The Kamerun Plebiscites of 1959-1961 were crucial to the rise and development of Western Kamerun nationalism. Some of the factors which shaped the events connected with that phenomenon can be traced' back to the pre-colonial period. Others emerged from the activities of the colonizers in the region during the colonial and trust period. But, it was against the British activities that a few Western-educated Southern Kamerunians, the political leaders, reacted and, in the 1940s, developed a nationalist movement. In 1953, these new leaders, who had made little headway in their demands of the British, involved the traditional leaders, the a-Fon, in the nationalist movement. The a-Fon who commanded the loyalty and support of most of the region's inhabitants, significantly strengthened and influenced the movement henceforth. During that crucial period, however, the movement witnessed several conflicts over policy regarding the future of Western Kamerun. In Northern Kamerun, the local authorities advocated integration with Nigeria while some dissident local Fulani and the a-Fon demanded secession from it. In Southern Kamerun, some political leaders stressed integration with Nigeria, others favoured secession from it and ultimate reunification of Kamerun, and, yet, others emphasized immediate secession and reunification. On the other hand, the a-Fon requested secession without reunification. Thus, there were fundamental differences among the political leaders and between them and the traditional rulers. During this period, the political leaders defined and redefined their varying programmes in an effort to win over the Crowned Princes who refused to budge. Realizing the firmness of the a-Fon, backed by massive support from the electorate, the organizers concentrated their efforts at the United Nations where they manipulated, confused, and engineered a split within its members. The division within the United Nations and among the organizers forced that organization to concentrate on reaching a compromise rather than finding out what the majority of the Western Kamerunians desired. The outcome of this approach was adverse decisions: in the case of Northern Kamerun, where the electorate, after the first plebiscite, had mistaken the reformed local administration for secession from Nigeria, the United Nations refused to postpone the second plebiscite, and, in the case of Southern Kamerun, it left out secession without reunification, the most popular view, from the plebiscite despite numerous appeals and protests from both regions. In the ensuing confusion in the North and dissatisfaction in the South, the electorate asked and answered their own questions at the plebiscites, interpreting the United Nations' questions to suit their local conditions and circumstances. This interpreting process was to be expected. In most plebiscites and elections, electors ask and answer their own questions, often with little reference to the larger issues, but the timing of the second plebiscite in the North and the unfortunate wording of the plebiscite questions in the context of politics in the South, contributed not only a good deal of confusion to the proceedings, but also significantly impeded the process of self-determination. Moreover, the conduct of the plebiscites, themselves, was characterized by the abuse of power by those interested groups in and out of authority, and by suspicion and accusation which were sometimes justifiable and sometimes not. Furthermore, the plebiscite undermined the Concert of the Crowned Princes, the symbol of Southern Kamerun unity, and left sections of the region standing at a distance from, and threatening, each other. Not only had the trust system ended in Western Kamerun on an uncertain note, but the United Nations had been less than effective in applying the principle of self-determination. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

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The research problem is an analysis of the political evolution of Cameroon from a colony in 1884 to an independent state in 1961. It involves not only the transition of the country from a colony to an independent state per se, but also the various factors which kindled the rise of nationalism in the country. The problem is rendered more interesting and complex by the fact that the country had, at different times in its colonial history, been a German colony, as well as British and French colonies – although technically Britain and France administered their respective portions of the country first as mandates of the League of Nations and then as trusteeship territories of the United Nations Organization. In order to study the problem, an analysis of the political and economic policies of the colonizing powers in the country is imperative, since they were the determining factors which conditioned the country’s political destiny until 1961.

Just as conflict is part of everyday life, mediation can and is practiced everyday and everywhere. It is a way of reaching decisions in a cooperative, non-hierarchical way, allowing for clear and open communication processes. Conflicts can be resolved in a formal manner through courts, arbitration, ombudspeople, diplomacy and mediation, or an informal manner through friends, colleagues, religious and community leaders, and dialogue. The way in which people resolve their disputes has an impact on how societies and institutions are governed. The war in Bakassi has taken its toll on the people of that area for several years now and has witnessed people from Bakassi facing some of the worst effects of armed conflict known to man. This study investigated the use of international mediation in the management of intractable conflict with a specific case study on the Bakassi peninsula conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria. It focused on the mediation process as a conflict management technique in relation to the international relations theories which has been used as a basis for conflict resolution practices. The researcher conducted a document review, content analysis on selected documents and this was supported by strategic interviews. The findings as well as the researcher‘s recommendations are discussed in the study in order to assist the future work of conflict management specialists and other stakeholders who have devoted their efforts to the recovery of areas emerging from conflict.

Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / Bibliography / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This research has used a critical discourse analysis approach encompassing postcolonial theory and theory of media effects in order to investigate the influence of political discourse in the media upon youth’s violence in Cameroon. As a result it has been found that the use of private violence by young people in urban cities has become ordinary. Such an attitude reflects among other some aspects of youth’s lifestyle designed to cope with the hardship of their social status and to resist the elite’s dominance. While no counter-narrative has been found in the independent publications about the portrayal of youth’s violence as criminal by the state-owned press, the young people nevertheless have produced through a street culture a narrative deconstructing the political discourse in the media and highlighting their grievances in a more or less violent tone. Thus the use of private violence during the riot in February 2008, is far from an isolated (re)action of angry young people , it obeys the very practicality of their existence and the political turmoil it might cause is incidental to the way of life in which it is embedded. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die navorsing het ‘n kritiese diskoers analise-benadering gebruik wat ‘n postkoloniale teorie en ‘n teorie van media-effekte insluit om sodoende die invloed van politieke diskoers in die media op jeuggeweld in Kameroen, te ondersoek. Daar is gevolglik gevind dat die gebruik van private geweld deur jongmense in stedelike gebiede normaal geword het. So ‘n houding reflekteer onder andere sommige aspekte van die jeug se leefstyl wat ontwerp is om die ontbering van hul sosiale status te hanteer en ook die elite se dominasie te weerstaan. Ofskoon geen teen-narratief sover gevind is in die onafhanklike publikasies oor die uitbeelding van jeuggeweld as krimineel en die publikasies van die staatsbeheerde pers wat die jeug uitbeeld met min agentskap nie, het jongmense wel ‘n teen-narratief geskep deur ‘n straat-kultuur. Hierdie teen-narratief dekonstruktueer die politieke diskoers in die media en onderstreep hul griewe in ‘n geweldadige toon. Dus die gebruik van private geweld gedurende die onluste in Februarie 2008, wat nie as ‘n geïsoleerde (re)aksie van woedende jongmense gesien kan word nie, is getrou aan die wese van hulle bestaan en die politieke onrus wat dit moontlik mag veroorsaak, is bykomstig tot die leefstyl waarin dit vasgelê is.”