what makes a person male or female. This understanding, I argue, takes the concepts MALE and FEMALE to be logically opposed and atomistic, and constitutive of categories with homogeneous members. I explore three important facts that challenge this understanding: 1) the emphasis on continuity within biological thought, 2) the understanding of sex differences within biology, and 3) the occurrence of intersexuality in human beings. Some authors have already proposed continuum-based understandings of SEX as a replacement for the folk understanding. I identify and discuss three of these: 1) the basic continuum model (Fausto-Sterling 1993, 2000; Blackless, et al. 2000; Kessler 1998; Preves 2003; Intersex Society of North America 2011a; Organisation International des Intersexués 2011a), 2) the multiple continua model (Stoltenberg 1989), and 3) the hybrid model (Stein 2001; Dreger 1998). Inherent to different degrees within each of these models is the belief that maleness and femaleness are somehow conceptually opposite (which is a belief also shared by the folk understanding). This belief, I argue, is not borne out in nature, as demonstrated in part by the occurrence of intersexuality in the species Homo sapiens, and the occurrence of hermaphroditism in other species. These occurrences, I argue, suggest another way to make sense of sex. The model of sex that I present is inspired by the occurrence of intersexuality and hermaphroditism, and also by Sandra Bem’s (1974) work on the concept ANDROGYNY. Bem reconceptualized masculinity and femininity as dimensions of psychological androgyny. I argue that the concepts MALE and FEMALE, and thus BIOLOGICAL SEX, can be understood in a similar way. I propose a multidimensional model of SEX that includes the concepts MALE and FEMALE as intersecting continua that create a space in which the separate features of an individual’s sex are each individually located. The dissertation concludes by discussing the moral implications of the multidimensional model, as some of our judgments about the rightness or wrongness of a person’s actions are related to our understanding of that person’s sex. But if the words male and female come to refer to individual parts of the body and not whole people (as I argue they would, if the multidimensional model were adopted), how would our ideas about the moral acceptability of certain actions and practices change? By examining this general question, I show that adoption of the multidimensional model of sex is important not just because it offers a more biologically accurate representation of sex: it is also important, I conclude, because there is good reason to think that adopting it could improve the quality of life for many.

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No description available.

Music educators are continually striving to find a comprehensive curriculum to adequately cover developments made in music. It could be argued that, at present, Victorian music curriculum places more emphasis on the aesthetics of music education rather than the learning of music concepts. This researcher firmly believes that the concepts of music are the building blocks through which children become better musicians. Researchers, music educators and curriculum designers must understand the way in which concept knowledge develops in children, so that they can use this knowledge in order to create meaningful learning experiences. The aim of this study, therefore, is to find out whether the acquisition of concepts, particularly rhythm, pitch, harmony and melody can be directly related to development in children, specifically primary aged children in State Government schools in Victoria.

Analogies have long been tools of discovery in mathematics and science, and are often used in the classroom as explanatory devices to help students understand difficult science concepts. However, research has shown that for many students, analogies engender misconceptions rather than scientists' science. It is believed that misconceptions arise when students reconstruct their knowledge within the context of their prior conceptions, and that misconceptions arise whenever the student has a different conception of the analog to the teacher or the student applies the analogy beyond its limits.The literature is richly endowed with descriptions of how it is thought that analogies generate meaning and contain a range of suggestions for improving classroom pedagogy when analogies are used. Five teaching models have been identified which claim to improve analogical instruction, and one of these, the teaching-with-analogies (TWA) model (Glynn, 1989) has been modified at the Science and Mathematics Education Centre of Curtin University for use in secondary science classrooms. To date, no empirical studies have been performed to determine the efficacy of this modified TWA model.This study set out to evaluate the modified TWA model in a qualitative interpretive manner by observing teachers, who had been in-serviced about the model, using analogies in their lessons. Data were generated from the verbatim transcripts of each teacher's in-class performance, each teacher's post-lesson interview and interviews with a number of the students who received the analogical instruction. The emergent data were interpreted from a constructivist perspective with attention being given to credibility, dependability and confirmability.The data derived from one teacher teaching four analogies to Year 8 and 10 science students were reported in this thesis. Three of these analogies were taught using ++ / the modified TWA model and these analogies were, light waves are like water waves, conduction of heat in a solid is like the domino effect and the refraction of light as it passes from air into perspex is like a pair of wheels rolling from a smooth surface onto a rough surface. The fourth analogy in which the size of a mole was illustrated using three brief analogies was reported only briefly because the teacher failed to use the modified TWA model during this lesson.The study's findings demonstrated that student understanding of difficult science concepts did appear to be enhanced by the use of the modified TWA model when analogies were included in the lesson. For analogies to be effective, it is believed that two teacher activities are essential: firstly, ensuring that the students understand the analog in the same way as the teacher and secondly, that the unshared attributes of the analogy are highlighted during the lesson. It is also asserted that an exemplary teacher, teaching-in-field, can integrate the modified TWA model into her teaching if she is provided with peer support over at least three to four uses of the model during normal lessons. It appears that maintenance of the TWA model within a teacher's pedagogy requires a supportive colleague to provide critical feedback and encouragement.This study raised some important questions that should be addressed in future research on the use of the modified TWA model. Can the modified TWA model produce conceptual change where alternative student conceptions are firmly entrenched? Can the modified TWA model be incorporated into the pedagogy of most teachers? Is there a more appropriate model for teaching-with-analogies?