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1	THE DEMOCRACY OF POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE AMERICAN STATES Eom, Kihong 01 January 2003 (has links) The intention of campaign finance regulations was to reduce the influence of special interest groups while increasing citizen contributions. Critics have suggested an unintentional consequence of this policy of increasing bias in campaign contributions in favor of incumbents. These claims of intentional and unintentional consequences, however, have rarely been tested. My dissertation examines the intentional and unintentional consequences of campaign finance regulations in the American states. This study adopts a theoretical framework emphasizing the different effects of regulations on two distinctive types of contributors. A particularistic contributor, whose motivation is influencing policy, is likely to be affected by contribution limits. A universalistic contributor, motivated by helping his or her favorite candidates, is not likely to respond to regulations. Furthermore, the disparity of contributions is not expected to be affected by contribution limits. Two specific hypotheses reflecting the theoretical consideration are tested: 1) Restrictive contribution limits reduce the number and amount of particularistic contributions and increase the disparity between the numbers as well as the amounts of contributions, and 2) Contribution limits do not affect the number, the amount, or the disparities of universalistic contributions. Individual contribution records on gubernatorial elections are collected from 1990 to 2000 in 42 states. After aggregating individual contribution records by state and candidate, two analyses are conducted at the state and candidate level. The results indicate that campaign finance regulations work without the unintentional consequence of providing a financial advantage to incumbents at both the state and candidate levels. Contribution limits increase the number of total contributors, reduce the number and amount of particularistic contributions, and increase the number of universalistic contributors. In addition, further analyses show a dynamic effect of contribution limits on corporations, labor unions, individuals, parties, and ideology PACs. Restrictive contribution limits reduce the number and amount of corporate contributions, but only reduce the amount of labor union contributions. On the other hand, strict contribution limits encourage individual contributions, but discourage party and ideological PAC contributions. The intentional consequence of campaign finance regulations does not result in the unintentional consequence of increasing bias in favor of incumbents. These findings suggest that current regulations that limit campaign contributions should remain in place.
2	Lobbying Regulation in Canada and the United States: Political Influence, Democratic Norms and Charter Rights Gold, Daniel 01 September 2020 (has links) Lobbying should be strictly regulated – that is the major finding of this thesis. The thesis presents many reasons to enact stricter regulations. The principle one being that, as lightly regulated as it is, lobbying is corroding democracy in both Canada and the United States. The thesis opens with a deep investigation of how lobbying works in both countries. There are examples taken from the literature, as well as original qualitative interviews of Canadian lobbyists, former politicians, and officials. Together, these make it clear that there is an intimate relationship between lobbying and campaign financing. The link between the two is sufficiently tight that lobbying and campaign financing should be considered mirrors of each other for the purposes of regulatory design and constitutional jurisprudence. They both have large impacts on government decision-making. Left lightly regulated, lobbying and campaign financing erode the processes of democracy, damage policy-making, and feed an inequality spiral into plutocracy. These have become major challenges of our time. The thesis examines the lobbying regulations currently in place. It finds the regulatory systems of both countries wanting. Since stricter regulation is required to protect democracy and equality, the thesis considers what constitutional constraints, if any, would stand in the way. This, primarily, is a study of how proposed stronger lobbying regulations would interact with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2 (free expression and association rights) and s. 3 (democratic rights). The principal findings are that legislation which restricted lobbying as proposed would probably be upheld by the Canadian court, but struck down by the American court, due to differences in their constitutional jurisprudence. The thesis contends that robust lobbying regulations would align with Canadian Charter values, provide benefits to democracy, improve government decision-making, increase equality, and create more room for citizen voices. The thesis concludes with a set of proposed principles for lobbying reform and an evaluation of two specific reforms: limits on business lobbying and funding for citizen groups. Although the thesis focuses on Canadian and American lobbying regulations, its lessons are broadly applicable to any jurisdiction that is considering regulating lobbying. Lobbying Lobbyist Pressure groups Interest groups Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Charter rights Section 2 Section 3 Freedom of expression Free speech Freedom of association Right to vote Democratic rights Structural rights Right to meaningful participation Guarantee of effective representation Charter values Canada United States Comparative Comparative constitutional rights Regulations Oversight Lobbying reform Reform ideas Code of Conduct Citizen groups Business lobbying Corporate lobbying Union lobbying Campaign finance Campaign finance donations Campaign finance regulations Shadow political parties Corruption Appearance of corruption Disclosure Hydraulic pressure of private influence Separation of business and state Political equality Voter equality

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THE DEMOCRACY OF POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE AMERICAN STATES

Lobbying Regulation in Canada and the United States: Political Influence, Democratic Norms and Charter Rights