During the 1968-1972 period attempts were made to introduce 'rationality' into the structures and processes of the Canadian Cabinet. It has usually been argued that these attempts by Prime Minister Trudeau provide an innovative and radically distinct departure from the 'diversified incrementalism' or 'crises management' decision-making under Prime Minister Pearson. Is the usual argument correct? This question is dealt with by examining in turn the role of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, the development of the committee system (with emphasis upon the Committee on Priorities and Planning), the place of the Treausury Board and especially of the Treasury Board Secretariat, the role of the Cabinet Secretariat, and the role of the Prime Minister's Office. The crucial difference between official actions and political actions is underscored in this examination. While the 1968-72 changes did establish , a more rational basis for decision-making, and may thus be seen as innovative, the changes did not amount to any radical departure — and, indeed, they were themselves the product of an incremental approach to change. While Prime Minister Trudeau presented the changes in terms of a philosophy of rationality, the actual changes must be seen as incremental extensions of changes which Prime Minister Pearson began. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

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No description available.

During the twentieth century, as Canadian voters began to associate the brand of their major political parties with the characteristics of their leaders, the Liberal Party of Canada’s leadership races evolved into events of national importance. This study examines this transformation through the 1948, 1958 and 1968 leadership conventions. It incorporates perspectives from inside the Liberal Party as well as the Canadian media’s portrayals of the conventions. This thesis explores the alternating pattern of anglophone and francophone Party leaders, the complications associated with the predictability of the outcome, the evolution of convention tactics to recruit delegate support, Party (dis)unity throughout the contests, and the political science theories that deconstruct the conventions and predict outcomes. It also details how, over time, the political ambitions of senior-ranking members trumped the interests the Liberal Party.

When I came to Canada five years ago, leaving a turbulent and politically unlucky land behind me, I knew nothing about the Canadian Senate. My interest in it does not extend farther back than three years. This comparatively short acquaintance may explain the weaknesses and the strength -- if any-- of this study. It will probably lack the insight which can only come with one's being reared and educated in the atmosphere of a particular social and political milieu with its traditions, Views and institutions. Such inside knowledge cannot possibly be acquired in the short span of a few years. Of the inevitable consequences of the absence of such native familiarity I am painfully aware. On the other hand, want of any preconceived notions may produce freedom from prejudice and encourage objectivity -- a trait particularly useful in the discussion of such a phenomenon as the Canadian Senate, which I have found fogged in an almost impenetrable cloud of partisan attitudes and biases. [...]

This thesis seeks to determine the nature and character of Canada's foreign policy towards Vietnam. / Dependent upon Southeast Asian stability for strategic resources, a merchandise surplus and the expansion of the American economy, Canada also benefitted directly through increased exports of staple goods, automotive parts and war material. / Ottawa's record on the International Control Commissions was characterized by partisan voting, complicity in the violation of the Geneva and Paris Agreements and the rationalization of Washington's strategy. / Canadian aid, dispensed only to Saigon, was a co-ordinated part of American pacification programs. / The purpose of Ottawa's policy was to ensure the permanent division of Vietnam while the ultimate intention and consequence was to legitimate the U.S. intervention. Underlying Ottawa's decision-making was Canada's integration into the world market system and the unequal, albeit voluntary, alliance between the economic elites of Canada and the United States.

This paper will rather seek to uncover and emphasize Cold War imperatives that served as significant guiding factors in shaping the Canadian response to the Suez Crisis. The success of Canadian diplomacy in the 1956 Suez Crisis was in the ability of Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson and his Canadian colleagues to protect Western interests in the context of the Cold War. Suez threatened Anglo-American unity, and the future of the North Atlantic alliance. It also presented the Soviets an opportunity to gain influence in the Middle East. The United Nations Emergency Force ensured that Britain and France had a means to extricate themselves from the Crisis. Canada wished to further protect Western credibility in the eyes of the non-white Commonwealth and Afro-Asian bloc. It was, therefore, important to focus international attention on Soviet aggression in Hungary, and not Anglo-French intervention in Egypt.

During the twentieth century, as Canadian voters began to associate the brand of their major political parties with the characteristics of their leaders, the Liberal Party of Canada’s leadership races evolved into events of national importance. This study examines this transformation through the 1948, 1958 and 1968 leadership conventions. It incorporates perspectives from inside the Liberal Party as well as the Canadian media’s portrayals of the conventions. This thesis explores the alternating pattern of anglophone and francophone Party leaders, the complications associated with the predictability of the outcome, the evolution of convention tactics to recruit delegate support, Party (dis)unity throughout the contests, and the political science theories that deconstruct the conventions and predict outcomes. It also details how, over time, the political ambitions of senior-ranking members trumped the interests the Liberal Party.

No description available.

The study, focuses on shadow cabinet organization, the practice; of appointing members to shadow the activities of cabinet ministers by Opposition parties. This practice is analyzed in Canada between 1963 and 1978, a period of continual Progressive Conservative Opposition. The underlying question is whether shadow cabinet organization has become more or less institutionalized during the period. In the introduction Samuel Huntington's four tests of institutionalization are outlined. They were used in assessing Canadian shadow cabinet institutionalization. To operationalize the tests for this study it proved useful to analyze the institution of the Canadian cabinet system along these dimensions. A comparative study of the British and Australian parliamentary systems in which the appointment of shadow cabinets is an accepted convention also helped isolate the variables to study in the Canadian context. Although the analysis centers on the period from 1963 to 1978, a brief history of Opposition organization is included. It provides the background for the period and an understanding of the roots of the present organization. The results of the study reveal that a shadow cabinet organization existed in Canada throughout the period 1963-78. For most of the 15 years its structure and practices were constantly changing. The change was in the direction of increased institutionalization on at least three of Huntington's four dimensions. On the basis of this study, therefore it is argued that shadow cabinet organization has become an established practice of at least Progressive Conservative Opposition in Canada. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate